Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Lexington Insurance Company and Chartis, Inc. appealed a circuit court order that appointed a third arbitrator to the arbitration panel established to settle a dispute between Lexington and Southern Energy Homes, Inc. ("SEH"). From January 1, 2002, through October 31, 2004, SEH purchased from Lexington three commercial general-liability ("CGL") policies. An endorsement to a CGL policy insuring SEH from January 1, 2002, through December 31, 2002, provided that SEH is responsible for a $100,000 self-insurance retention ("SIR") "per occurrence." Endorsements to two successive CGL policies that together provided coverage to SEH through October 31, 2004, provide that SEH is responsible for a $250,000 SIR per occurrence. The SIR applied both to costs of defense incurred by SEH and to amounts SEH pays in settlement or pursuant to a judgment. From January 1, 2002, through October 31, 2004, SEH was named as a defendant in 46 lawsuits alleging property damage and personal injury resulting from SEH's using a vinyl-on-gypsum product in the homes it manufactured. SEH gave notice of these lawsuits to Lexington, and that it had exhausted its SIR amounts in the litigation and was entitled to reimbursement from Lexington. More than 120 days passed without SEH receiving a decision from Lexington as to whether it agreed with SEH's claim for this amount. SEH made an arbitration demand pursuant to the arbitration clauses of the CGL policies, including the SIR endorsement to the 2002 policy. Upon review of the policies in question, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in appointing the third arbitrator. The order was reversed and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lexington Insurance Co. v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc. " on Justia Law

Alpine Glass, Inc. appealed the district court's partial denial of Alpine's motion to consolidate 482 short-pay claims for arbitration against the Country Mutual Insurance Co. and five of its subsidiaries. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Alpine's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291 because the district court's order was not a final order; and (2) the denial of a motion to consolidate arbitrations does not imperil a substantial public interest sufficient to warrant jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, and therefore, the order was not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. View "Alpine Glass, Inc. v. Country Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the Fourth Circuit concerned commercial arbitration of insurance disputes in foreign tribunals. Appellant-Cross-Appellee ESAB Group, Inc. contended that South Carolina law "reverse preempts" federal law (namely, a treaty and its implementing legislation) pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act. ESAB Group faced numerous products liability suits arising from alleged personal injuries caused by exposure to welding consumables manufactured by ESAB Group or its predecessors. These suits presently were proceeding in numerous state and federal courts in the United States. ESAB Group requested that its insurers defend and indemnify it in these suits. Several, including Zurich Insurance, PLC (ZIP), refused coverage. As a result, ESAB Group brought suit against its insurers in South Carolina state court. The district court then found that ZIP had the requisite minimum contacts with the forum to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction and that the exercise of jurisdiction over ZIP was otherwise reasonable. Because it had referred to arbitration all claims providing a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. ESAB Group timely appealed the district court's exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction. ZIP filed a cross-appeal, challenging the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction and its authority to remand the nonarbitrable claims to state court. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit affirmed as to the district court’s exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction, and found no error in the district court's order compelling arbitration. Likewise, the Court rejected ZIP's arguments that the district court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over it and in remanding nonarbitrable claims to state court. View "ESAB Group, Incorporated v. Zurich Insurance PLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Wheeling Hospital and Belmont Hospital along with other medical providers, filed this putative class action in West Virginia state court against the Ohio Valley Health Services and Education Corporation, Ohio Valley Medical Center and East Ohio Regional Hospital, (collectively, the "OV Health System Parties"), and Appellant The Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, Inc. The plaintiffs sued in order to collect amounts allegedly owed to them by employee benefit plans established by the OV Health System Parties, for which The Health Plan acted as administrator. After pretrial activity, The Health Plan moved to dismiss the claims brought against it by the hospital plaintiffs pursuant to an arbitration agreement between the parties. The district court denied this motion, holding that The Health Plan had defaulted on its right to arbitrate. The Health Plan appealed. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its determination that The Health Plan defaulted on its right to arbitrate. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s denial of The Health Plan’s motion to dismiss. View "Wheeling Hospital, Inc. v. Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, Inc. " on Justia Law

Cogswell purchased the vacant paper mill in a tax foreclosure sale for $70,000. The site has more than 20 buildings, covering 440,700 square feet. Evanston issued first-party property insurance with a building coverage limit of $1,000,000, subject to coinsurance at 80%. On the first day of coverage, 15,700 square feet (less than 4%) were damaged by fire. Evanston determined that actual cash value of the buildings at the time of loss was $10,223,384.80; under the coinsurance provision, Cogswell was required to carry insurance of $8,178,707.84. Cogswell carried only $1 million. Evanston determined that it was liable for 12.23% ($1 million/ $8,178,707.84); calculated cash value of loss at $342,836.46; and determined that it was liable for $36,918.27 ($342,836.46 times 12.23% less $5,000 deductible). An umpire, appointed under the contract determined actual cash value of $1,540,000.00 and damage at $736,384.89. Cogswell demanded $554,553.49, the net amount under the appraisal after application of the coinsurance provision and deductible. The district court vacated the appraisal and granted Evanston judgment on a second appraisal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The provision calling for appointment of an umpire is not governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, which would require deference; the parties agreed to the process under Michigan law.View "Evanston Ins. Co. v. Cogswell Props., LLC" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals arose from the same facts: in 1990, Richard L. Parker applied to American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus (Aflac) for a cancer-indemnity insurance policy. Aflac issued Parker a policy. The term of the 1990 policy was month-to-month; the monthly premium was $28.50. Aflac received payments for the 1990 policy from August 25, 1990, to August 17, 1996. Parker applied for a new policy in May 1996 for when the 1990 policy was set to terminate. The 1996 policy took effect August 16, 1996, and used the same number as the 1990 policy. Parker renewed the policy once again in 2009, but the 2009 policy contained an arbitration clause. By a special waiver, the 2009 policy's language stated that Parker would give up his "current" policy and its benefits for the benefits in the new one. Parker paid according to the term of the 2009 policy. But in 2010, Parker sued Aflac asserting a claim of bad faith for Aflac's alleged failing to pay policy benefits owed under the 1990 policy. Aflac responded by filing a motion to compel arbitration according to the terms of the 2009 policy. The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion and denied it. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Aflac satisfied its burden of proving that an arbitration agreement existed that applied to Parker's claims against it. Because there was no issue as to whether the contract containing the arbitration agreement affected interstate commerce, the burden then shifted to Parker to offer evidence refuting the evidence offered by Aflac and Hunter; Parker offered no evidence to refute that evidence and presented "no persuasive argument" that Aflac failed to meet its burden. The Court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "American Family Life Assurance Company of Columbus v. Parker " on Justia Law

