Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

A married couple with eight children began divorce proceedings after a long marriage during which the husband was a successful ophthalmologist and the wife primarily cared for the children at home. During the proceedings, the wife initially sought spousal support, child support, and an equitable division of property, while the husband sought joint custody and an equitable property division. The parties agreed, through counsel and with court approval, to divide the husband's income and a business account temporarily, avoiding a child support calculation at that stage. Once custody was resolved, the parties entered into two successive arbitration agreements, under which the wife waived spousal support in exchange for arbitration of all remaining issues, including property division and child support. The arbitrator awarded the wife 60% of the marital assets and retroactive child support.After the arbitration, the husband challenged the award in the Magistrate Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to refer divorce matters to arbitration and that the arbitrator exceeded authority by awarding retroactive child support and an unequal asset division. The magistrate court rejected these arguments and confirmed the award. On appeal, the District Court affirmed the magistrate court, holding that Idaho law permits arbitration of divorce issues and that the arbitrator acted within the scope of the agreement. The district court did, however, vacate part of the attorney fee award based on the arbitration award, but affirmed an award of appellate attorney fees to the wife, finding the husband's jurisdictional challenge was unreasonable.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. The main holding is that Idaho law permits courts to refer divorce actions to binding arbitration if the parties agree, and such referral does not divest the court of jurisdiction. The court also held that the arbitrator did not exceed authority in awarding retroactive child support and an unequal division of property. The case was remanded for consideration of appellate attorney fees under Idaho Code section 32-704(3). View "Miller v. Miller" on Justia Law

Sarah Knell and Catlin Kinden, who married in 2003 and have four children, divorced in October 2020. They initially agreed to share equal residential responsibility for their children, with the children spending most of the school year with Knell. Conflicts arose, particularly regarding the medical care of their two minor children, B.K. and P.K., who require medication. Kinden meticulously monitored P.K.'s diabetes care, often initiating conflicts with Knell over it. In July 2021, Kinden moved to modify residential responsibility, alleging Knell's disregard for the children's health. The district court ordered mediation, which was unsuccessful.In December 2021, Knell filed a countermotion to modify residential responsibility. The parties agreed to a parenting investigation, which did not recommend changing their equal residential responsibility. They signed a stipulation to modify the judgment, which the court adopted in September 2022. In 2023, Kinden moved to Bismarck, prompting Knell to seek primary residential responsibility, arguing that the two-year moratorium on modifications did not apply due to Kinden's relocation. Both parties made prima facie cases for modification, leading to an evidentiary hearing in July 2024.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case, affirming the district court's decision. The court found that N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.6, which governs modifications of primary residential responsibility, did not apply as there was no prior order establishing primary residential responsibility. Instead, the court made an original determination based on the best interests of the children, weighing the factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1). The court concluded that awarding Kinden primary residential responsibility was in the children's best interests, particularly due to his diligence in addressing their medical and educational needs. The Supreme Court found no clear error in the district court's findings and affirmed the second amended judgment. View "Kinden v. Kinden" on Justia Law

Thomas Steiger and Hope VanDelden have two minor children, G.L.M.S. and T.L.S. Thomas filed a Petition for Establishment of a Permanent Parenting Plan in October 2016, which was granted in May 2017 after Hope did not respond or attend the hearing. The plan allowed the children to reside primarily with Thomas and have contact with Hope on alternating weekends, holidays, and up to 14 days of vacation each year. Hope filed a motion to amend the parenting plan in October 2017, claiming Thomas had reduced her parenting time. Thomas’s mother and stepfather also petitioned to intervene, asserting their grandparenting time had been decreased.In October 2023, Hope filed a motion to proceed with mediation to address the parenting plan. After unsuccessful mediation, she filed another motion to amend the plan in January 2024, claiming Thomas did not allow the children to spend additional time with her. Thomas opposed the motion, asserting there was no change in circumstances to warrant an amendment. The District Court set an in-chambers interview with the oldest child, G.L.M.S., but did not hold an evidentiary hearing before granting Hope’s motion to amend the parenting plan in July 2024.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court erred by not holding a hearing on the motion to amend the parenting plan, as required by Montana law unless the motion is denied for lack of adequate cause. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s order and remanded the case for a hearing to determine if the statutory criteria for amending the parenting plan were met and to amend the plan in the best interests of the children. View "In Re G.L.M.S. and T.L.S." on Justia Law

