Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

This case concerned an arbitration provision that allowed each party to appoint one arbitrator to a panel, subject to certain requirements. At issue was whether Americo wavied its objection to the removal of the arbitrator it selected. The underlying dispute concerned the financing mechanism for Americo's purchase of several insurance companies from Robert Myer. Pursuant to the financing agreement, Americo and Myer submitted their dispute to arbitration under American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules. The arbitrators found in favor of Myer, and Americo filed a motion to vacate the award. The trial court granted the motion, holding that Americo was entitled to any arbitrator that met the requirements set forth in the financing agreement and that the arbitrator removed by the AAA met those requirements. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Americo had waived these arguments by not presenting them to the AAA. Because the record demonstrated otherwise, the court rejected the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. View "Americo Life, Inc., et al. v. Myer, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant is a captive insurer owned by plaintiff plans across the nation. In 2003 healthcare providers filed class action suits in Florida against all of those plans. Twelve plans, which had errors-and-omissions insurance from defendant, asked it to assume the defense and indemnify. Defendant declined, and the plans demanded arbitration. Acting under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 5, the district court held that the arbitrators could determine whether arbitration of a class action or consolidated arbitration were authorized by contract and appointed a third arbitrator. The court dismissed the appeal of the court's first ruling for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the appointment. If defendant wanted a judge to decide whether the plans' demands should be arbitrated jointly or separately, it should have refused to appoint an arbitrator. Both sides appointed arbitrators, however, and the proceeding got under way. Nothing in the Federal Arbitration Act authorizes anticipatory review of the arbitrators' anticipated decisions on procedural questions. View "Blue Cross Blue Shield of MA, Inc. v. BCS Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Exum, an employer of Elrac, served a notice of intention to arbitrate on Elrac, seeking uninsured motorist benefits. Elrace petitioned to stay the arbitration. Supreme Court granted the petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, permitting the arbitration to proceed. The court affirmed and held that a self-insured employer whose employee was involved in an automobile accident could not be liable to that employee for uninsured motorist benefits, notwithstanding the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Law. View "Matter of Elrac, Inc. v Exum" on Justia Law

Appellees executed a credit application and retail installment contract (RIC) for the purchase of an automobile. The application contained an arbitration agreement. The RIC provided an option for Appellees to purchase credit-life insurance coverage with Insurer. Appellees subsequently filed a class action against Insurer seeking the refund of unearned credit-life insurance premiums from the date they paid off their loan until the original maturity date of the loan. Insurer filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the terms of the arbitration agreement. The circuit court denied the motion after finding that the dispute was governed by Ark. Code Ann. 16-108-201(b), thereby preventing Insurer from compelling Appellees to arbitrate a dispute under an insurance policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not allow the Federal Arbitration Act to preempt section 16-108-201(b), and section 16-108-201(b) prohibited arbitration under these facts; and (2) the principles of equitable estoppel did apply to allow Insurer to compel arbitration. View "S. Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas" on Justia Law

This action came before the court following the insolvency and proposed rehabilitation of a Delaware insurance company. At issue was whether the arbitration clause in the reinsurance agreements between the insolvent insurance company and the reinsurer were enforceable against the receiver under Delaware law. If so, the question became whether this court should, in its discretion, require the parties to honor their agreement to arbitrate in light of the ongoing rehabilitation of the insurer. The court held that Delaware law permitted enforcement of the arbitration clause of the reinsurance agreements against the receiver and that the parties should be required to arbitrate their competing claims to the disputed cash. In addition, the court ordered a partial stay of the proceedings pending resolution of the arbitration. View "In the Matter of The Rehabilitation of Manhattan Re-Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case arose when Cat Tech sought indemnification from its insurers after Cat Tech damaged several components of a hyrotreating reactor owned by Ergon Refining, Inc. and arbitrators entered an award against Cat Tech for the damage. Insurers subsequently denied the claim, contending, inter alia, that the "your work" exclusion found in the policies precluded coverage for damage to the reactor. The district court found that insurers had no duty to indemnify Cat Tech. The court held that the information contained in the arbitration award was insufficient to properly apply the "your work" exclusion. As such, the court concluded that the district court erred when it relied on the award in granting insurer's summary judgment motion. On remand, the district court should conduct any additional fact-finding necessary to determine whether the damage suffered by Ergon's reactor was limited only to those components upon which Cat Tech worked, or instead included other components unrelated to Cat Tech's operations. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "American Home Assurance Co, et al. v. Cat Tech L.L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, John and Colm Farrell, were allegedly involved in a motor vehicle accident with an insured of Defendant, Twenty-First Century Insurance Company. Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendant, seeking damages for personal injuries arising out of the accident. During a pretrial conference, the parties agreed to settle Plaintiffs' claims and, allegedly, further agreed to arbitrate Plaintiffs' claims. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendant seeking a court order to compel arbitration. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that there was no clear manifestation of an agreement to arbitrate. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that, after drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, no genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to whether the parties had an enforceable agreement to arbitrate. View "Farrell v. Twenty-First Century Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This action arose from a final arbitration award made in favor of defendant where plaintiff sought to vacate the award. At issue was whether the Arbitration Award should be filed under seal. Also at issue was whether the arbitrator concealed material information about past adversarial relationships with plaintiff-related entities amounting to evident partiality requiring the court to vacate the Arbitration Award. The court held that the existence of a confidentiality order did not necessarily require, without regard for whether it applied to the Arbitration Award or not, the sealing of the award. Rather, Court of Chancery Rule 5(g) controlled the treatment of that award and mandated that plaintiff show good cause as to why the Arbitration Award should be sealed. The court also held that because plaintiff was entitled to limited discovery into the arbitrator's alleged adversarial relationship with it, the court denied defendant's motion for a protective order and held in abeyance the entry of a scheduling order on motions for summary judgment. View "Chartis Specialty Ins. Co. v. LaSalle Bank, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose when plaintiffs filed a nationwide consumer class action against Life of the South Insurance Company (Life of the South). At issue was whether Life of the South had a right to enforce against plaintiffs the arbitration clause in the loan agreement, between plaintiffs and the car dealership where they purchased their vehicle, where the loan agreement lead plaintiffs to enter into a separate credit life insurance contract with Life of the South. The court held that the loan agreement did not show, on its face or elsewhere, an intent to allow anyone other than plaintiffs, the car dealership, and Chase Manhattan, and the assignees of the dealership of Chase Manhattan, to compel arbitration of a dispute and Life of the South was none of those. The court also held that because the only claims plaintiffs asserted were based on the terms of their credit life insurance policy with Life of the South, which did not contain an arbitration clause, equitable estoppel did not allow Life of the South to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Life of the South's motion to compel arbitration. View "Lawson, et al. v. Life of the South Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This lawsuit arose from the dispute between the parties about how much appellant was obligated to pay appellee for auto-glass goods and services rendered on behalf of appellant's insureds. Appellants appealed from the district court's orders dismissing its counterclaim that appellee violated Minnesota's anti-incentive statute, Minn. Stat. 325F.783, granting summary judgment in favor of appellee on appellant's counterclaim for breach of contract, and denying appellant's motion to vacate the arbitration award. The court held that, given the plain language of the statute and the ordinary meaning of the terms of rebate and credit, appellee's practice did not violate the anti-incentive statute. The court also held that even if the blast faxes at issue constituted offers to enter into unilateral contracts, appellee rejected the offers when its actions failed to conform to the terms of the offer. The court further held that the arbitration award did not require reversal or new proceedings because the award was based on the finding that appellant failed to pay the competitive price standard set forth in the applicable endorsement and Minnesota law.