Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

This case involves a group of plaintiffs who were minors at the time their guardians purchased and activated DNA test kits from Ancestry.com. The plaintiffs, through their guardians, provided their DNA samples to Ancestry.com for genetic testing and analysis. The plaintiffs later sued Ancestry.com, alleging that the company violated their privacy rights by disclosing their confidential genetic information to another business. Ancestry.com moved to compel arbitration based on a clause in its Terms & Conditions agreement, which the plaintiffs' guardians had agreed to when they purchased and activated the test kits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois law, held that the plaintiffs were not bound to arbitrate their claims under the agreement between their guardians and Ancestry.com. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs neither signed the agreement nor created Ancestry.com accounts, and did not independently engage with Ancestry.com's services. Furthermore, the court refused to bind the plaintiffs to the agreement based on equitable principles, including the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel. The court noted that while the plaintiffs theoretically could benefit from Ancestry.com's services, there were no allegations that the plaintiffs had actually accessed their DNA test results.The court therefore affirmed the district court's decision denying Ancestry.com's motion to compel arbitration. The court's holding clarified that under Illinois law, a minor cannot be bound to an arbitration agreement that their guardian agreed to on their behalf, unless the minor independently engaged with the services provided under the agreement or directly benefited from the agreement. View "Coatney v. Ancestry.com DNA, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court setting aside a judgment confirming an arbitration award under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (NRCP 60(b)), holding that Nevada Arbitration Rule (NAR) 19(C) bars a district court from setting aside a judgment confirming gan arbitration award under NRCP 60(b).On appeal from a district court judgment confirming an arbitration award under NRCP 60(b), Appellant argued that NAR 19(C) barred the district court from applying NRCP 60(b) to set aside the judgment. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the judgment, holding that NAR 19(C) barred post-judgment relief under NRCP 60(b). View "Arce v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying David Taylor's motion to invalidate an arbitration award in this divorce case on the grounds that it was contrary to public policy to arbitrate divorce actions or, alternatively, arguing that the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the law, holding that there was no error.After litigating their divorce for a year, David asked Jill to arbitrate. After the arbitrator issued his decision, David filed a motion to invalidate the award under Utah Uniform Arbitration Act 78B-11-107, arguing that the arbitration agreement was not valid or binding in the divorce context for policy reasons. The district court denied David's request and confirmed the arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) having participated in arbitration without objection, David was barred from relying on section 78B-11-107 to contest the arbitration award; and (2) there was no reason to invalidate the arbitration award for manifest disregard of the law. View "Taylor v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Respondent Simran Singh (Mother) and Petitioner Gunjit Singh (Father) separated in January of 2012. They entered into a settlement agreement which resolved all issues arising from their marriage, including custody and visitation matters involving their two children, then aged eleven and two. Pursuant to that agreement, Mother received primary custody, and the parties consented to submit any future disputes regarding child support or visitation to a mutually agreed-upon arbitrator, specifically providing that his or her decision would "be binding and non-appealable." The family court approved the agreement and granted the parties a divorce in February of 2013. Approximately nine months later, Father filed an action in family court seeking modification of custody, visitation, and child support, alleging Mother had violated a provision of the agreement when she failed to return to South Carolina with the children after embarking on a cross-country tour as a motivational speaker. From January through August of 2014, four family court judges issued decisions— one dismissing Father’s complaint due to the parties' decision to arbitrate; a second issuing a consent order to arbitrate; and two approving amended agreements to arbitrate. The arbitrator issued a "partial" arbitration award finding a substantial and material change of circumstance affecting the welfare and custody of the minor children, and awarding Father temporary custody. A thirty-two-page final arbitration award was issued the next month, awarding custody to Father. A fifth family court judge issued an order in January 2015 confirming both the partial and final arbitration awards. Thereafter, Mother filed five separate Rule 60(b)(4), SCRCP, motions to vacate all the orders approving the parties' agreements to arbitrate. The court of appeals issued its unanimous decision in December of 2019, holding that the parties could not divest the family court of jurisdiction to determine issues relating to custody, visitation, and child support. One month prior, another panel of the court of appeals issued a decision in Kosciusko v. Parham, 836 S.E.2d 362 (Ct. App. 2019), holding the family court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to approve the binding arbitration of children's issues. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari, and affirmed as modified, the appellate court's order. View "Singh v. Singh" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court granting Plaintiff's motion to vacate an arbitration award and denying Defendant's corresponding application to confirm the award, holding that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority or manifestly disregard the law, but the inclusion of issues related to child support in the award was improper.Before the parties were married they executed a premarital agreement. Years later, Plaintiff brought this action to dissolve the marriage, and the parties executed a binding agreement to arbitrate the dissolution action. At issue was the validity of the arbitrator's award dividing the equity in the parties' marital home and assigning responsibility for certain expenses related to child support. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion to vacate the portion of the arbitration award. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court erred in ruling that the arbitrator's award exceed the scope of the parties' submission; (2) any error in distributing the equity in the marital home would not permit a court to vacate the arbitration award; and (3) because Connecticut law prohibits the inclusion of issues related to child support in arbitration awards, this portion of the award is reversed. View "Blondeau v. Baltierra" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court ordering Eryn Winegeart to sell real estate she owned jointly with her former spouse, Weston Winegeart, holding that the court did not err by ordering Eryn to sign a purchase agreement signed by a third party.After the parties underwent mediation, Weston signed an agreement with a real-estate agent to list the jointly owned real estate, and the listing agreement included a commission for the realtor. After the third party signed the purchase agreement, Eryn refused to sign it, asserting that during mediation Weston had orally agreed to sell the property without paying for a realtor. The circuit court found that the parties had not entered into an enforceable oral agreement in regard to realtor fees and ordered Eryn to sign the purchase agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by entering its order requiring Eryn to sign the purchase agreement. View "Winegeart v. Winegeart" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action seeking equitable distribution of the parties’ marital assets and child support. Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to arbitrate the action under North Carolina’s Family Law Arbitration Act. Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an equitable distribution arbitration award by consent. The trial court confirmed the award. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to vacate arbitration award and set aside order and motion to engage in discovery on the basis of Plaintiff’s alleged fraud. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to engage in discovery. The court of appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal, concluding that Plaintiff had no right to immediately appeal the trial court’s order denying discovery and that the trial court had no discretion to order post-confirmation discovery in this case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff had a right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to engage in discovery; and (2) the trial court had the discretion to order discovery in this case. View "Stokes v. Crumpton" on Justia Law

