Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, John and Colm Farrell, were allegedly involved in a motor vehicle accident with an insured of Defendant, Twenty-First Century Insurance Company. Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendant, seeking damages for personal injuries arising out of the accident. During a pretrial conference, the parties agreed to settle Plaintiffs' claims and, allegedly, further agreed to arbitrate Plaintiffs' claims. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendant seeking a court order to compel arbitration. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that there was no clear manifestation of an agreement to arbitrate. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that, after drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, no genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to whether the parties had an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. View "Farrell v. Twenty-First Century Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This action arose from a final arbitration award made in favor of defendant where plaintiff sought to vacate the award. At issue was whether the Arbitration Award should be filed under seal. Also at issue was whether the arbitrator concealed material information about past adversarial relationships with plaintiff-related entities amounting to evident partiality requiring the court to vacate the Arbitration Award. The court held that the existence of a confidentiality order did not necessarily require, without regard for whether it applied to the Arbitration Award or not, the sealing of the award. Rather, Court of Chancery Rule 5(g) controlled the treatment of that award and mandated that plaintiff show good cause as to why the Arbitration Award should be sealed. The court also held that because plaintiff was entitled to limited discovery into the arbitrator's alleged adversarial relationship with it, the court denied defendant's motion for a protective order and held in abeyance the entry of a scheduling order on motions for summary judgment. View "Chartis Specialty Ins. Co. v. LaSalle Bank, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs filed a nationwide consumer class action against Life of the South Insurance Company (Life of the South). At issue was whether Life of the South had a right to enforce against plaintiffs the arbitration clause in the loan agreement, between plaintiffs and the car dealership where they purchased their vehicle, where the loan agreement lead plaintiffs to enter into a separate credit life insurance contract with Life of the South. The court held that the loan agreement did not show, on its face or elsewhere, an intent to allow anyone other than plaintiffs, the car dealership, and Chase Manhattan, and the assignees of the dealership of Chase Manhattan, to compel arbitration of a dispute and Life of the South was none of those. The court also held that because the only claims plaintiffs asserted were based on the terms of their credit life insurance policy with Life of the South, which did not contain an arbitration clause, equitable estoppel did not allow Life of the South to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Life of the South's motion to compel arbitration. View "Lawson, et al. v. Life of the South Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This lawsuit arose from the dispute between the parties about how much appellant was obligated to pay appellee for auto-glass goods and services rendered on behalf of appellant's insureds. Appellants appealed from the district court's orders dismissing its counterclaim that appellee violated Minnesota's anti-incentive statute, Minn. Stat. 325F.783, granting summary judgment in favor of appellee on appellant's counterclaim for breach of contract, and denying appellant's motion to vacate the arbitration award. The court held that, given the plain language of the statute and the ordinary meaning of the terms of rebate and credit, appellee's practice did not violate the anti-incentive statute. The court also held that even if the blast faxes at issue constituted offers to enter into unilateral contracts, appellee rejected the offers when its actions failed to conform to the terms of the offer. The court further held that the arbitration award did not require reversal or new proceedings because the award was based on the finding that appellant failed to pay the competitive price standard set forth in the applicable endorsement and Minnesota law.

Defendant appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, compelling arbitration of a dispute related to healthcare benefits under an expired collective bargaining agreement. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and issuing an order compelling the arbitration. The court reversed and held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment and compelling arbitration where both parties vigorously disputed issues of both law and fact, including whether the 1994 agreement was ambiguous and whether the summary plan descriptions constituted an intrinsic or extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. The parties also point to various other extrinsic evidence and vehemently disagree as to whether the bargained for fully-paid health insurance premiums for life or just for the term of the agreement. Under these circumstances, the court held that the question of whether the right to fully-paid premiums vested under the 1994 agreement was best decided in the first instance by the district court and therefore, remanded for further proceedings.

Appellants Bruce and Cindy Thompson filed a claim for basic economic loss benefits against their insurer, Respondent Western National Insurance Company (Western National), arising from injuries they sustained in an automobile accident. Western National paid some benefits, but a dispute arose over the Thompsonsâ obligation to submit to examinations requested by Western National. The Thompsons filed for no-fault arbitration, and Western National moved to stay the arbitration in order to seek a declaratory judgment in the district court. The arbitrator entered awards in favor of the Thompsons. In court, Western National moved for summary judgment, and the Thompsons moved to confirm their awards. The district court denied Western Nationalâs motion and confirmed the awards, concluding that the reasonableness of the Thompsonsâ refusal to attend the examinations was an issue handled by the arbitrator. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the examination question was a question of law for the court to decide. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding that the examination issue was a question of fact for the arbitrator. The Court reinstated the arbitration awards in favor of the Thompsons.