Insured, who was injured, submitted a claim to Insurer under her underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage after exhausting the policy limits of the underinsured motorist. An arbitration panel concluded that the court of appeals decision in Heritage Mutual v. Graser precluded Insured from recovering under her UIM coverage the value of medical expenses that were written off by her medical provider. The circuit court modified the arbitration award to include the reasonable value of the written-off medical expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration panel's decision in this case was properly modified by the circuit court because the arbitrators exceeded their authority by failing to fully review the Court's decisions on the collateral source rule and the law of damages. The Court overruled Graser to the extent that it held that the collateral source rule had no application in cases involving UIM coverage, because according to precedent, an injured party is entitled to recover the reasonable value of medical services, which, under the operation of the collateral source rule, includes written-off medical expenses. View "Orlowski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Auto Owners Insurance, Inc. (Auto Owners) appealed a circuit court's denial of its motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration in an action against it filed by Blackmon Insurance Agency, Inc. Blackmon and Auto Owners entered into an "agency agreement" authorizing Blackmon to act as an agent for the sale of Auto Owners' insurance in Alabama (the 1995 agreement). A 2005 document entitled "Letter of Instructions" was alleged to be an independent document from the 1995 agreement. Auto Owners contended that the 2005 document was contemplated by and incorporated into the 1995 agreement. The 2005 document contained instructions governing the issuance of a variety of bonds by an agency of Auto Owners. In late 2010, Blackmon filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment as to the arbitrability of a dispute between Blackmon and Auto Owners as to which Auto Owners had already initiated arbitration proceedings in its home state of Michigan. Blackmon also alleged that in the Michigan arbitration proceeding Auto Owners based its claims on the 2005 document and a 2009 agreement. Upon review of the matter, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in denying Auto Owners' motion to compel arbitration. The Court therefore reversed that order and remanded the case for the circuit court to grant the motion to compel arbitration and either issue a stay of these proceedings pending arbitration or dismiss the case. View "Auto Owners Insurance, Inc. v. Blackmon Insurance Agency, Inc. " on Justia Law

In 2005, Plaintiff Marlene Harris purchased a car from Defendant David Stanley Chevrolet. Her purchase agreement contained an arbitration provision that applied to any "controversy, claim or dispute between the Purchaser and the Dealer arising out of, or related to this sale or transaction, including but not limited to, any and all issues or disputes arising as a result of this sale or transaction whether said issues arise prior to, during or subsequent to the sale or attempted sale of a vehicle." A few days after executing the purchase agreement, Plaintiff entered into a GAP insurance contract sold to her by an employee of the dealership (acting as an agent of the insurance company). In 2009, the car was a total loss. The GAP insurance company refused to pay the total difference between the insurance proceeds and the amount owed on the car, and Plaintiff sued to compel the GAP coverage. Plaintiff maintained that the purchase of the vehicle and the purchase of the policy were separate transactions, and that the arbitration clause of the purchase contract was inapplicable to the underpayment of coverage (GAP coverage). She argued no claim was brought against the GAP insurance company which was related to the sale or financing of the vehicle, conceding the arbitration clause would have applied to claims related to the sale or financing issues. After reviewing the motions of the parties, the trial court denied Defendant's Motion to Compel arbitration without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the two contracts involved two separate subjects, executed on different dates, and the arbitration clause in the purchase agreement did not mention or reference GAP insurance or any relationship between the two contracts. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the evidentiary hearing and ruling that the arbitration clause did not apply as a matter of law.View "Harris v. David Stanley Chevrolet, Inc." on Justia Law

St. Paul appealed from the district court's grant of a petition by Scandinavian to vacate an arbitral award in St. Paul's favor and denying a cross-petition by St. Paul to confirm the same award. St. Paul had initiated the arbitration to resolve a dispute concerning the interpretation of the parties' reinsurance contract. The principal issue on appeal was whether the failure of two arbitrators to disclose their concurrent service as arbitrators in another, arguably similar, arbitration constituted "evident partiality" within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(2). The court concluded, under the circumstances, that the fact of the arbitrators' overlapping service in both the Platinum Arbitration and the St. Paul Arbitration did not, in itself, suggest that they were predisposed to rule in any particular way in the St. Paul Arbitration. As a result, their failure to disclose that concurrent service was not indicative of evident partiality. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with instruction to the district court to affirm the award. View "Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins." on Justia Law