Glen and Danielle Rollins divorced in December 2013, and they agreed at that time to submit to binding arbitration of their respective claims to certain furniture and furnishings in the marital home. The arbitrator rendered an award in July 2014, and Glen promptly moved for judicial confirmation. While his motion was pending, in August 2014, the trial court ordered Danielle to account for some of the furniture and furnishings that the arbitrator had awarded to Glen that he could not find. Dissatisfied with her accounting, Glen filed a motion to hold Danielle in contempt of the August 2014 order. In April 2015, the trial court found Danielle was in willful contempt of the August 2014 order in at least one respect, and it entered an initial contempt order that directed Danielle to show cause why she ought not be incarcerated for her contempt. Danielle appealed the initial contempt order, both by filing an application for discretionary review with the Supreme Court, and by filing a notice of direct appeal. In May 2015, the Supreme Court denied the application for discretionary review. The direct appeal was not docketed until November 2015. In December 2015, the Supreme Court dismissed the direct appeal, explaining that any appeal of the initial contempt order had to come by application, and noting that it already had denied an application for discretionary review. In the meantime, the trial court held a final hearing on the motion for contempt and entered a final order on November 24, 2015, finding Danielle in contempt of the August 2014 order in additional respects, directing her to immediately surrender any property awarded to Glen, ordering her to pay Glen for any such property that had gone missing or was damaged, and ordering her to pay fines for 34 separate instances of contempt. The trial court also awarded Glen attorney fees. Danielle then applied for discretionary review of the final contempt order, and the Supreme Court granted her application. Danielle argued that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter a final contempt order while her direct appeal from the initial contempt order still was pending with the Supreme Court. The Supreme agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rollins v. Rollins" on Justia Law

Before they were married, Wife and Husband entered a prenuptial agreement. Approximately ten years later, Wife brought a marital dissolution action against Husband. In accordance with an agreement to arbitrate in the prenuptial agreement, the trial court ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration on the matter of the sale of the parties’ residence. The arbitrator issued a partial award and then a final award. The trial court confirmed the partial award and confirmed in part, modified in part, and vacated in part the final arbitration award. Defendant appealed. The trial court subsequently entered judgment dissolving the marriage, allocating property, interpreting the prenuptial agreement, and deciding all pending motions. Defendant filed a second appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly applied Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-66(c) to the agreement to arbitrate contained within the prenuptial agreement; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion for leave to file an amended answer and cross complaint; and (3) the arbitrator did not exceed her authority by issuing orders in contravention of the express terms of the prenuptial agreement. View "LaFrance v. Lodmell" on Justia Law

Tracy and Jose married in 1996. They later separated. Tracy filed a petition for dissolution in 2011. In 2012, the superior court ordered temporary spousal support. The parties decided not to further litigate the case in the superior court and stipulated to the appointment of attorney Perkovich as judge pro tempore, under California Rules of Court 2.830-2.834. After Perkovich had served for two years, Tracy learned that Perkovich had not disclosed “in writing or on the record” professional relationships she had with lawyers in the proceeding, as required by the Rules. Tracy filed in the superior court a statement seeking disqualification. Perkovich failed to respond in accordance with statutory procedure. The presiding judge ordered her disqualified, holding that she was deemed to have consented to disqualification by her failure to file a consent or verified answer. The case was reassigned; discovery proceeded. The court delayed a hearing on Tracy’s motion to set aside orders made by Perkovich. The court of appeal held that Perkovich’s failure to contest the claims means that those factual allegations must be taken as true and that she was automatically disqualified. Her rulings are all void; the settlement agreement signed before her disqualification was tainted and may not be enforced. Perkovich’s conduct did not taint the proceedings before the superior court judge who replaced her. View "Hayward v. Super Court" on Justia Law