A woman and a man were married in July 2003 and separated in March 2022. Before their marriage, the woman had an employer-provided deferred compensation plan with a balance between $63,131.23 and $67,536.80. During the marriage, she continued contributing to the plan until 2006. She made significant withdrawals from the account for marital expenses, including $40,000 in 2009 and $75,000 in 2016. In 2018, the remaining funds were transferred to a USAA account and then to a Charles Schwab IRA account in 2020, which was valued at $102,100.55 at the time of trial. The parties disputed whether these funds were marital or nonmarital.The parties engaged in mediation in March 2022 and appeared before the superior court to memorialize their agreement. The court noted that the parties had agreed to allocate the assets and debts of the marriage with one exception related to the disputed account. The woman was to provide additional information to confirm that the marital portion of the account had already been spent. However, the parties had conflicting interpretations of this proviso, leading to further disputes.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court found that the superior court had erred in its legal conclusions. It ruled that the use of some funds for marital expenditures did not demonstrate an intent to donate the entire account to the marriage. Additionally, the court held that when a mixed account contains both premarital and marital funds, the default rule is "first in, last out," meaning premarital funds are not withdrawn until all marital funds have been exhausted. The court vacated the superior court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the respective separate and marital portions of the account. View "Rush v. Rush" on Justia Law

The case involves a divorced couple, Bradley Carter (father) and Rachel Carter (mother), who have two children. Following their divorce, the mother, who had an alcohol use disorder, was granted supervised visits with her children twice a month. After two years of sobriety and the impending closure of their visitation center, the mother requested unsupervised visits and weekends with her children, which the father opposed.The Circuit Court initially sent the parties to mediation, which proved unsuccessful. At the final hearing, the mother requested two modifications of her parental rights and responsibilities: unsupervised parenting time and an expansion of her parenting time. The Circuit Court denied her request, maintaining the schedule of two, two-hour supervised visits with the mother per month with a mutually agreeable supervisor. The mother appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case. The mother argued that the trial court improperly narrowed its “present environment” inquiry to the children’s routine with the father and failed to consider other factors, including the infrequency of their contact with their mother. The Supreme Court agreed with the mother, stating that the children’s “present environment” is determined by assessing the surroundings or conditions in which the children now exist, which includes their daily activities, mental and emotional states, and their needs.The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order denying the mother’s request for a modification of parenting time and remanded for the trial court to reconsider her request. The Supreme Court also vacated the court’s denial of her request for unsupervised visitation, allowing the parties to clarify the statutory basis for the relief they are requesting on remand. View "In the Matter of Carter & Carter" on Justia Law

