Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Aleut Corporation terminated its chief executive officer, Troy Johnson. He challenged the termination, and according to his employment contract, the matter was submitted to binding arbitration. That agreement contained a broad arbitration clause providing that "[a]ny and all disputes . . . arising out of, relating in any way to or in connection with this Agreement and/or Executive's employment with or termination of employment from the Company . . . shall be solely settled by an arbitration." The parties disputed whether the Corporation had violated the contract by terminating Johnson and whether Johnson's alleged breach of contract justified the termination. The arbitrator awarded damages to Johnson, finding the Corporation violated the contract. The Aleut Corporation petitioned the superior court to vacate the arbitrator's decision, claiming that the arbitrator had addressed an issue that was never submitted to arbitration and was thus not arbitrable. The superior court vacated the arbitration award, concluding that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority, and Johnson appealed. Because the dispute was arbitrable, the Supreme Court concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority, and therefore reversed the superior court's decision to vacate the award. View "Johnson v. The Aleut Corporation" on Justia Law

Liberty Anesthesia Associates, LLC (Liberty), an independent contractor that provides anesthesia services at the Jersey City Medical Center (JCMC), contracted plaintiff Karen Cole to provide anesthesia services at JCMC. Cole's employment agreement with Liberty included an arbitration provision. After JCMC revoked Cole's work privileges, Liberty terminated Cole's employment pursuant to their agreement. Cole filed a complaint against JCMC asserting statutory and common law claims. JCMC impleaded Liberty as a third-party defendant and filed an answer to Cole's amended complaint, asserting thirty-five affirmative defenses, none of which referred to arbitration. After discovery, which included interrogatories and depositions, both Liberty and JCMC moved for summary judgment. After Cole settled her claims with JCMC, the court entered summary judgment in Liberty's favor on two of four causes of action and scheduled trial. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a defendant could compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement after being joined and actively participating in litigation between a party and a non-party to the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court concluded that Liberty's active participation in the litigation for twenty-one months before invoking the arbitration provision on the eve of trial constituted a waiver of its right to arbitrate. View "Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center" on Justia Law

The Town of Malborough terminated the employment of Emily Chaponis as town assessor after the board of selectmen did not make a motion to reappoint her to a successive term of office. Chaponis filed a grievance through the Union, of which she was a member, alleging that the Town violated its collective bargaining agreement with the Union by discharging her without just cause. An arbitration panel ordered the Town to reinstate Chaponis to her position, concluding that the Town violated the agreement when it terminated Chaponis' employment without just cause. The trial court denied the Town's application to vacate the arbitration award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitrators' award ordering the reinstatement of Chaponis' employment after the statutory expiration of her term of office contravened the mandates of the statutory scheme governing the term of office for municipal officers, and therefore, the award was unenforceable. Remanded.View "Town of Marlborough v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 818-052" on Justia Law

After the Town of Westbrook's board of selectmen unanimously voted not to reappoint Ivan Kuvalanka to a successive term of office as town assessor, Kuvalanka filed a grievance asserting that the Town had violated its collective bargaining agreement with the Union, of which Kuvalanka was a member. The arbitrators determined that the grievance was not arbitrable under the agreement. The Union filed an application in the trial court to vacate the award. The trial court denied the application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) properly limited the scope of its review when considering the Union's application to vacate the award; and (2) properly determined that the Union did not establish grounds to vacate the award. View "AFSCME, Council 4. Local 1303-325 v. Town of Westbrook" on Justia Law

The City of Boston transferred a Boston police sergeant who served as a union representative due to what the City said were ongoing concerns about the officer's supervisory authority. The Boston Police Superior Officers Federation (union) sought to enforce a provision of its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the City, which prohibited the involuntary transfer of certain union representatives between stations or assignments. A grievance arbitrator concluded that the City had violated the CBA and awarded the officer damages and reinstatement to his original position. The superior court confirmed the award. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for judgment vacating the award, holding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in invalidating the officer's transfer, where assignment and transfer of officers within the Boston police department are nondelegable statutory powers of the Boston police commissioner.View "City of Boston v. Boston Police Superior Officers Fed'n" on Justia Law

Employee was discharged from his employment for allegedly engaging in sexual harassment. Employee's union filed a grievance against Employer, and the parties submitted the controversy to arbitration. The arbitrator reduced the dismissal to a one year suspension without pay, finding the dismissal was without just cause. Employer filed an application to vacate the arbitral award, claiming that enforcement of the award violated public policy. The trial court granted the application and vacated the arbitrator's award on public policy grounds. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the award violated the public policy against workplace sexual harassment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace required nothing less than Employee's termination. View "State v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 391" on Justia Law

A union and college were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) containing a provision that the "granting or failure to grant tenure shall be arbitrable but any award is not binding." A professor at the college, who was a member of the union, was denied tenure and submitted a grievance to arbitration. The arbitrator found that the college violated the terms of the CBA and ordered that the professor be reinstated to his position. A superior court judge confirmed the arbitrator's award. The appeals court reversed, holding that the arbitrator's award was not binding on the college pursuant to the CBA, and therefore, the judge erred in confirming that arbitrator's award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the terms of the CBA, the college and the union did not agree to binding arbitration of a tenure denial determination and therefore did not agree to binding arbitration of the grievance in this case; and (2) because the arbitrator's award was nonbinding, the union was not entitled to have the award judicially confirmed and enforced.View "Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. Mass. Bd. of Higher Educ." on Justia Law

Employee was employed by the State's Department of Services for Children, Youth, and their Families (Department). After Employee was injured during the course and scope of his employment, the Department concluded that Employee did not make a sufficient return to work and terminated him. Employee's termination was subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement between the Department and Council 81, the exclusive bargaining agent for certain Department employees. The arbitrator upheld Employee's termination, finding just cause for Employee's dismissal. Council 81, acting on behalf of Employee, challenged the arbitrator's decision. The Court of Chancery granted summary judgment for the State, holding that Council 81 failed to offer a recognized basis for setting aside the contractually bargained for arbitrator's decision.View "Council 81, AFL-CIO v. State" on Justia Law