Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

This case arose when Leeward and AUA entered into an agreement for Leeward to build a medical school for AUA in Antigua. AUA subsequently appealed the district court's confirmation of an international arbitration award entered in favor of Leeward. AUA principally argues that the district court erred in confirming the award because the arbitration panel failed to fulfill its obligation to produce a reasoned award.The court held, however, that an arbitration decision need not contain a line‐by‐line analysis of damages awarded to be considered a reasoned award. Rather, an arbitration award is a reasoned award when it contains a substantive discussion of the panel’s rationale. The court considered AUA's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. The court disposed of Case No. 15-1595-cv in a separate summary order issued concurrently with this decision. View "Leeward Construction Co. v. American Univ. of Antigua" on Justia Law

Diag Human appealed the district court's dismissal, sua sponte, of its claim for enforcement of a foreign arbitral award for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found for Diag Human on both of the contested Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(6), issues here: Diag Human and the Czech Republic shared a legal relationship, and their arbitration “may” be governed by the New York Convention. Therefore, the Czech Republic is not entitled to sovereign immunity in this matter under the FSIA’s arbitration exception. Here, Diag Human’s relationship with the Czech Republic qualifies as a commercial legal relationship, and the arbitration at issue here arises out of that commercial legal relationship. Because a legal basis exists for federal courts to enforce this arbitration award, the court concluded that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Whether the arbitration award is final will be a question going to the merits of the case, as it could determine whether the arbitration award can be enforced or not. The court expresses no view on the matter. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Diag Human S.E. v. Czech Republic - Ministry of Health" on Justia Law

The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 21 U.S.T. 2517, requires signatory states to recognize written arbitration agreements “concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.” In this appeal, the court addressed an issue of first impression for the Circuit: whether a cruise ship employee who is injured on the job, and whose employment contract contains an arbitration agreement governed by the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 201, can bar arbitration by showing that high costs may prevent him from effectively vindicating his federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum. The court concluded that it need not definitely answer this question because, even if the court were to assume that plaintiff could raise a cost-based (public policy) defense in response to NCL's motion to compel arbitration, on this record he has plainly failed to establish that the costs of arbitration would preclude him from arbitrating his federal statutory claims. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s order compelling the parties to arbitrate. However, the court denied defendant's motion for sanctions. View "Suazo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Archangel Diamond Corporation Liquidating Trust, as successor-in-interest to Archangel Diamond Corporation (collectively, “Archangel”), appealed dismissal of its civil case against defendant OAO Lukoil (“Lukoil”), in which it alleged claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), breach of contract, and commercial tort law. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Lukoil and under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Archangel Diamond Corporation was a Canadian company and bankrupt. The liquidating trust was located in Colorado. In 1993, Archangel entered into an agreement with State Enterprise Arkhangelgeology (“AGE”), a Russian state corporation, regarding a potential license to explore and develop diamond mining operations in the Archangelsk region of Russia. Archangel and AGE agreed that Archangel would provide additional funds and that the license would be transferred to their joint venture company. However, the license was never transferred and remained with AGE. In 1995, AGE was privatized and became Arkhangelskgeoldobycha (“AGD”), and the license was transferred to AGD. Diamonds worth an estimated $5 billion were discovered within the license region. In 1998, Lukoil acquired a controlling stake in AGD, eventually making AGD a wholly owned subsidiary of Lukoil. Pursuant to an agreement, arbitration took place in Stockholm, Sweden, to resolve the license transfer issue. When AGD failed to honor the agreement, Archangel reactivated the Stockholm arbitration, but the arbitrators this time concluded that they lacked jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute even as to AGD. Archangel then sued AGD and Lukoil in Colorado state court. AGD and Lukoil removed the case to Colorado federal district court. The district court remanded the case, concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because all of the claims were state law claims. The state trial court then dismissed the case against both AGD and Lukoil based on lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal as to AGD, reversed as to Lukoil, and remanded (leaving Lukoil as the sole defendant). On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s previous dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, which it had not addressed before, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The trial court granted Lukoil and AGD's motion to hold an evidentiary hearing, and the parties engaged in jurisdictional discovery. In 2008 and early 2009, the case was informally stayed while the parties discussed settlement and conducted discovery. By June 2009, Archangel had fallen into bankruptcy due to the expense of the litigation. On Lukoil’s motion and over the objection of Archangel, the district court referred the matter to the bankruptcy court, concluding that the matter was related to Archangel’s bankruptcy proceedings. Lukoil then moved the bankruptcy court to abstain from hearing the matter, and the bankruptcy court concluded that it should abstain. The bankruptcy court remanded the case to the Colorado state trial court. The state trial court again dismissed the action. While these state-court appeals were still pending, Archangel filed this case before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, maintaining that Lukoil had a wide variety of jurisdictional contacts with Colorado and the United States as a whole. Finding no reversible error in the district court's ruling dismissing the case on forum non conveniens grounds, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Archangel Diamond v. OAO Lukoil" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a dispute between Ecuador and Chevron involving a series of lawsuits related to an investment and development agreement. On appeal, Ecuador challenged the district court's confirmation of an international arbitral award to Chevron. In this case, the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) includes a standing offer to all potential U.S. investors to arbitrate investment disputes, which Chevron accepted in the manner required by the treaty. Therefore, the court concluded that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1604, allows federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over Ecuador in order to consider an action to confirm or enforce the award. The dispute over whether the lawsuits were “investments” for purposes of the treaty is properly considered as part of review under the Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), 9 U.S.C. 201-208. The court further concluded that, even if it were to conclude that the FSIA required a de novo determination of arbitrability, the court still would find that the district court had jurisdiction where Ecuador failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Chevron's suits were not "investments" within the meaning of the BIT. Likewise, the court rejected Ecuador's arguments against confirmation of the award under the New York Convention as meritless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chevron Corp. v. The Republic of Ecuador" on Justia Law

