Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Glen and Danielle Rollins divorced in December 2013, and they agreed at that time to submit to binding arbitration of their respective claims to certain furniture and furnishings in the marital home. The arbitrator rendered an award in July 2014, and Glen promptly moved for judicial confirmation. While his motion was pending, in August 2014, the trial court ordered Danielle to account for some of the furniture and furnishings that the arbitrator had awarded to Glen that he could not find. Dissatisfied with her accounting, Glen filed a motion to hold Danielle in contempt of the August 2014 order. In April 2015, the trial court found Danielle was in willful contempt of the August 2014 order in at least one respect, and it entered an initial contempt order that directed Danielle to show cause why she ought not be incarcerated for her contempt. Danielle appealed the initial contempt order, both by filing an application for discretionary review with the Supreme Court, and by filing a notice of direct appeal. In May 2015, the Supreme Court denied the application for discretionary review. The direct appeal was not docketed until November 2015. In December 2015, the Supreme Court dismissed the direct appeal, explaining that any appeal of the initial contempt order had to come by application, and noting that it already had denied an application for discretionary review. In the meantime, the trial court held a final hearing on the motion for contempt and entered a final order on November 24, 2015, finding Danielle in contempt of the August 2014 order in additional respects, directing her to immediately surrender any property awarded to Glen, ordering her to pay Glen for any such property that had gone missing or was damaged, and ordering her to pay fines for 34 separate instances of contempt. The trial court also awarded Glen attorney fees. Danielle then applied for discretionary review of the final contempt order, and the Supreme Court granted her application. Danielle argued that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter a final contempt order while her direct appeal from the initial contempt order still was pending with the Supreme Court. The Supreme agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rollins v. Rollins" on Justia Law

Before they were married, Wife and Husband entered a prenuptial agreement. Approximately ten years later, Wife brought a marital dissolution action against Husband. In accordance with an agreement to arbitrate in the prenuptial agreement, the trial court ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration on the matter of the sale of the parties’ residence. The arbitrator issued a partial award and then a final award. The trial court confirmed the partial award and confirmed in part, modified in part, and vacated in part the final arbitration award. Defendant appealed. The trial court subsequently entered judgment dissolving the marriage, allocating property, interpreting the prenuptial agreement, and deciding all pending motions. Defendant filed a second appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly applied Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-66(c) to the agreement to arbitrate contained within the prenuptial agreement; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion for leave to file an amended answer and cross complaint; and (3) the arbitrator did not exceed her authority by issuing orders in contravention of the express terms of the prenuptial agreement. View "LaFrance v. Lodmell" on Justia Law

Tracy and Jose married in 1996. They later separated. Tracy filed a petition for dissolution in 2011. In 2012, the superior court ordered temporary spousal support. The parties decided not to further litigate the case in the superior court and stipulated to the appointment of attorney Perkovich as judge pro tempore, under California Rules of Court 2.830-2.834. After Perkovich had served for two years, Tracy learned that Perkovich had not disclosed “in writing or on the record” professional relationships she had with lawyers in the proceeding, as required by the Rules. Tracy filed in the superior court a statement seeking disqualification. Perkovich failed to respond in accordance with statutory procedure. The presiding judge ordered her disqualified, holding that she was deemed to have consented to disqualification by her failure to file a consent or verified answer. The case was reassigned; discovery proceeded. The court delayed a hearing on Tracy’s motion to set aside orders made by Perkovich. The court of appeal held that Perkovich’s failure to contest the claims means that those factual allegations must be taken as true and that she was automatically disqualified. Her rulings are all void; the settlement agreement signed before her disqualification was tainted and may not be enforced. Perkovich’s conduct did not taint the proceedings before the superior court judge who replaced her. View "Hayward v. Super Court" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife signed an agreement to arbitrate the issues in their divorce under the Family Law Arbitration Act (FLAA). The family law arbitrator entered conclusions of law providing for legal and physical custody of the parties’ child to be granted to Wife, Husband to pay certain child support obligation, the division of the marital property, Husband to pay certain spousal maintenance costs, and Husband to pay $95,000 of Wife’s attorney’s fees. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the arbitrator’s decision. Husband appealed the arbitrator’s attorney fee award. Wife cross-appealed other issues. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in the appellate consideration of an FLAA award, the proper standard of review is the same standard of appellate review that applies to the review of trial court decisions in marriage dissolution cases; and (2) in this case, the family law arbitrator’s award satisfies that standard, and Husband failed to establish that the award of attorney’s fees is not supported by the arbitrator’s findings. View "Masters v. Masters" on Justia Law

