Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Sisyphian for (1) failure to pay minimum wage, (2) failure to pay overtime wages, (3) failure to pay wages for missed meal periods, (4) failure to pay wages for missed rest breaks, (5) waiting time penalties (6) failure to provide accurate wage statements and (7) unfair competition. In reliance on the arbitration clause in the Entertainment Agreement, the trial court granted Sisyphian’s motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims. The arbitrator concluded that Plaintiff’s complaint contained a viable prayer for attorney fees for the claims on which she prevailed. Plaintiff filed a petition to confirm the final arbitration award. Following the entry of judgment for Plaintiff in the amount of $105,109.75, Sisyphian appealed. Sisyphian argued that the trial court erred in confirming the final arbitration award because, in reconsidering its initial attorney fees order, the arbitrator exceeded his powers   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiff’s petition to confirm was procedurally proper because no party sought dismissal of Plaintiff’s petition, and because Sisyphian’s filings seeking to vacate or correct the arbitration award were not timely filed, the trial court, in this case, was obligated to confirm the final arbitration award. Further, because Sisyphian forfeited its right to seek to vacate or correct the final arbitration award before the trial court, the court may not consider its arguments to do so on appeal. View "Darby v. Sisyphian, LLC" on Justia Law

Employer Howard Center appealed a trial court order that confirmed an arbitration award in favor of grievant Daniel Peyser and AFSCME Local 1674. In May 2019, employer expressed concern over grievant’s billing practices, specifically, his submission of billing paperwork in May for services provided in April. Employer told grievant that it was considering disciplining him for “dishonesty and unethical action” concerning the backdated bills. Grievant brought two billing notes from patient records to show that other employees engaged in the same billing practices. Employer did not reprimand grievant for the billing practices. In August 2019, however, employer informed grievant that he breached employer’s confidentiality policy by sharing the billing notes with his union representative at the June meeting. Employer issued a written reprimand to grievant. The reprimand stated that sharing client records without redacting confidential information violated protocols and state and federal regulations, and that grievant knew or should have known of these standards. Employer also explained that it was required to report the breach to state and federal authorities and to those individuals whose records were disclosed. Grievant filed a grievance under the terms of his collective-bargaining agreement, arguing in part that employer lacked just cause to discipline him. In an October 2020 decision, the arbitrator sustained the grievance. Employer then filed an action in the civil division seeking to modify or vacate the arbitrator’s award, arguing in relevant part that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in sustaining the grievance. Employer asked the Vermont Supreme Court to adopt “manifest disregard” of the law as a basis for setting aside the arbitration award and to conclude that the arbitrator violated that standard here. The Supreme Court did not decide whether to adopt the manifest-disregard standard because, assuming arguendo it applied, employer failed to show that its requirements were satisfied. The Court therefore affirmed. View "Howard Center v. AFSCME Local 1674, et al." on Justia Law

Three plaintiffs began working for Wise on separate dates. Each purportedly signed an arbitration agreement, “governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and the California Arbitration Act. It bans class arbitration and waives the employees’ right to join class litigation, noting that the employee “may wish to consult with an attorney.” An acknowledgment indicates that the employee has read the agreement and understands that he can choose not to sign and still be employed by Wise, without retaliation. Wise fired the plaintiffs. They filed a joint complaint.Wise moved to compel each plaintiff to submit to individual arbitration. Wise submitted a declaration from its HR director, authenticating the documents, bearing the handwritten signature of each plaintiff. Each plaintiff alleged that, on his first day of work, he was handed a stack of documents and was not given any time to review them nor given a copy of the documents, adding “I do not recall ever reading or signing any" Binding Arbitration Agreement ... I do not know how my signature was placed on [either document].”The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The court of appeal reversed. The plaintiffs offered no admissible evidence creating a dispute as to the authenticity of their physical signatures and did not prove that the agreement was unconscionable. The FAA does not prescribe substantive rules of law for resolving disputes. It does not displace the substantive law of California. View "Iyere v. Wise Auto Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Desert Regional Medical Center, Inc. (DRMC) appealed trial court orders denying DRMC’s first amended petitions to compel nurses Leah Miller, Lynn Fontana, and Renita Romero (Respondents) to arbitrate their labor claims alleging rest and meal break violations by DRMC. DRMC contended the trial court erred by denying its petitions to compel arbitration and failing to stay Respondents’ individual claims until after completion of arbitration of a separate proceeding initiated by Respondents’ union (the California Nurses Association) on behalf of all nurses employed by DRMC in California. DRMC argued the trial court erred in denying DRMC’s petitions to compel arbitration based on a finding DRMC waived the right to arbitrate. DRMC argued the issue of waiver had to be determined by the arbitrator, not the trial court, and, even if the court has jurisdiction to decide waiver, there was insufficient evidence to support its finding of waiver. DRMC further contended Respondents were estopped from arguing waiver because Respondents’ Union was responsible for DRMC’s delay in petitioning to compel arbitration and agreed, in a separate proceeding, to arbitrate the Union’s group grievance. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected DRMC’s contentions and affirmed the order denying DRMC’s amended petitions to compel arbitration and request for a stay. View "Desert Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Miller" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs first worked for Tesla through staffing agencies. When Tesla offered them employment, effective August 2, 2017, most of the plaintiffs electronically signed offer letters, including an arbitration provision, “any and all disputes, claims, or causes of action, in law or equity, arising from or relating to your employment, or the termination of your employment, will be resolved, to the fullest extent permitted by law by final, binding and confidential arbitration.” A complaint under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code 12900) alleged that the plaintiff and other Black workers “suffered severe and pervasive harassment.”The trial court partially granted Tesla's motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that the arbitration clauses required the plaintiffs to arbitrate disputes that arose on or after 8/2/17 while claims based on alleged wrongs before 8/2/17 are not within the scope of the agreements. The trial court denied the motion to the extent that the plaintiffs sought a public injunction. The court of appeal affirmed. The court properly declined to mandate arbitration of the request for a public injunction. Injunctions sought under FEHA may be considered “public injunctions.” The Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. 1), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in 2022 (Viking River) does not preempt the California rule prohibiting waiver of the right to seek such injunctions. View "Vaughn v. Tesla, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the appellate division reversing Supreme Court's order granting the petition filed by the City of Yorkers pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 75 to permanently stay arbitration of the underlying labor dispute, holding that grievances like the present one are arbitrable so long as no public policy, statutory, or constitutional provisions prohibit them and they are reasonably related to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA).The underlying dispute between City of Yonkers and its firefighters concerned whether Yonkers must make certain types of payments to firefighters who were permanently disabled for work-related injuries and who qualified for benefits under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law 207-a(2). Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO (the Union) filed a grievance alleging that Yonkers violated the CBA and then served a demand for arbitration. Yonkers responded by filing a petition to permanently stay arbitration. Supreme Court granted the petition. The appellate division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that this grievance was arbitrable. View "City of Yonkers v. Yonkers Fire Fighters, Local 628, IAFF, AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Bernell Beco filed suit against his former employer, defendant Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (Fast Auto) alleging 14 causes of action relating to the termination of his employment. Plaintiff alleged causes of action under with), including claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), numerous wage and hour violations under the Labor Code, wrongful termination, unfair competition, and additional tort claims. Fast Auto moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Beco had signed a valid arbitration agreement at the time he was hired. The trial court found the agreement unconscionable to the extent that severance would not cure the defects and declined to enforce it. After its review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the agreement was unconscionable, and further rejected Fast Auto’s argument that the arbitrator, not the court, should have decided the issue of unconscionability. Additionally, because the agreement included numerous substantively unconscionable provisions, the appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision not to sever them. View "Beco v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant, Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (Simplified) appealed an order denying its motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims brought under the California Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Simplified’s motion was based on Plaintiff’s predispute agreement to arbitrate all claims arising from their employment relationship. The trial court understandably denied the motion based on a rule followed by numerous California Courts of Appeal that predispute agreements to arbitrate PAGA claims are unenforceable.   The Second Appellate District reversed and held that this rule cannot survive the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) U.S.[142 S.Ct. 1906] (Viking River). The court further held that the scope of the arbitration clause is to be determined by the arbitrator in accordance with the arbitration agreement. Specifically, the parties’ dispute about whether nonindividual PAGA claims are governed by the arbitration agreement, in the same way, individual PAGA claims are, is an issue for the arbitrator to address. View "Lewis v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO 20 (“Local Union 97”), a union primarily of electrical workers, executed a memorandum of agreement (“2003 MOA”) detailing a two-pronged approach to providing retiree life insurance benefits. Local Union 97 brought a complaint seeking to compel arbitration of a grievance they submitted alleging that NRG violated the terms of the CBAs by changing the life insurance benefit for the Pre-2019 Retirees to a lump sum of $10,000. The district court held that: 1) the grievance is not arbitrable under the 2019-2023 CBA, 2) the 2003 MOA is not arbitrable, and 3) the grievance is not arbitrable under any of the CBAs covering 2003-2019.   The Second Circuit reversed and remanded and held the grievance is arbitrable under the 2019-2023 CBA because the broad arbitration provision creates a presumption in favor of arbitrability that NRG failed to overcome. The court also held that the parties’ dispute was arbitrable under the Prior CBAs because the 2003 MOA was a supplemental agreement that arguably vested the life insurance benefit for life. View "Local Union 97 v. NRG Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against his former employer, Facility Solutions Group, Inc. (FSG), for disability discrimination and related causes of action under the Fair Employment & Housing Act. The same month Plaintiff filed this class action against FSG for Labor Code violations, which also included a claim under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004.   The trial court in this action denied FSG’s motion, finding unconscionability permeated the arbitration agreement because it had a low to moderate level of procedural unconscionability and at least six substantively unconscionable terms, making severance infeasible. On appeal, FSG contends claim and issue preclusion required the trial court in this action to enforce the arbitration agreement.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court agreed with the trial court that the arbitration agreement is permeated with unconscionability, and the court cannot simply sever the offending provisions. Rather, the court would need to rewrite the agreement, creating a new agreement to which the parties never agreed. Moreover, upholding this type of agreement with multiple unconscionable terms would create an incentive for an employer to draft a onesided arbitration agreement in the hope employees would not challenge the unlawful provisions, but if they do, the court would simply modify the agreement to include the bilateral terms the employer should have included in the first place. View "Mills v. Facility Solutions Group" on Justia Law