Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

First State Insurance Company and New England Reinsurance Corporation (collectively, First State) entered into several reinsurance and retrocession agreements with a reinsurer, National Casualty Company (National). First State demanded arbitration under eight of these agreements to resolve disputes about billing disputes and the interpretation of certain contract provisions relating to payment of claims. The arbitrators handed down a contract interpretation award that established a payment protocol under the agreements. First State filed a petition pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act to confirm the contract interpretation award, and National filed a cross-petition to vacate the award. A federal district court summarily confirmed both the contract interpretation award and the final arbitration award. After noting that “a federal court’s authority to defenestrate an arbitration award is extremely limited,” the First Circuit affirmed, holding that the arbitrators “even arguably” construed the underlying agreements and, thus, acted within the scope of their contractually delineated powers in confirming the contract interpretation award. View "First State Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Cas. Co." on Justia Law

This action involved a dispute arising from the construction of a large house. Interstate Mechanical, Inc. initiated an arbitration action to recover payments it claimed as a result of its work on the house project. Abbey/Land LLC and Glacier Construction Partners LLC (collectively, Plaintiffs) then filed suit against Interstate in Montana District Court in Flathead County. Thereafter, Glacier asserted counterclaims in the Interstate arbitration proceeding and obtained a positive arbitration award against Interstate. Abbey/Land subsequently filed an amended complaint dismissing Glacier as a plaintiff and naming it as a defendant. Glacier tendered the Abbey/Land claims to its insurer, James River Insurance Company. James River refused to provide defense or indemnity. Glacier and Abbey/Land settled the Flathead County action as between themselves. James River moved to intervene in the Flathead County action to challenge the reasonableness of the confessed judgment against Glacier. Meanwhile, Abbey/Land and Glacier entered settlements with all other parties. The district court never ruled on James River’s motion to intervene and entered final judgment against Glacier. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in entering judgment without considering either its motion to intervene or the reasonableness of the confessed judgment. View "Abbey/Land LLC v. Interstate Mechanical, Inc." on Justia Law

Russ Irwin brought an arbitration proceeding against Lyman Morse Boatbuilding, Inc. (LMB) of Maine and Cabot Lyman, the controlling owner of LMB, claiming damages related to the allegedly defective construction of a luxury yacht. After Northern Assurance Company of America, the insurer for LMB and Lyman, refused the insureds’ request for defense, LMB and Lyman filed this federal suit seeking to recover the costs and attorneys’ fees they incurred in the arbitration proceeding. The district court concluded that Northern Assurance had a duty to defend Lyman but did not have a duty to defend LMB. The First Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Northern Assurance, holding that, under Maine law, the insurer did not owe a duty to defend LMB or Lyman in the underlying arbitration proceeding. View "Lyman Morse Boatbuilding Inc. v. N. Assurance Co." on Justia Law

This suit arose out of an insurance policy SWEPCO, a public electric utility serving Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas, purchased from Underwriters for coverage associated with the construction of a power plant in Louisiana. On appeal, SWEPCO challenged the district court's order granting Underwriters' motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that the district court's order was not a final, appealable order within the meaning of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. 201-08, or the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1-16. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Southwestern Elec. Power Co., et al. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London" on Justia Law

Pine Top, an insurer, sued Banco, an entity wholly owned by Uruguay, claiming that Banco owes $2,352,464.08 under reinsurance contracts. The complaint sought to compel arbitration but alternately proposed that the court enter judgment for breach of contract. Pine Top moved to strike Banco’s answer for failure to post security under Illinois insurance law. The district court denied the motion and later denied the motion to compel arbitration. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which prohibits attaching a foreign state’s property, thereby preventing application of the Illinois security requirement, 28 U.S.C. 1609. Banco did not waive its immunity in the manner allowed by that law and Pine Top forfeited contentions that the McCarran-Ferguson Act allows a state rule to govern. On the arbitration question, the court held that denials of motions to compel arbitration under the Panama Convention are immediately appealable under 9 U.S.C. 16(a)(1)(B), but that the contract language, reasonably read, does not transfer the right to demand arbitration. View "Pine Top Receivables of IL, LLC v. Banco de Seguros del Estado" on Justia Law

