Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff National Nurses Organizing Committee, Missouri & Kansas/National Nurses United filed a grievance and sought arbitration under the grievance procedure set forth in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). Defendant Midwest Division MMC, LLC refused to arbitrate. Although Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to arbitrate disputes under many provisions of their CBA, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal found "with positive assurance" the parties did not intend to arbitrate disagreements related to staffing plans. And, at its core, the dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant was about a staffing plan. The Court applied the presumption of arbitrability “only where a validly formed and enforceable arbitration agreement is ambiguous about whether it covers the dispute at hand.” The Court found parties did not consent to arbitrate the kind of dispute Plaintiff’s grievance asserted and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant. View "National Nurses Organizing v. Midwest Division MMC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff City of Portsmouth, New Hampshire Police Commission/Police Department (the City) appealed a superior court's denial of the City’s request to modify, correct, or vacate an arbitrator’s award of backpay to Aaron Goodwin, a police officer who was previously employed by the City and who was a member of defendant Portsmouth Ranking Officers Association, NEPBA, Local 220 (the Union). The arbitration arose from a grievance filed by the Union challenging Goodwin’s termination. The arbitrator found that the City wrongfully terminated Goodwin and awarded him approximately twenty-six months of backpay. The superior court confirmed the arbitrator’s termination decision and backpay award. On appeal, the City argued the arbitrator committed plain mistake because she failed to correctly apply the after-acquired-evidence doctrine in determining the amount of the backpay award. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court agreed with the City that the arbitrator committed a plain mistake of law in reaching the backpay award, it reversed in part, vacated the superior court’s confirmation of the arbitrator’s award, and remanded. View "City of Portsmouth Police Commission/Department v. Portsmouth Ranking Officers Association, NEPBA, Local 220" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed from April 2018 to August 2019 by Defendant EmployBridge, LLC, which does business in California as Select Staffing. In March 2018, as part of her employment application, Plaintiff electronically signed an arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement (1) states it “is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act,” and (2) contains a broad agreement to arbitrate claims. Plaintiff sued EmployBridge Holding Company, a Delaware corporation, solely to recover civil penalties under PAGA for Labor Code violations suffered by her or by other employees. The trial court determined that the agreement to arbitrate specifically excluded PAGA claims. This appeal challenges the denial of a motion to compel arbitration of claims to recover civil penalties.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the order denying the motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that the trial court correctly interpreted the agreement’s carve-out provision stating that “claims under PAGA … are not arbitrable under this Agreement.” This provision is not ambiguous. It is not objectively reasonable to interpret the phrase “claims under PAGA” to include some PAGA claims while excluding others. Thus, the carve-out provision excludes all the PAGA claims from the agreement to arbitrate. View "Duran v. EmployBridge Holding Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district court denying Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc.'s motion to vacate an arbitration award in favor of AFSCME Minnesota Council 5, holding that the court of appeals erroneously substituted its own judgment for that of the arbitrator.Hennepin Healthcare and AFSCME, which represented two bargaining units of Hennepin Healthcare employees, arbitrated a dispute regarding Hennepin Healthcare's use of temporary staffing agency workers. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of AFSCME. The district court confirmed the award. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that because the arbitration award did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement it must be vacated. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Hennepin Healthcare failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that the arbitrator clearly exceeded the powers granted to him in the CBA because the award failed the essence test. View "Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc. v. AFSCME Minnesota Council 5, Union" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in this employment discrimination suit ruling that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable and affirming the order of the trial court denying the employer's motion to compel arbitration, holding that the court of appeals erred in ruling that the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable.After Petitioner terminated Respondent's employment Respondent sued for race discrimination and retaliation under federal and state law. Petitioner moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration agreement signed by Respondent when he was hired. Respondent opposed the motion, arguing that the agreement was unconscionable. The trial court denied the motion to compel, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the agreement was unconscionable. View "Houston AN USA, LLC v. Shattenkirk" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that this dispute over an exempt class employee's termination was not arbitrable, thus reversing the order of the appellate division and denying a petition to compel arbitration, and that the Town of Monroe was free to terminate the employee without cause.In 2012, the Town appointed Employee to an exempt class civil service position. Three years later, the Town entered a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a Union that defined the bargaining unit to include Employee's position, permitted the Town to "terminate employees for just cause," and supplied procedures culminating in binding arbitration. In 2017, the Town terminated Employee, and the Union filed a grievance. When the Town refused to address the grievance the Union brought this action to compel the Town to arbitrate the dispute. Supreme Court denied the Town's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the underlying dispute was not arbitrable because granting the relief sought would violate a statute, decisional law, and public policy. View "Teamsters Local 445 v. Town of Monroe" on Justia Law

