Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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Plaintiff-Appellant Dennis Cornwell brought a wrongful death action on behalf of his wife who died at a railroad grade crossing when the vehicle she was driving hit a locomotive owned and operated by Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company. Union Pacific moved for summary judgment and also moved to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff's four experts based on "Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc." (509 U.S. 579 (1993)). The district court granted the summary judgment motion in part and ruled that the testimony of three experts should be excluded. The case proceeded to a jury trial. At its conclusion, the jury entered a verdict in favor of Union Pacific. Plaintiff appealed seeking to overturn the pre-trial rulings. Finding that the district court's ruling was supported by Tenth Circuit precedent and case law from other circuits, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision: "[t]he district court determined that [Plaintiff's experts'] proffered evidence was unreliable under "Daubert" standards: their evidence was speculative and conclusory." The Court therefore affirmed the exclusion of the experts' testimony and the grant of summary judgment in favor of the railroad. View "Cornwell v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

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The parties in this case signed an arbitration agreement providing that arbitration would occur in accordance with the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) Code of Procedure, but the NAF became unavailable to administer its Code and the arbitration. Defendants moved the circuit court to appoint a substitute arbitrator under Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The circuit court concluded that a substitute arbitrator could not be appointed under Section 5 because the NAF Code of Procedure was integral to the parties' agreement to arbitrate and the NAF was unavailable to administer its Code. The Supreme Court reversed after considering the language of the arbitration agreement, the language of the NAF Code, and the federal policy expressed in the FAA, holding that Section 5 applied, and that absent some other defense, Section 5 required the appointment of a substitute arbitrator. View "Wright v. GGNSC Holdings LLC " on Justia Law

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Exum, an employer of Elrac, served a notice of intention to arbitrate on Elrac, seeking uninsured motorist benefits. Elrace petitioned to stay the arbitration. Supreme Court granted the petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, permitting the arbitration to proceed. The court affirmed and held that a self-insured employer whose employee was involved in an automobile accident could not be liable to that employee for uninsured motorist benefits, notwithstanding the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Law. View "Matter of Elrac, Inc. v Exum" on Justia Law

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Petitioner filed suit against respondent, alleging negligence, violation of resident's rights, and breach of fiduciary duty. Respondent moved to compel arbitration. Petitioner raised several issues on appeal. The court held that its decision was controlled in part by Shotts v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., another nursing home arbitration case. Pursuant to the court's reasoning in that case, the court held that the district court erred in the following respects: (i) in ruling that the limitation of liability provisions in this case, which placed a $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages and waived punitive damages, were severable; (ii) in failing to rule that the court, not the arbitrator, must decide whether the arbitration agreement violated public policy; and (iii) in failing to rule that the above limitation of liability provisions violated public policy. The court also held that the United States Supreme Court decision in Rent-A-Center, West. Inc. v. Jackson was inapplicable. View "Gessa, etc. v. Manor Care of Florida, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

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Petitioner, as personal representative of her uncle's estate, filed a complaint against respondent alleging negligence and breach of fiduciary duties. Respondent moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement petitioner had signed on her uncle's admission. The court held that the district court erred in failing to rule that the court, not the arbitrator, must decide whether the arbitration agreement violated public policy. The court also held that the district court erred in failing to rule that the limitations of remedies provisions in this case violated public policy, for they undermined specific statutory remedies created by the Legislature. The court further held that the district court erred in ruling that the limitations of remedies provisions that called for imposition of the American Health Lawyer Association rules was severable. The court finally concluded that the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson was inapplicable. View "Shotts, etc. v. OP Winter Haven, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a constructor, was sued by several people living in new homes built by Petitioner (Residents). Residents claimed they were injured by radon gas leaking into their homes because of improper construction by Petitioner. Petitioner argued that the agreement to purchase the new homes required Residents to arbitrate their claims, whether they signed the agreement or not. The circuit court found the arbitration provision ambiguous and unconscionable and refused to compel Residents into arbitration. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to compel Residents to arbitrate their claims. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the circuit court was within its authority to refuse to enforce the arbitration clause against Residents because the arbitration provision was ambiguous, unconscionable, and unenforceable. View "State ex rel. Richmond Am. Homes v. Jefferson County Circuit Court (Sanders)" on Justia Law

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From 2007 to 2008, Dorothy Rogers received Medicare benefits through Pacificare's federally-approved Medicare Advantage Plan, Secure Horizons. Rogers and Pacificare entered into separate contracts each year providing the terms and conditions of coverage. After receiving treatment from the Endoscopy Center of Southern Nevada (ECSN), a facility approved by Pacificare for use by its Secure Horizons plan members, Rogers tested positive for hepatitis C. Rogers sued Pacificare, alleging that Pacificare should be held responsible for her injuries because it failed to adopt and implement an appropriate quality assurance program. Pacificare moved to dismiss her claims and compel arbitration based on a provision in the parties' 2007 contract. The district court determined that the 2007 contract governed, but held that the arbitration provision was unconscionable and, thus, unenforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the parties in this case did not expressly rescind the arbitration provision at issue, the provision survived the 2007 contract's expiration and was properly invoked; and (2) as the Medicare Act expressly preempts any state laws or regulations with respect to the Medicare plan at issue in this case, Nevada's unconscionability doctrine was preempted to the extent that it would regulate federally-approved Medicare plans. View "Pacificare of Nevada v. Rogers" on Justia Law