BSDL petitioned the district court to confirm an arbitration award rendered against the government of Belize. The district court entered judgment in favor of BSDL. The arbitration award arises out of the alleged breach by Belize of a 2005 agreement between Belize and Belize Telemedia Limited, BSDL’s predecessor in interest. The court concluded that the language of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(6), arbitration exception makes clear that the agreement to arbitrate is severable from the underlying contract. In order to succeed in its claim that there was no “agreement made by the foreign state . . . to submit to arbitration,” Belize must show that the Prime Minister lacked authority to enter into the arbitration agreement. Belize has failed to do this and therefore, Belize failed to carry its burden of establishing that BSDL’s allegations do not bring this case within the FSIA’s arbitration exception. The court rejected Belize's remaining arguments and affirmed the judgment. View "Belize Social Dev. Ltd. v. Government of Belize" on Justia Law

AVR, an Israeli corporation, and Interton, a Minnesota corporation, produce hearing aid technology, and entered into an Agreement, giving Interton a 20 percent interest in AVR. During negotiations, they discussed integrating AVR's DFC technology into Interton's products, and Interton's purchase of AVR's W.C. components. The Agreement incorporated terms indicating that the Agreement would be governed by the laws of the State of Israel and that “Any dispute between the parties relating to (or arising out of) the provisions of this Agreement … will be referred exclusively to the decision of a single arbitrator … bound by Israeli substantive law.” AVR commenced arbitration in Israel. Interton participated, but believed that disputes concerning DFC and W.C. were separate and not subject to arbitration. The Israeli Supreme Court rejected Interton's objection to the scope of arbitration, citing the "relating to (or arising out of)" language. An Israeli arbitrator awarded AVR $2,675,000 on its DFC and W.C. claims, plus fees and expenses. After the award became final in Israel, in accordance with the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. 201, AVR successfully petitioned the district court for recognition and enforcement in the US. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Convention does not allow Interton to relitigate the scope of arbitration in an American court. View "AVR Commc'ns, Ltd. v. Am. Hearing Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

This suit arose out of an insurance policy SWEPCO, a public electric utility serving Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas, purchased from Underwriters for coverage associated with the construction of a power plant in Louisiana. On appeal, SWEPCO challenged the district court's order granting Underwriters' motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that the district court's order was not a final, appealable order within the meaning of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. 201-08, or the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1-16. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Southwestern Elec. Power Co., et al. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London" on Justia Law

Pine Top, an insurer, sued Banco, an entity wholly owned by Uruguay, claiming that Banco owes $2,352,464.08 under reinsurance contracts. The complaint sought to compel arbitration but alternately proposed that the court enter judgment for breach of contract. Pine Top moved to strike Banco’s answer for failure to post security under Illinois insurance law. The district court denied the motion and later denied the motion to compel arbitration. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, citing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which prohibits attaching a foreign state’s property, thereby preventing application of the Illinois security requirement, 28 U.S.C. 1609. Banco did not waive its immunity in the manner allowed by that law and Pine Top forfeited contentions that the McCarran-Ferguson Act allows a state rule to govern. On the arbitration question, the court held that denials of motions to compel arbitration under the Panama Convention are immediately appealable under 9 U.S.C. 16(a)(1)(B), but that the contract language, reasonably read, does not transfer the right to demand arbitration. View "Pine Top Receivables of IL, LLC v. Banco de Seguros del Estado" on Justia Law

An investment treaty between the U.K. and Argentina authorizes a party to submit a dispute to “the competent tribunal of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment was made,” and permits arbitration if, 18 months after such submission, the tribunal has not made a final decision. BG, a British firm, had an interest in MetroGAS, an Argentine entity licensed to distribute natural gas in Buenos Aires. At the time of BG’s investment, Argentine law provided that gas tariffs would be calculated in U.S. dollars and would be set at levels sufficient to assure gas distribution firms a reasonable return. Argentina later changed the calculation basis to pesos. Profits became losses. BG sought arbitration, which was conducted in Washington, D. C. BG claimed that Argentina had violated the Treaty, which forbids expropriation of investments and requires each nation to give investors fair and equitable treatment. Argentina denied the claims and argued that the arbitrators lacked jurisdiction because BG had not complied with the local litigation requirement. The arbitration panel concluded that Argentina’s enactment of laws that hindered recourse to its judiciary excused compliance and that Argentina had not expropriated BG’s investment but had denied fair and equitable treatment. The district court confirmed the award. The District of Columbia Circuit vacated, holding that the arbitrators lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed. The local litigation requirement was a matter for arbitrators to interpret and apply; courts should review that interpretation with deference. Courts presume that the parties intended arbitrators to decide disputes about application of procedural preconditions to arbitration, including claims of waiver, delay, defense to arbitrability, time limits, notice, laches, or estoppel. The provision is procedural; it determines when the contractual duty to arbitrate arises, not whether there is a duty to arbitrate. It is a claims-processing rule. The fact that contract is a treaty does not make a difference. The Treaty contains no evidence that the parties had intentions contrary to the ordinary presumptions about who should decide threshold arbitration issues. View "BG Group plc v. Republic of Argentina" on Justia Law