Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Christina Leeper entered into an independent contractor agreement with Shipt, Inc. to provide services as a Shipt shopper. The agreement included an arbitration clause requiring all disputes to be resolved through binding arbitration. Leeper filed a complaint against Shipt and its parent company, Target Corporation, under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), alleging that Shipt misclassified her and other workers as independent contractors, violating multiple provisions of the Labor Code. Leeper sought civil penalties and injunctive relief on behalf of herself and other aggrieved employees.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Shipt and Target's motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that Leeper's PAGA action did not include any individual claims subject to arbitration under the parties' agreement. The court concluded that the action was solely a representative PAGA suit without any individual causes of action to compel to arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that every PAGA action necessarily includes an individual PAGA claim based on the unambiguous statutory language and legislative history. Consequently, the court directed the lower court to issue a new order compelling arbitration of Leeper's individual PAGA claim and staying the litigation of the representative PAGA claim portion of the lawsuit. The appellate court awarded costs on appeal to Shipt and Target. View "Leeper v. Shipt, Inc." on Justia Law

Pauline Mary Huff filed a class action and a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) action against her former employer, Interior Specialists, Inc., alleging various wage-and-hour violations. Huff opposed the motion to compel arbitration, arguing that the arbitration agreement was invalid because it was signed by someone else named "William" in DocuSign. The trial court found sufficient evidence that Huff consented to the agreement and granted the motion to compel arbitration.The trial court consolidated the class and PAGA actions. Interior Specialists then moved to compel Huff’s PAGA claims to arbitration. The trial court reiterated its earlier finding that Huff validly signed the agreement and, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, ordered Huff’s individual PAGA claims to arbitration and dismissed her nonindividual PAGA claims without prejudice for lack of standing.Huff appealed the October 21, 2022 order, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing her nonindividual PAGA claims and in finding that she signed the arbitration agreement. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, concluded that Huff timely appealed the October 21 order. On the merits, the court reversed the dismissal of Huff’s nonindividual PAGA claims based on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., which rejected Viking River’s interpretation of California law on standing. The court did not address Huff’s arguments concerning the electronic signature, as the reversal based on Adolph rendered it unnecessary.The court remanded the case with directions to stay Huff’s nonindividual PAGA claims pending the completion of arbitration. Huff was awarded her costs on appeal. View "Huff v. Interior Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

Annalycia Jenkins, a former employee of Dermatology Management, LLC, filed a class action lawsuit against her employer after resigning. She alleged unfair competition, and the employer sought to compel arbitration based on an agreement Jenkins signed on her first day of work. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding the agreement both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.The San Luis Obispo County Superior Court found the arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable due to its lack of mutuality, shortened statute of limitations, unreasonable discovery restrictions, and requirement for the parties to equally share the arbitrator’s fees and costs. Procedurally, the court noted the agreement was a contract of adhesion, pre-signed by the employer months before Jenkins was hired, and presented to her on a take-it-or-leave-it basis without the presence of the Chief People Officer.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable due to the inequality of bargaining power and the pre-signed nature of the agreement. It also upheld the finding of substantive unconscionability, noting the lack of mutuality, the unreasonable one-year statute of limitations, the unfair cost-sharing provision, and the restrictive discovery terms. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the unconscionable provisions, as doing so would condone an illegal scheme and incentivize employers to draft one-sided agreements. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed. View "Jenkins v. Dermatology Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Ariel Torres, a former Starbucks employee, and Raphyr Lubin, the husband of another former Starbucks employee, filed a putative class action against Starbucks. They alleged that Starbucks sent them deficient health-insurance notices under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), as amended by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). Starbucks moved to compel arbitration based on employment agreements signed by Torres and Lubin’s wife. Torres agreed to arbitration, but Lubin opposed it, arguing he was not a party to his wife’s employment agreement.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied Starbucks’s motion to compel arbitration for Lubin. The court found that Lubin was not a party to his wife’s employment agreement and was not suing to enforce it. Instead, Lubin sought to enforce his own statutory right to an adequate COBRA notice. The court held that no equitable doctrine of Florida contract law required Lubin to arbitrate and that Starbucks waived its argument that Lubin’s rights were derivative of his wife’s rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Lubin, not being a party to the arbitration agreement, could not be compelled to arbitrate. The court also found that the arbitration agreement’s delegation clause did not apply to Lubin, as he was not a party to the agreement. Additionally, the court rejected Starbucks’s arguments based on equitable estoppel, third-party beneficiary doctrine, and the derivative claim theory, concluding that none of these principles required Lubin to arbitrate his claim. The court affirmed the district court’s order denying Starbucks’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Lubin v. Starbucks Corporation" on Justia Law