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The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the appellate court erred in reversing a trial court's denial of Harold Wright's exception of res judicata. Mr. Wright was paralyzed and incapacitated by a medical accident in 1973. He received $1.7 million in damages. The court declared Mr. Wright an interdict and appointed his wife as his curatrix. In conjunction with the proceeding, the court issued an order allowing the curatrix to invest the damages in long-term bonds. No portion of the Mr. Wright's capital estate could be withdrawn from any long range investments without specific orders from the court. Through his investment bank Defendant A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. (and with the court's permission), Mr. Wright received disbursements from the invested damages award. In 2002, Mrs. Wright sued Defendant alleging breach of fiduciary duty. Specifically, she argued that A.G. Edwards and its agents misappropriated the entire $1.7 million and disbursed principal in violation of the court's order. Furthermore, Mrs. Wright alleged that when one of her account managers left A.G. Edwards to work for Morgan Stanley, he took Mr. Wright's remaining principal with him. The dispute went to arbitration. While pending, Mr. Wright died, thereby terminating the interdiction proceeding. An arbitration panel issued an award in favor of Defendants. Mr. Wright's estate then filed a motion with the district court, and Defendants filed several exceptions including an exception of res judicata where they contended the arbitration proceeding precluded further court action. The trial court denied the exception, and the appellate court reversed, dismissing the estate's claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitration award was unconfirmed, and therefore did not have a preclusive effect. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Interdiction of Harold Wright" on Justia Law

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Aurora Healthcare, Inc., Aurora Cares, LLC, (d/b/a Tara Cares) and Birmingham Nursing and Rehabilitation Center East, LLC appealed a circuit court order that denied their motion to compel arbitration. Mary Pettway, then 75 years old, was discharged from the hospital at the University of Alabama at Birmingham and admitted to a nursing home in Birmingham owned and operated by the defendants. She was returned to the hospital and then readmitted to the nursing home twice in the weeks following her initial discharge. Upon Pettway's first readmission, an arbitration agreement was executed, along with the other admission documents, on her behalf. Pettway was finally returned to the hospital, where she died on December 10, 2003. Sharon Ramsey, in her capacity as administratrix of Pettway's estate, filed a complaint against the defendants. The complaint asserted a variety of statutory and common-law claims allegedly arising from Pettway's death, including a wrongful-death claim. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for a change of venue. The parties litigated the issue of venue vigorously until the Wilcox Circuit Court entered an order transferring the case to the Jefferson Circuit Court. The "Aurora" defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that they did not own the nursing home at which Pettway resided during the relevant period. Because the Supreme Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support a determination that Ramsey was substantially prejudiced by defendants' belated assertion of their right to arbitration, "the order of the circuit court denying the defendants' motion to compel arbitration must be reversed. We are unable to determine, however, whether this case is due to be arbitrated." Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court's order denying the defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The Court remanded the case for that court to consider the motion to compel arbitration in light of the issues associated with the validity and scope of the arbitration agreement proffered by the defendants. View "Aurora Healthcare, Inc. v. Ramsey" on Justia Law

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This case was an interlocutory appeal from a circuit court which granted the "Motions to Compel Arbitration" of Pass Marianne, LLC (Pass) and Alfonso Realty, Inc. (Alfonso). On appeal, the Supreme Court considered: (1) whether Pass waived its right to arbitration, and (2) whether a principal’s waiver of its contractual right to arbitrate operates to waive that right for its agent. In 2005, Pass entered into a contract with Carl E. Woodward, LLC (Woodward) for the construction of a new condominium development, Pass Marianne Condominiums, in Pass Christian, Mississippi. In February, Pass and Lemon Drop Properties, LLC (Lemon Drop) entered into a "Preconstruction Sales and Purchase Agreement" for Unit No. 209 within the Pass Marianne Condominiums. Because of Hurricane Katrina, construction of the Pass Marianne Condominiums was not completed until 2007. On October 3, 2007, Pass executed a warranty deed conveying Unit No. 209 to Lemon Drop, and Woodward furnished a "Warranty of Completion of Construction" to Lemon Drop. On October 28, 2008, Lemon Drop filed a Complaint in the circuit court against Pass and Woodward, which sought, inter alia, rescission of the Agreement due to alleged defects in design and construction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that while Pass waived its right to compel arbitration, that waiver was not imputed to its agent, Alfonso. As there was no evidence of waiver by Alfonso, it should have been entitled to proceed in arbitration. Therefore, as to Alfonso the Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting arbitration was affirmed. But regarding Pass, Court reversed and remanded the circuit court's order for further proceedings. View "Lemon Drop Properties, LLC. v. Pass Marianne, LLC" on Justia Law