Consolidated appeals stemmed from an employment dispute between Dr. Margot G. Potter and her former employer, Women's Care Specialists, P.C. ("Women's Care"), and out of a dispute between Potter and three Women's Care employees: Dr. Karla Kennedy, Dr. Elizabeth Barron, and Beth Ann Dorsett ("the WC employees"). In case no. CV-21-903797, Potter alleged claims of defamation, tortious interference with a business relationship, and breach of contract against Women's Care. In case no. CV-21-903798, Potter alleged claims of defamation and tortious interference with a business relationship against the WC employees. After the trial court consolidated the cases, Women's Care and the WC employees filed motions to compel arbitration on the basis that Potter's claims were within the scope of the arbitration provision in Potter's employment agreement with Women's Care and that the arbitration provision governed their disputes even though Potter was no longer a Women's Care employee. The trial court entered an order denying those motions. Women's Care and the WC employees separately appealed; the Alabama Supreme Court consolidated the appeals. In appeal no. SC-2022-0706, the Supreme Court held that Potter's breach of-contract claim and her tort claims against Women's Care were subject to arbitration. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's order denying Women's Care's motion to compel arbitration. In appeal no. SC-2022-0707, the Supreme Court held that Potter's tort claims against the WC employees were subject to arbitration. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's order denying their motion to compel arbitration, and remanded both cases for further proceedings. View "Women's Care Specialists, P.C. v. Potter" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer Xceed Financial Credit Union (Xceed) for wrongful termination and age discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The case was submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. The arbitrator granted summary judgment in favor of Xceed on the ground Plaintiff’s claims were barred by a release in her separation agreement. The arbitrator rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that the release violated Civil Code section 1668, which prohibits pre-dispute releases of liability in some circumstances. Plaintiff moved to vacate the arbitration award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded his powers by enforcing an illegal release. The trial court denied the motion to vacate and entered judgment confirming the arbitration award.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the arbitrator’s ruling for clear error. The arbitrator correctly ruled the release did not violate Civil Code section 1668. Plaintiff signed the separation agreement after she was informed of the decision to terminate her but before her last day on the job. At the time she signed, she already believed that the decision to terminate her was based on age discrimination and that she had a valid claim for wrongful termination. The alleged violation of FEHA had already occurred, even though the claim had not yet fully accrued. Accordingly, the release did not violate section 1668 because it was not a release of liability for future unknown claims. View "Castelo v. Xceed Financial Credit Union" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a former employee of appellant Cambrian Homecare. When she was hired, Plaintiff signed a written arbitration agreement. Plaintiff brought wage-and-hour claims against Cambrian. Cambrian petitioned for arbitration. The trial court denied the petition. The trial court found that even if the parties had formed an arbitration agreement, the agreement had unconscionable terms, terms that so permeated the agreement they could not be severed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the agreement, read together—as it must be—with other contracts signed as part of Plaintiff’s hiring, contained unconscionable terms. The trial court had discretion to not sever the unconscionable terms and to refuse to enforce the agreement.   The court explained that it has no difficulty concluding that the Arbitration Agreement and the Confidentiality Agreement should be read together. They were executed on the same day. They were both separate aspects of a single primary transaction—Plaintiff’s hiring. They both governed, ultimately, the same issue—how to resolve disputes arising between Plaintiff and Cambrian arising from Alberto’s employment. Failing to read them together artificially segments the parties’ contractual relationship. Treating them separately fails to account for the overall dispute resolution process the parties agreed upon. So, unconscionability in the Confidentiality Agreement can and does affect whether the Arbitration Agreement is also unconscionable. View "Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare" on Justia Law

After being fired by his employer, Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC, Intervenor filed suit in federal district court, alleging that his termination reflected racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Anheuser-Busch filed a motion seeking to compel arbitration of Intervenor’s district court claims, asserting that at the time when he was hired, Intervenor had agreed to be bound by the company’s Dispute Resolution Policy. Intervenor disagreed that he was required to arbitrate his claims. After Anheuser-Busch asked the district court to compel arbitration, Intervenor filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, arguing that Defendant’s efforts to enforce its arbitration agreement contravened the collective bargaining agreement and constituted a unilateral change to the terms of Intervenor’s employment, in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).   The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review of the Board’s order dismissing the complaint, vacated the decision of the Board, and remanded for consideration of whether enforcement of the Dispute Resolution Policy against Intervenor would violate the NLRA. The court held that the Board applied an erroneously narrow standard for determining whether Anheuser-Busch’s motion had an illegal objective. The court explained that on remand, the Board should instead determine whether the outcome sought by Anheuser-Busch’s motion— the compelled arbitration of Brown’s Title VII claims under the Dispute Resolution Policy—would violate the NLRA. If the Board decides that the answer to that question is “yes,” it should then order all relief that is appropriate based on Anheuser-Busch’s unlawful conduct. View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 947 v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law