Stephnie Trujillo filed a complaint against her former employer, J-M Manufacturing Company (JMM), and four former coworkers, alleging unlawful sexual/gender discrimination, harassment, failure to prevent such actions, retaliation, and seeking injunctive relief. The parties negotiated and entered into a post-dispute stipulation for arbitration, which was approved by the trial court. Arbitration commenced, and JMM paid the arbitrator’s invoices for over a year. However, JMM failed to pay an invoice by the due date of September 12, 2022, but paid it immediately upon being reminded on October 18, 2022. Trujillo then sought to withdraw from arbitration under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, which the trial court granted.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Trujillo’s motion to withdraw from arbitration, finding that JMM’s late payment constituted a material breach under section 1281.98, which does not allow exceptions for inadvertent delays or lack of prejudice. The court lifted the stay on trial court proceedings, allowing the case to proceed in court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1281.98 did not apply because the parties entered into a post-dispute stipulation to arbitrate, not a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Additionally, JMM was not considered the “drafting party” as defined by section 1280, subdivision (e), which refers to the company that included a pre-dispute arbitration provision in a contract. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded with instructions to deny Trujillo’s motion to withdraw from arbitration and to reinstate the stay of trial court proceedings pending completion of arbitration. View "Trujillo v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Edgar Gonzalez worked for Nowhere Santa Monica, one of ten related LLCs operating Erewhon markets in Los Angeles. As a condition of his employment, he signed an arbitration agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica. Gonzalez later filed a class action lawsuit against all ten Nowhere entities, alleging various Labor Code violations. He claimed that all entities were his joint employers, sharing control over his employment conditions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the motion to compel arbitration for Nowhere Santa Monica but denied it for the other entities, finding no evidence that Gonzalez's claims against the non-signatory entities were intertwined with his claims against Nowhere Santa Monica. Gonzalez then dismissed his complaint against Nowhere Santa Monica, and the other entities appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that Gonzalez was equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration with the non-Santa Monica entities because his claims against them were intimately founded in and intertwined with his employment agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica. The court reasoned that Gonzalez's joint employer theory inherently linked his claims to the obligations under the employment agreement, which contained an arbitration clause. Therefore, it would be unfair for Gonzalez to claim joint employment for liability purposes while denying the arbitration agreement's applicability.The appellate court reversed the lower court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration for the non-Santa Monica entities, concluding that all of Gonzalez's claims should be arbitrated. View "Gonzalez v. Nowhere Beverly Hills LLC" on Justia Law

Karl Hansen sued Tesla, Inc., its CEO Elon Musk, and U.S. Security Associates (USSA), alleging retaliation for reporting misconduct at Tesla. Hansen, initially hired by Tesla, was later employed by USSA. He reported thefts, narcotics trafficking, and improper contracts at Tesla, and filed a report with the SEC. After Musk saw Hansen at the Gigafactory and demanded his removal, USSA reassigned Hansen, which he claimed was retaliatory.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada ordered most of Hansen’s claims to arbitration, except his Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) claim. The arbitrator dismissed Hansen’s non-SOX claims, finding no contractual right to work at the Gigafactory and no reasonable belief of securities law violations. The district court confirmed the arbitration award and dismissed Hansen’s SOX claim, holding that the arbitrator’s findings precluded relitigation of issues essential to the SOX claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that while an arbitrator’s decision cannot preclude a SOX claim, a confirmed arbitral award can preclude relitigation of issues underlying such a claim. The court found that the arbitrator’s decision, which concluded Hansen had no reasonable belief of securities law violations, precluded his SOX claim. The court also held that the arbitrator’s findings on Hansen’s state law claims had a preclusive effect, as they were confirmed by the district court. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Hansen’s complaint. View "Hansen v. Musk" on Justia Law