The case involves Ling Mueller and Paul Mueller, a married couple who separated in 2017. During their marriage, they cultivated cannabis and buried the proceeds on their property. They initially attempted to use a collaborative law process to dissolve their marriage. They signed an agreement that outlined the collaborative process, including a confidentiality clause. However, the agreement also explicitly stated that it did not create any legally enforceable rights or obligations. During the second collaborative session, Ling became angry and left the meeting abruptly when asked about investments she had made using the proceeds from the couple's marijuana operation. She subsequently initiated divorce proceedings in family court.In the family court, Paul subpoenaed both parties' collaborative attorneys to testify about statements Ling made during the second collaborative session. Ling argued that the confidentiality clause in the agreement shielded her statements from disclosure. However, the court found the agreement, including the confidentiality clause, to be unenforceable. It also found that Ling had waived the confidentiality provision. As a result, it allowed the parties' collaborative attorneys to testify about the second collaborative session. The court found Ling to be not credible and ordered her to make a $161,077 equalizing payment.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Five, the sole issue on appeal was the admissibility of testimony about the second collaborative session. This depended on whether the confidentiality clause was enforceable despite the agreement's multiple statements that it created no enforceable rights or obligations. The court found that the agreement unequivocally stated that it did not give either party enforceable legal rights. Therefore, the court affirmed the family court's decision that the confidentiality clause was unenforceable. View "Mueller v. Mueller" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the death of Skyler A. Womack (Skyler) at Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc., a skilled nursing facility. Skyler's parents, Jonie A. Holland (Holland) and Wayne D. Womack (Wayne), filed a lawsuit against Silverscreen, alleging dependent adult abuse and negligence on behalf of Skyler, as well as their own claim for wrongful death. Silverscreen moved to compel arbitration of the entire complaint based on an arbitration agreement between Skyler and Silverscreen.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Silverscreen’s motion to compel arbitration for the survivor claims but denied the motion for the wrongful death cause of action. The court reasoned that the parents did not have an enforceable arbitration agreement with Silverscreen. The court's decision was heavily influenced by the case Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc.Silverscreen appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District. The appellant argued that, according to Ruiz v. Podolsky, the parents are bound by the arbitration agreement signed by Skyler, and therefore, the parents’ wrongful death claim should be subject to arbitration. The appellate court agreed with Silverscreen, stating that Ruiz governs this matter. Consequently, under Ruiz and Code of Civil Procedure section 1295, the parents’ wrongful death claim must go to arbitration along with Skyler’s survivor claims. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with directions. View "Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involves a group of plaintiffs who were minors at the time their guardians purchased and activated DNA test kits from Ancestry.com. The plaintiffs, through their guardians, provided their DNA samples to Ancestry.com for genetic testing and analysis. The plaintiffs later sued Ancestry.com, alleging that the company violated their privacy rights by disclosing their confidential genetic information to another business. Ancestry.com moved to compel arbitration based on a clause in its Terms & Conditions agreement, which the plaintiffs' guardians had agreed to when they purchased and activated the test kits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois law, held that the plaintiffs were not bound to arbitrate their claims under the agreement between their guardians and Ancestry.com. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs neither signed the agreement nor created Ancestry.com accounts, and did not independently engage with Ancestry.com's services. Furthermore, the court refused to bind the plaintiffs to the agreement based on equitable principles, including the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel. The court noted that while the plaintiffs theoretically could benefit from Ancestry.com's services, there were no allegations that the plaintiffs had actually accessed their DNA test results.The court therefore affirmed the district court's decision denying Ancestry.com's motion to compel arbitration. The court's holding clarified that under Illinois law, a minor cannot be bound to an arbitration agreement that their guardian agreed to on their behalf, unless the minor independently engaged with the services provided under the agreement or directly benefited from the agreement. View "Coatney v. Ancestry.com DNA, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court setting aside a judgment confirming an arbitration award under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (NRCP 60(b)), holding that Nevada Arbitration Rule (NAR) 19(C) bars a district court from setting aside a judgment confirming gan arbitration award under NRCP 60(b).On appeal from a district court judgment confirming an arbitration award under NRCP 60(b), Appellant argued that NAR 19(C) barred the district court from applying NRCP 60(b) to set aside the judgment. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the judgment, holding that NAR 19(C) barred post-judgment relief under NRCP 60(b). View "Arce v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying David Taylor's motion to invalidate an arbitration award in this divorce case on the grounds that it was contrary to public policy to arbitrate divorce actions or, alternatively, arguing that the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the law, holding that there was no error.After litigating their divorce for a year, David asked Jill to arbitrate. After the arbitrator issued his decision, David filed a motion to invalidate the award under Utah Uniform Arbitration Act 78B-11-107, arguing that the arbitration agreement was not valid or binding in the divorce context for policy reasons. The district court denied David's request and confirmed the arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) having participated in arbitration without objection, David was barred from relying on section 78B-11-107 to contest the arbitration award; and (2) there was no reason to invalidate the arbitration award for manifest disregard of the law. View "Taylor v. Taylor" on Justia Law