Hennessy, a car parts manufacturer, beset by asbestos-related personal injury claims, sought coverage by National Union. The companies entered into a cost sharing agreement in 2008. As claims occurred, Hennessy asked National Union to indemnify its settlement and defense costs. To resolve their differences about what was owed, Hennessy demanded arbitration under the agreement, which instructs arbitrators to apply Illinois law. Hennessy filed suit under the Illinois Insurance Code 215 ILCS 5/155(1), which provides that, in cases involving vexatious and unreasonable delay, the court may award reasonable attorney fees, other costs, plus an additional amount. Hennessy claimed that National Union’s delays in providing coverage were vexatious and unreasonable. The district judge declined to dismiss, acknowledging a provision that “the arbitrators shall not be empowered or have jurisdiction to award punitive damages, fines or penalties,” but expressing a belief that Hennessy’s claim arose under statutory law rather than under the cost-sharing agreement. National Union appealed under 9 U.S.C. 16(a)(1)(A), (B), the Federal Arbitration Act. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Hennessy waived any right to ask the arbitrator to award punitive damages, fines, or penalties for an allegedly unreasonable delay. Having submitted a dispute to arbitration that explicitly excludes a particular remedy, a party cannot sue in court for that remedy. View "Hennessy Indus., Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute between an insurance carrier (Plaintiff) and its insured (Defendant) regarding Plaintiff’s obligation to pay underinsured motorist benefits. An arbitration panel concluded that the issue of whether the relevant policy provisions provided coverage for the claim should be resolved under the choice of law rules governing claims sounding in tort, rather than claims sounding in insurance and contract, and therefore, that New Jersey law rather than Connecticut law governed Defendant’s claim for uninsured motorist benefits under the policy. The trial court vacated the arbitration award, and the Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court, in its opinion adopting the decision of the trial court, properly applied sections 6(2), 188 and 193 of the Restatement (Second), contract choice of law, to determine that Connecticut law governed the claim. View "Gen. Accident Ins. Co. v. Mortara" on Justia Law

Flintkote was a major supplier of asbestos-based products and was covered by insurance policies from London insurance firms, including Aviva, one of the world’s largest insurers. It became apparent that claims under these policies would result in protracted disputes regarding the scope of coverage. In 1985, Flintkote and several insurers, but not Aviva, entered into the Wellington Agreement, which required that coverage disputes be resolved through ADR consisting of open mediation, binding arbitration, and an expedited appellate process; that the insurers make payments to Flintkote; and that Flintkote reimburse with interest, if it also received those same payments from another insurer. In 1989, Flintkote and Aviva entered into a separate agreement, similar to the Wellington Agreement, including as to reimbursement for claims also paid by other insurers. The1989 Agreement explicitly reserves each party’s right to resolve disputes through litigation. Flintkote filed for bankruptcy in 2004. In 2006, invoking the Wellington Agreement, Flintkote initiated coverage-related mediation with the insurers. Aviva, although not obligated to participate, opted to join. During mediation, Flintkote reached settlements with some insurers, but not with Aviva. In 2012, Aviva and the remaining other insurers sought reimbursement or off-set with respect to prior payments and interest under the Wellington Agreement. Flintkote took no action. Aviva, acting separately, moved to lift the automatic bankruptcy stay. Before the Bankruptcy Court ruled on Aviva’s motion, Flintkote moved to compel arbitration pursuant the Federal Arbitration Act. The district court granted Flintkote’s motion to compel arbitration, concluding that Aviva was equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration by virtue of its participation in the lengthy mediation process. The Third Circuit reversed. View "Flintkote Co v. Aviva PLC" on Justia Law

The Providers supply outpatient cardiac telemetry (OCT) services, used by doctors to monitor cardiac arrhythmias. The device differs from conventional technology in that it transmits electrocardiographic (EKG) data in real time to certified technicians, who forward the data to a physician. OCT is approved by the FDA, and has long been covered by Medicare and commercial insurers. CIGNA administers employer sponsored health benefit plans. CIGNA pays its in-network providers directly for the services rendered to patients. In 2007, the Providers joined CIGNA’s network by Agreements that set the reimbursement rate and define “Covered Services.” In 2012, CIGNA issued a statement that it would no longer cover OCT “for any indication because it is considered experimental, investigational or unproven.” The 2012 Policy acknowledged that this new position would be trumped by any conflicting language in the coverage policies themselves. In arriving at the new policy, CIGNA relied on the same medical literature it had previously relied upon in concluding that OCT should be covered. The Providers claim that CIGNA indicated that its motive was financial, but refused to reconsider the 2012 Policy. The district court found that the Providers’ claims fell within the arbitration clause of the Agreement. The Third Circuit vacated. The clause at issue is limited in scope to disputes “regarding the performance or interpretation of the Agreement” and the claims at issue do not relate to the performance or interpretation of the Agreement.View "Cardionet Inc v. Cigna Health Corp." on Justia Law

A contract for reinsurance between National and Meadowbrook required both parties to submit any reinsurance disputes to a three-member arbitration panel to be comprised of “two arbitrators and an umpire” who were “active or retired disinterested officials of the insurance or reinsurance companies, or Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, not under the control of either party.” After Meadowbrook initiated arbitration, National named Rosen and Meadowbrook named Schlaybaugh as arbitrators. They deadlocked in selecting an umpire, exchanged slates of candidates, and chose Greene, who disclosed that he was a personal friend of Rosen and that both were members of the reinsurance industry group The panel adopted orders that, “Ex parte communications with any member of the Panel shall cease upon the filing of the parties’ initial pre-hearing briefs.” The panel issued a unanimous Interim Final Award, resolving issues of liability in favor of National, but did not calculate a final damages award at that time. Rosen resumed ex parte communications and National disclosed those communications. After the panel rejected Meadowbrook’s submissions concerning damages, Meadowbrook claimed that it had disenfranchised Schlaybaugh. National claimed that a swift decision was needed, that Schlaybaugh was on vacation and could not be reached, and that his participation would have made no difference. The district court enjoined proceedings. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that judicial review of arbitral decisions is narrow and deferential.View "Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law