The City and County of Butte-Silver Bow, Montana (BSB) hired Rhonda Staton as a police officer in 2001, promoting her to detective in 2008. Staton received two verbal reprimands in 2017 and 2018 for tardiness and refusal to investigate underage drinking, respectively. In 2019, Staton filed a hostile work environment complaint, which was not substantiated. In early 2020, Staton lost her department-issued taser, leading to a Fit for Duty Evaluation (FFDE) by Dr. George Watson, who found her unfit for duty. Staton was terminated in August 2020 based on this evaluation and her performance issues.The Butte Police Protective Association (BPPA) filed a grievance on Staton’s behalf, leading to arbitration. Arbitrator A. Ray McCoy found Watson’s FFDE unreliable and ruled that BSB had not established just cause for Staton’s termination. McCoy ordered Staton’s reinstatement, back pay, and an additional evaluation to determine rehabilitative strategies. BSB did not comply with the reinstatement or compensation but arranged for an Independent Medical Evaluation (IME) by Dr. William Patenaude, which did not provide a diagnosis or rehabilitative recommendations.BSB petitioned to vacate the arbitration award, arguing it was a manifest disregard of Montana law. The Second Judicial District Court denied the motion to vacate but remanded the matter to the arbitrator to reconcile the award with Staton’s inability to return to service. BSB appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and held that the arbitrator’s award did not violate Montana law or public policy. The court found that the District Court abused its discretion by remanding the matter, as it exceeded the permissible scope of review for arbitration awards. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s order and remanded with instructions to confirm the original arbitration award. View "Butte v Butte Police" on Justia Law

Edgar Gonzalez worked for Nowhere Santa Monica, one of ten related LLCs operating Erewhon markets in Los Angeles. As a condition of employment, Gonzalez signed an arbitration agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica. He later filed a lawsuit against all ten LLCs, alleging various Labor Code violations and claiming they were joint employers. The non-Santa Monica entities moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica, but Gonzalez opposed, arguing they were not parties to the agreement.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the motion to compel arbitration for Nowhere Santa Monica but denied it for the other entities, finding no evidence that Gonzalez's claims against the non-signatory defendants were intertwined with the arbitration agreement. Gonzalez then dismissed his complaint against Nowhere Santa Monica, and the other entities appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that Gonzalez was equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration with the non-Santa Monica entities because his claims against them were intimately founded in and intertwined with the employment agreement with Nowhere Santa Monica. The court reasoned that Gonzalez's joint employment theory inherently linked his claims to the obligations under the employment agreement, which contained the arbitration clause. Therefore, the court reversed the lower court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration for the non-Santa Monica entities. View "Gonzalez v. Nowhere Beverly Hills LLC" on Justia Law

Stephnie Trujillo filed a complaint against her former employer, J-M Manufacturing Company (JMM), and four former coworkers, alleging unlawful sexual/gender discrimination, harassment, failure to prevent such acts, retaliation, and seeking injunctive relief. The parties negotiated and entered into a post-dispute stipulation for arbitration, which was approved by the trial court. Arbitration commenced, and JMM paid the arbitrator’s invoices timely for over a year. However, JMM paid one invoice late, leading Trujillo to file a motion to withdraw from arbitration under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, which the trial court granted.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Trujillo’s motion to withdraw from arbitration, finding that JMM’s late payment constituted a material breach under section 1281.98, despite acknowledging that the delay did not prejudice Trujillo. The court lifted the stay on trial court proceedings, allowing the case to proceed in court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that section 1281.98 did not apply because the parties had entered into a post-dispute stipulation to arbitrate, not a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Additionally, JMM was not considered the “drafting party” as defined by section 1280, subdivision (e), since the stipulation was primarily drafted by Trujillo. The appellate court remanded the case with instructions to deny Trujillo’s motion to withdraw from arbitration and to reinstate the stay of trial court proceedings pending the completion of arbitration. View "Trujillo v. J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc." on Justia Law