Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued the Union for damages caused by a work stoppage conducted by the Union in alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The district court entered summary judgment without reaching the merits holding that the dispute was subject to arbitration under the contract. Plaintiff appealed. The court held that, in this case, the employee oriented grievance machinery in the parties' contract qualified and limited the universe of claims and grievances subject to arbitration, and the language negated the intention that the employer's claim for damages must be submitted to arbitration. Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Salvatore Rabbia appealed a superior court order that ordered $37,000 held in escrow be dispersed to Intervenor Automotive Finance Corporation instead of to him. Plaintiff was a principal in the corporate Defendant Harvard Auto Sales (d/b/a "Hitcars.com"). The company was in the business of salvaging motor parts; Automotive Finance Corporation and Plaintiff were two of Harvard Motors' creditors. AFC financed Harvard's purchase of inventory. Plaintiff was involved in a long-standing dispute with Harvard. The issue before the Supreme Court invovled Plaintff's and AFC's competing claims to funds Harvard gave to their counsel to hold in escrow in the summer of 2008 while settlement discussions with Plaintiff were ongoing. Upon careful review of the superior court record, the Supreme Court concluded that a "transfer" occurred when the Court affirmed an earlier trial court decision requiring disbursement of the escrowed funds to Plaintiff. As a result, Plaintiff acquired both legal and equitable title to the escrowed funds, entitling him to take them free of any perfected security interest AFC may have had in them. The Court reversed the superior court decision with respect to release of the funds to AFC. The Court affirmed the superior court with respect to all other matters in this case. View "Rabbia v. Rocha" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Eddie Lee Howard and Shane Schneider (Employees) entered an employment contract with Defendant-Appellee Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. For two years following termination, the contract prohibited employees from: working for, leasing to, or selling equipment to competitors. The contract contained an arbitration agreement requiring application of Louisiana law with disputes to be resolved in Houston, Texas. After the employees terminated their employment with Nitro-Lift, they went to work for a competitor in Arkansas. The employer filed an arbitration proceeding in Houston. Howard and Schneider filed an application for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in Oklahoma asserting that the non-competition agreement violated public policy. The district court initially granted the employees a temporary injunction, prohibiting Nitro-Lift from continuing the arbitration proceedings in Texas. Thereafter, the employer filed a motion to dismiss. After considering the parties' briefs and arguments, the district court found the arbitration clause to be valid on its face and reasonable in its terms, lifted the temporary restraining order, and granted the motion to dismiss. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the existence of an arbitration agreement in an employment contract did not prohibit judicial review of the underlying agreement; and as drafted, the non-competition covenants were void and unenforceable as against Oklahoma public policy. The Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Howard v. Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a constructor, was sued by several people living in new homes built by Petitioner (Residents). Residents claimed they were injured by radon gas leaking into their homes because of improper construction by Petitioner. Petitioner argued that the agreement to purchase the new homes required Residents to arbitrate their claims, whether they signed the agreement or not. The circuit court found the arbitration provision ambiguous and unconscionable and refused to compel Residents into arbitration. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to compel Residents to arbitrate their claims. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court was within its authority to refuse to enforce the arbitration clause against Residents because the arbitration provision was ambiguous, unconscionable, and unenforceable. View "State ex rel. Richmond Am. Homes v. Jefferson County Circuit Court (Sanders)" on Justia Law

Appellees executed a credit application and retail installment contract (RIC) for the purchase of an automobile. The application contained an arbitration agreement. The RIC provided an option for Appellees to purchase credit-life insurance coverage with Insurer. Appellees subsequently filed a class action against Insurer seeking the refund of unearned credit-life insurance premiums from the date they paid off their loan until the original maturity date of the loan. Insurer filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the arbitration agreement. The circuit court denied the motion after finding that the dispute was governed by Ark. Code Ann. 16-108-201(b), thereby preventing Insurer from compelling Appellees to arbitrate a dispute under an insurance policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not allow the Federal Arbitration Act to preempt section 16-108-201(b), and section 16-108-201(b) prohibited arbitration under these facts; and (2) the principles of equitable estoppel did apply to allow Insurer to compel arbitration. View "S. Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute over the arbitration of a collective bargaining agreement that contained a no-layoff clause. The court held that because the clause was not explicit, unambiguous and comprehensive, there was nothing for the Union to grieve or for an arbitrator to decide. Having concluded that the dispute was not arbitrable for reasons of public policy, the court need not reach the issue of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the Village's application to stay the arbitration was granted. View "Matter of Johnson City Professional Firefighters Local 921" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, Defendants Medtronic, Inc. (and several of its subsidiaries) appealed a district court's denial of their motion to compel Plaintiff Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corporation (LM) to arbitrate its antitrust claims against them even though none of the Defendants signed the distribution and licensing agreement containing the arbitration provision. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that even if LM's antitrust claims either expressly or implicitly alleged collusion between subsidiary Medatronic Danek USA and one or more of the other Medtronic subsidiaries, they were not "intimately founded in or intertwined with" the obligations in the agreement at issue in this case. "In sum, equity does not demand that LM be compelled to arbitrate its antitrust claims against the Medtronic Defendants. The district court therefore did not err in denying the Medtronic Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration." View "Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought to vacate a unanimous arbitration award in favor of Sirius arising out of a breach of contract dispute. Petitioner, which had a non-exclusive agreement with Sirius to distribute radio receivers, claimed that the chairman of the arbitration panel failed to disclose relationships of interest that affected the impartiality and propriety of the arbitration process. The court adopted the Second Circuit's reasonable person standard and held that the Appellate Division erred by imposing upon petitioner a "burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that any impropriety or misconduct of the arbitrator prejudiced its rights." The court held, however, that the Appellate Division correctly determined that there was no basis to vacate the arbitration award. Accordingly, the order was affirmed. View "U.S. Electronics, Inc. v Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs James and Heidi Glassford, who brought suit to obtain compensation for an allegedly negligent home inspection, appealed a superior court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of home inspector Defendants The BrickKicker and GDM Home Services, Inc. (a franchisee of BrickKicker) based on the terms of a binding arbitration agreement in the parties' contract. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the superior court erred in rejecting Plaintiffs' contention that the terms of the home inspection contract were unconscionable under the common law and unfair and deceptive under Vermont’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA). Upon review of the contract in question, as well as the superior court record, the Supreme Court found the contractual provisions limiting liability to the cost of the inspection and yet requiring arbitration that would necessarily cost more than the amount of the liability limit unconscionable. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Glassford v. BrickKicker" on Justia Law

Appellants brought various claims before Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitrators against Ameriprise, a financial-services company, for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation related to the decline in value of various financial assets owned by appellants and managed by Ameriprise. Ameriprise answered appellants' FINRA complaint by asserting, principally, that appellants released their claims by operation of a settlement agreement in a class-action agreement suit that had proceeded between 2004 and 2007 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. After FINRA arbitrators denied Ameriprise's motion to stay appellants' arbitration, Ameriprise moved in the district court, in which the class action had been litigated and settled, for an order to enforce the settlement agreement that would enjoin appellants from pressing any of their claims before FINRA arbitrators. The district court concluded that the class settlement barred all of appellants' arbitration claims and therefore granted Ameriprise's motion and ordered appellants to dismiss their FINRA complaint with prejudice. The court held that the district court had the power to enter such an order and that several of appellants' arbitration claims were barred by the 2007 class-action settlement. Therefore, the court affirmed in part. But because the court concluded that appellants' arbitration complaint plead claims that were not, and could not have been, released by the class settlement, the court vacated in part the district court's judgment, and remanded the case for the entry of an order permitting the non-Released claims to proceed in FINRA arbitration. The court dismissed as moot appellants' appeal from the district court's denial of their motion for reconsideration. View "In Re: American Express Finance Advisors Securities Litigation" on Justia Law