Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Defendant Halliburton Energy Services hired Plaintiff Edward Flemma to work as a cement equipment operator in Houma, Louisiana, in January of 1982. During his twenty-six years of employment with Halliburton, Flemma was promoted several times and worked for the company in Louisiana, Texas, Angola, and New Mexico. The last position he held was as district manager in Farmington, New Mexico, where he worked from 2006 until the time of his termination in 2008.The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a conflict of laws issue that requires the Court to determine whether enforcement of an arbitration agreement, formed in the State of Texas, would offend New Mexico public policy to overcome our traditional choice of law rule. Upon review, the Court concluded that the agreement formed in Texas would be unconscionable under New Mexico law, and it therefore violated New Mexico public policy. Thus, the Court applied New Mexico law and concluded that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed between the parties because Halliburton's promise to arbitrate was illusory. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Flemma v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent awarded Petitioner a contract to develop an affordable housing development project. The parties entered into a development services agreement (DSA) that contained a provision stating that the parties would proceed to arbitration under state law in the event of a dispute. Petitioner was subsequently terminated from the project. Respondent filed a complaint against Petitioner asserting several causes of action, including intentional misrepresentation and negligence. Petitioners counterclaimed. Petitioners later filed an arbitration motion, which the circuit granted. The intermediate court of appeals denied Petitioners' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the order compelling arbitration in this case was sufficiently final under the collateral order doctrine to be appealable under the general civil matters appeal statute; (2) the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the DSA encompassed all claims of Respondent and counterclaims of Petitioners; and (3) the circuit court correctly granted the motion to compel alternative dispute resolution and to stay proceedings. Remanded. View "County of Hawaii v. UniDev, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against NoteWorld alleging, among other things, violations under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., and Washington state law. At issue on appeal was whether an entity could compel arbitration on the basis of an arbitration clause in a contract to which it was not a party. The court concluded that the district court correctly concluded that NoteWorld was not entitled to invoke the arbitration clause as a third-party beneficiary or through equitable estoppel. Accordingly, the court need not decide any other question on appeal and affirmed the judgment. View "Rajagopalan v. NoteWorld, LLC" on Justia Law

This federal case sought confirmation of an arbitration award made at the first, non-liability stage of arbitration as to a contract, and which was filed approximately one month after the arbitral opponents had filed a petition in the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance to vacate the same award. The underlying arbitration resulted from the non-renewal of a sub-distribution agreement between V. Suarez & Co. (VSC) and Bacardi Caribbean Corporation (BCC). The federal district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that an absent party, Bacardi Corporation (BC), was an indispensable party whose joinder would destroy complete diversity. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the federal district court engaged in an incomplete Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) analysis, its conclusions under Rule 19 were wrong, and therefore, the proceeding should not have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; and (2) the federal court should stay its hand where the Court of First Instance confirmed the award and that decision had been pending on appeal in the court of appeals since August 22, 2012. Remanded. View "Bacardi Int'l Ltd. v. V. Suarez & Co." on Justia Law

Vinmar appealed a judgment confirming an arbitration panel award to Tricon for damages and post-award interest on those damages at 8.5% because Vinmar breached a contract. Vinmar claimed that the parties never agreed to arbitrate and Tricon cross-appealed, contending that the district court improperly granted postjudgment interest at the statutory rate instead of the rate assigned by the arbitrators. The court concluded that the evidence conclusively demonstrated that Tricon and Vinmar reached a binding agreement to arbitrate even though they did not sign the contract. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. The court also affirmed the award and concluded that the arbitrators in this case did not award postjudgment interest, but post-award interest. View "Tricon Energy Ltd. v. Vinmar Int'l, Ltd." on Justia Law

This case arose out of the payment of benefits pursuant to an Aflac accident insurance policy. Defendant and the decedent's siblings challenged the district court's entry of summary judgment and order compelling arbitration of defendant's claims against Aflac and its agents. At issue was whether defendant's affidavit, which included her opinion that the signature on the arbitration acknowledgment form was a forgery, was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. The court concluded that defendant's affidavit was never made part of the summary judgment record before the district court and therefore failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the authenticity of the decedent's signature. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "American Family Life Assurance Co. of Columbus v. Biles, et al" on Justia Law

AEGIS, an insurer, appealed from the district court's denial of its motion to compel alternative dispute resolution in its dispute with UEC. The court agreed with the district court that by agreeing in the endorsement of the contract to submit to the jurisdiction of Missouri state courts, AEGIS agreed to have any dispute relating to the insurance or to the claim resolved in those courts. Thus, the endorsement entirely supplanted the condition's mandatory arbitration provision. Even if the policy as a whole were ambiguous as to the mandatory arbitration, the court concluded that UEC would still prevail because it would be entitled to have the ambiguity resolved in its favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Union Electric Co. v. AEGIS Energy Syndicate 1225" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against a check advance company, asserting claims based on numerous Florida statutes. Plaintiffs later amended the complaint to add Tiffany Kelly as an additional plaintiff and named class member. Because Kelly had signed the version of Defendant's arbitration agreement that contained a class action waiver, this case focused on her contracts with Defendant. The trial court eventually denied Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, ruling that the class action waiver was unenforceable because it was void as against public policy. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that no other reasonable avenue for relief would be available if it enforced the class action waiver. After the court of appeal decided this case, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion. Applying the rationale of Concepcion to the facts set forth in this case, the Supreme Court quashed the court of appeal's decision, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted invalidating the class action waiver in this case on the basis of the waiver being void as against public policy. View "McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts" on Justia Law

Norma Slater-Moore hired the Goeldner Law Firm and its attorneys to represent her in what ultimately was an unsuccessful lawsuit and its appeal. Slater-Moore and Goeldner entered into two separate contracts during the course of that litigation, both containing nearly identical provisions stating that any attorney-fee disputes would be submitted to arbitration. Slater-Moore later sued Goeldner for legal malpractice and breach of contract, disputing, among other allegations, the amount she was billed for attorney fees. Goeldner successfully moved the Circuit Court to compel arbitration of the attorney-fee dispute, and Slater-Moore appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. Because the Supreme Court found ]no grounds for revocation of a valid agreement to arbitrate the fee dispute, the Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Slater-Moore v. Goeldner" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of a video game publishing agreement entered into by Timegate and Gamecock. Under the terms of the agreement, Timegate was to be the developer and Gamecock was to be the publisher of a futuristic military-style video game entitled "Section 8." When their business relationship deteriorated, the parties proceeded with arbitration and the arbitrator awarded Gamecock monetary compensation and a perpetual license in the video game's intellectual property. The district court vacated the arbitrator's award, determining that the perpetual license was not consistent with the "essence" of the underlying contract. Because the agreement bestowed broad remedial powers upon the arbitrator and because it was fraudulently induced and irreversibly violated by Timegate, the perpetual license was a rational and permissible attempt to compensate Gamecock and maintain the agreement's essence. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded, finding that the perpetual license was a remedy that furthered the essence of the publishing agreement. View "TimeGate Studios, Inc. v. Southpeak Interactive, L.L.C., et al" on Justia Law