Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

AEGIS, an insurer, appealed from the district court's denial of its motion to compel alternative dispute resolution in its dispute with UEC. The court agreed with the district court that by agreeing in the endorsement of the contract to submit to the jurisdiction of Missouri state courts, AEGIS agreed to have any dispute relating to the insurance or to the claim resolved in those courts. Thus, the endorsement entirely supplanted the condition's mandatory arbitration provision. Even if the policy as a whole were ambiguous as to the mandatory arbitration, the court concluded that UEC would still prevail because it would be entitled to have the ambiguity resolved in its favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Union Electric Co. v. AEGIS Energy Syndicate 1225" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against a check advance company, asserting claims based on numerous Florida statutes. Plaintiffs later amended the complaint to add Tiffany Kelly as an additional plaintiff and named class member. Because Kelly had signed the version of Defendant's arbitration agreement that contained a class action waiver, this case focused on her contracts with Defendant. The trial court eventually denied Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, ruling that the class action waiver was unenforceable because it was void as against public policy. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that no other reasonable avenue for relief would be available if it enforced the class action waiver. After the court of appeal decided this case, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion. Applying the rationale of Concepcion to the facts set forth in this case, the Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted invalidating the class action waiver in this case on the basis of the waiver being void as against public policy. View "McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts" on Justia Law

Norma Slater-Moore hired the Goeldner Law Firm and its attorneys to represent her in what ultimately was an unsuccessful lawsuit and its appeal. Slater-Moore and Goeldner entered into two separate contracts during the course of that litigation, both containing nearly identical provisions stating that any attorney-fee disputes would be submitted to arbitration. Slater-Moore later sued Goeldner for legal malpractice and breach of contract, disputing, among other allegations, the amount she was billed for attorney fees. Goeldner successfully moved the Circuit Court to compel arbitration of the attorney-fee dispute, and Slater-Moore appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. Because the Supreme Court found ]no grounds for revocation of a valid agreement to arbitrate the fee dispute, the Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Slater-Moore v. Goeldner" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of a video game publishing agreement entered into by Timegate and Gamecock. Under the terms of the agreement, Timegate was to be the developer and Gamecock was to be the publisher of a futuristic military-style video game entitled "Section 8." When their business relationship deteriorated, the parties proceeded with arbitration and the arbitrator awarded Gamecock monetary compensation and a perpetual license in the video game's intellectual property. The district court vacated the arbitrator's award, determining that the perpetual license was not consistent with the "essence" of the underlying contract. Because the agreement bestowed broad remedial powers upon the arbitrator and because it was fraudulently induced and irreversibly violated by Timegate, the perpetual license was a rational and permissible attempt to compensate Gamecock and maintain the agreement's essence. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded, finding that the perpetual license was a remedy that furthered the essence of the publishing agreement. View "TimeGate Studios, Inc. v. Southpeak Interactive, L.L.C., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a claim with their insurer (Insurer) for underinsured motorist benefits after a car accident. Pursuant to a provision of the insurance policy, the parties submitted the dispute to an arbitration panel. Prior to the arbitration hearing, Insurer sought broad discovery under Wis. Stat. 804. Plaintiffs refused to comply with such discovery on the grounds that Wis. Stat. 788.07 controlled and permitted only the taking of certain depositions. The arbitration panel decided that Insurer was entitled to chapter 804 discovery. The circuit court reversed and directed that arbitration discovery would proceed as allowed by section 788.07. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiffs were not allowed to seek an interlocutory appeal, and that full chapter 804 discovery was available to Insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) because no unusual circumstances justified an interlocutory appeal, Plaintiffs' action in the circuit court was premature; and (2) because Insurer failed to include an explicit, specific, and clearly drafted arbitration clause stating otherwise, discovery in this case was limited to that provided for in section 788.07. Remanded. View "Marlowe v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Whites were dealers of Kinkade’s artwork. The parties agreed to arbitrate disputes in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association. In 2002, they commenced arbitration in which Kinkade claimed that the Whites had not paid hundreds of thousands of dollars, and the Whites counterclaimed that they had been fraudulently induced to enter the agreements. Kinkade chose Ansell as its arbitrator; the Whites chose Morganroth. Together Ansell and Morganroth chose Kowalsky as the neutral who would chair the panel. The arbitration dragged on; in 2006, Kinkade discovered that the Whites’ counsel, Ejbeh, had surreptitiously sent a live feed of the hearing to a hotel room. Ejbeh’s replacement departed after being convicted of tax fraud. The Whites did not comply with discovery requests, but after closing arguments and over objections, the panel requested that the Whites supply additional briefs. The Whites and their associates then began showering Kowalsky’s law firm with business. Kinkade objected, to no avail. A series of arbitration irregularities followed, all favoring the Whites. Kowalsky entered a $1.4 million award in the Whites’ favor. The district court vacated the award on grounds of Kowalsky’s “evident partiality.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Thomas Kinkade Co. v. White" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the court considered the enforceability of an arbitration clause included in a franchise agreement between plaintiff and Shuttle Express. The court concluded that the Supreme Court's recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion required reversal of the district court's holding that the class action waiver in the franchise agreement was an unconscionable contract provision; the district court erred in holding that the other two challenged provisions of the franchise agreement also rendered the arbitration clause unconscionable; and therefore, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for entry of an order compelling arbitration. View "Muriithi v. Shuttle Express, Inc." on Justia Law

The trial court denied defendant Virginia College's motion to compel arbitration. Because the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to support a claim that they were fraudulently induced to agree to the arbitration provision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Virginia College, LLC v. Blackmon" on Justia Law

Second Chance Investments, LLC (SCI) purchased a fire insurance policy from Auto-Owners Insurance Company (Auto-Owners) that covered a building with the limit of insurance set at $2,095,500. The building subsequently suffered extensive fire damage. SCI filed a proof of loss claiming the building was a total loss. Auto-Owners rejected the proof of loss, contending that it did not state the actual cash value of the loss as required by the policy or provide a written estimate of repair to support the claim. After a continued dispute over whether the property was a total loss, Auto-Owners ultimately filed a complaint in district court seeking an order compelling SCI to submit the issue of whether the building was a total loss to a binding determination by an appraisal panel. The district court denied Auto-Owners' motion to compel appraisal and dismissed its complaint. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that a court, rather than an appraisal panel, is the appropriate forum to determine whether the property suffered a total loss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a party to a fire insurance policy does not have the statutory right to have an appraisal panel decide whether a claim involves a total loss. View "Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Second Chance Invs., LLC" on Justia Law

In a wrongful death action against a nursing home, the nursing home moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the nursing home resident was the third-party beneficiary to the admission and arbitration agreements signed by his sister. The trial court denied the motion, finding that no valid contract was signed by someone with the legal authority to do so, and the nursing home appealed. Because the resident's sister lacked the authority to contract for him, and thus no valid contract existed, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "GGNSC Batesville, LLC v. Johnson" on Justia Law