Gilda filed for dissolution of marriage. She and former husband, Murray, agreed to resolve property and support issues through mediation, during which they purportedly exchanged financial disclosure declarations mandated by the Family Code. They executed a marital settlement agreement, which was incorporated into a stipulated judgment. Shortly after entry of judgment, Gilda learned that Murray recently sold a company he founded during the marriage. In the settlement agreement, Gilda relinquished her community share of the company for $10 million. Murray received approximately $75 million from the sale. Gilda sought to set aside the judgment on grounds of fraud and duress and served discovery on Murray requesting the financial disclosure declarations that were exchanged prior to entry of judgment. Murray refused to produce the declarations, asserting they were covered by the mediation confidentiality statutes, insofar as they constituted writings that were prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, mediation. (Evid. Code, 1119(b).) The trial court a motion to compel on mediation confidentiality grounds. The court of appeal vacated, noting the Family Code’s stated public policy to promote “full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities” in dissolution proceedings View "Lappe v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Stephanie Lee and Benjamin Redus were the parents and joint managing conservators of their minor daughter. A 2007 order adjudicating parentage gave Stephanie the exclusive right to designate the child's primary residence. Benjamin sought to modify that order. The parties executed a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) modifying the 2007 order. Stephanie moved to enter judgment on the MSA, but Benjamin withdrew his consent to the MSA, arguing that it was not in the best interest of the child. The district court refused to enter judgment on the MSA, concluding that it was not in the best interest of the child. Stephanie unsuccessfully petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to enter judgment on the MSA. The Supreme Court conditionally granted the writ of mandamus, holding (1) a trial court may not deny a motion to enter judgment on a properly executed MSA on the grounds that the MSA was not in a child's best interest; and (2) because the MSA in this case met the Family Code's requirements for a binding agreement, the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to enter judgment on the MSA.View "In re Lee" on Justia Law

David Efron and his former wife, Madeleine Candelario-Del-Moral, were engaged in long-running litigation related to their high-stakes divorce. In 2006, a Puerto Rico court in which the divorce proceedings were pending issued an order attaching the funds held in Efron’s UBS Financial Services Inc. accounts. The court subsequently made a ruling that may or may not have vacated the attachment. UBS treated the attachment as void and dispersed the bulk of the funds. Candelario sued UBS in federal district court for negligently releasing the attached funds. Ultimately, at the district court’s suggestion, UBS and Candelario opted to undertake mediation. Thereafter, Efron moved to intervene as of right in the Candelario-UBS litigation. The district court denied the motion. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion and denied Candelario’s motion for appellate sanctions, holding (1) the Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine Efron’s interlocutory appeal; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in deeming Efron’s motion to intervene untimely and in refusing to grant it; and (3) although Efron’s case for intervention was weak, it was not frivolous. View "Candelario-Del-Moral v. Efron" on Justia Law

Tennessee law mandates mediation in certain contested divorce proceedings. Now-Judge Martin was appointed and performed mediation in plaintiff's divorce as part of his private legal practice. The divorce was granted, allowing wife to take the children to Japan during vacations but requiring her to live within 100 miles of husband. Husband believed that wife planned to abduct the children to her native Japan, petitioned to modify the parenting plan, and sought a restraining order. The hearing, initially assigned to another, was re-assigned to Judge Martin. The parties agreed to have Judge Martin hear the motion, despite the judge raising the issue. Judge Martin ruled in favor of wife, who subsequently took the children out of the U.S. with no apparent intent to return. Husband was awarded full custody; wife was charged with felony custodial interference. Husband filed suit against Martin as both judge and mediator; the law firm as his employer; and a court-ordered parental coordinator, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law negligence and contract theories. The district court dismissed all claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Savoie v. Martin" on Justia Law

This appeal involved six siblings and their mother. The parties participated in mediation that resulted in an agreement, which, among other things, divided Mother's real property. After disputes arose over the agreement, the probate court ordered arbitration pursuant to the agreement's arbitration clause. The arbitrator concluded that the agreement was enforceable and ordered the transfer of land necessary to effectuate it. Four of the sisters (Appellants) and the remaining siblings and mother (Appellees) then filed a series of motions. The superior court confirmed the arbitration award, denied a motion to vacate the award, denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and granted a motion to dismiss a complaint for declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err in affirming the arbitrator's award and in concluding that the arbitrator and that the settlement agreement gave the arbitrator the authority to determine whether the agreement was valid and enforceable. View "Anderson v. Banks" on Justia Law