Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Union represents about 165 employees at the Clinton research facility, staffed by EMRE. In 2015, a bargaining unit member retired. After advertising internally failed to fill the open position, EMRE used independent contractors to staff the position. The Union filed a grievance regarding the propriety of EMRE contracting out bargaining unit positions and attempting to permanently fill bargaining unit positions with contractors. The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) allows the Company to “let independent contracts” as long as: during any period of time when an independent contractor is performing work of a type customarily performed by employees and employees qualified to perform such work together with all of the equipment necessary in the performance of such work are available in the Company facilities, the Company may not because of lack of work demote or lay off any employee(s) qualified to perform the contracted work."Arbitrator Klein found that the CBA “expressly limits contracting to a ‘period of time” and that EMRE pursued a plan to replace employees with contractors as they left EMRE. She concluded that EMRE’s actions undermined the composition and breadth of the bargaining unit. The Third Circuit affirmed the arbitration award preventing EMRE from permanently contracting out bargaining unit positions at the Clinton facility. Rejecting an argument that the arbitrator improperly considered extrinsic evidence contrary to the CBA, the court noted that the standard of review for upholding arbitration awards is highly deferential. The award “withstands the minimal level of scrutiny.” View "Independent Laboratory Employees' Union, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Research and Engineering Co." on Justia Law

Romero, a truck driver employed by Watkins, an interstate trucking business, made deliveries only to retail stores in California. To complete paperwork and training, Romero periodically logged in to an online portal that required a unique employee identification number and password. Romero’s unique user account completed a set of “Associate Acknowledgements,” through which he clicked “I Agree,” signifying that he read and agreed to the Arbitration Policy, a stand-alone agreement that purports to waive any right to bring or participate in a class action; it states that the agreement is “governed by the Federal Arbitration Act,” and purports to waive "any provision of the FAA which would otherwise exclude [the agreement] from its coverage.” However, if "this [agreement] and/or its Waiver Provisions are not subject to and governed by the FAA, then the laws of the State of Nevada . . . will be the applicable state law.” The Arbitration Policy was not a condition of employment. Romero did not opt-out. In August 2019, Watkins announced it would cease operations. Romero and other employees were laid off.Romero filed a putative class action under the California and federal WARN Acts, 29 U.S.C. 2101, which require advance notice to employees before being laid off. The district court granted a motion to compel arbitration. The NInth Circuit affirmed, while noting that the Federal FAA exemption of employment contracts for transportation workers applies and cannot be waived by private contract. View "Romero v. Watkins & Shepard Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer, AmeriHome, in a putative class action lawsuit for unpaid overtime compensation and unlawful business practices. The superior court granted AmeriHome's motion to compel arbitration, ordered arbitration of plaintiff's individual claims, and dismissed the class claims.In light of the uncertainty of the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to consider plaintiff's appeal from the order compelling arbitration and the absence of any delay or prejudice our intervention at this stage would cause, the court found this an appropriate case in which to exercise its discretion to treat the appeal from that order as a petition for writ of mandate. The court denied the petition on the merits, concluding that Labor Code section 229 does not exempt plaintiff's wage claim from arbitration. In this case, neither the choice-of-law provision nor the arbitration agreement contains "unambiguous language" making it "unmistakably clear" that the parties intended to incorporate section 229 while agreeing to arbitrate "any dispute or controversy arising out of or relating to" plaintiff's employment at AmeriHome.The court also concluded that the superior court properly exercised its discretion under Code of Civil Procedure 1281.2 to order arbitration of plaintiff's individual claims. The court explained that the superior court reasonably concluded the conditions for invoking the third-party litigation exception did not exist because plaintiff's lawsuit did not arise out of the same transaction as the Brooks action, and there was no likelihood of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. Furthermore, even when the third-party litigation exception applies, the superior court has discretion to "order arbitration among the parties who have agreed to arbitration." Therefore, the court affirmed the order dismissing the putative class claims, dismissed the order compelling arbitration, and denied the petition for writ of mandate. View "Nixon v. AmeriHome Mortgage Co., LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery granted Defendants' motion to dismiss this amended complaint brought by Plaintiff seeking a determination that Defendants - the City of Wilmington, the Wilmington Police Department, and the mayor of the City - breached the collective bargaining agreement between the police union and the City when he was terminated for an alleged violation of the City's resident requirement, holding that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.Specifically, the Court of Chancery held that Plaintiff's claims fell within the grievance procedure and were therefore subject to arbitration, and where Plaintiff did not follow the grievance process that was provided in the collective bargaining agreement, a complete remedy otherwise existed in the form of the grievance process outlined in the agreement. View "Kroll v. City of Wilmington" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed an arbitration award that reinstated a member of the union to her former position after she was discharged by the company. The court concluded that the parties agreement authorized the arbitrator to determine whether there has been a violation of the parties' agreement within the allegations set forth in the grievance. In this case, the parties bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement's just cause provision and the provision does not specify that the same just cause is sufficient to justify all types of adverse action.The court also concluded that the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the parties' agreement. Finally, the court concluded that the record does not establish that the employee committed abuse as defined by the cited statutes, or that allowing her to return to work after a suspension violates public policy. View "WM Crittenden Operations, LLC v. United Food and Commercial Workers" on Justia Law

Lim, formerly a TForce California delivery driver, alleged that TForce employs delivery drivers and misclassifies them as independent contractors in violation of California law. The drivers sign an Independent Contractor Operating Agreement, providing that the agreement is governed by the laws of Texas, that “any legal proceedings … shall be filed and/or maintained in Dallas, Texas,” that all disputes “arising under, out of, or relating to this Agreement … including any claims or disputes arising under any state or federal laws, statutes or regulations, … including the arbitrability of disputes … shall be fully resolved by arbitration," that any arbitration will be governed by the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, that class actions are prohibited, and that the parties shall share the costs except in the case of substantial financial hardship--the prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorney’s fees and costs.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, referring to the Agreement as an adhesion contract. Based on the cost-splitting, fee-shifting, and Texas venue provisions, the district court correctly concluded the delegation clause, which requires the arbitrator to determine the gateway issue of arbitrability, the agreement was substantively unconscionable as to Lim. View "Lim v. TForce Logistics, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting the City of Waterbury's motion to dismiss this action seeking to have the trial court confirm an interest arbitration award, holding that the trial court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award under Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-417.Brass City Local, CACP (the union), a collective bargaining unit that represented employees of the Waterbury Police Department, brought this action seeking confirmation of an arbitration award issued in accordance with the provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-473c of the Municipal Employees Relations Act (MERA). The trial court granted the City's motion to dismiss, concluding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the union's application to confirm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction under section 52-417 to confirm an interest arbitration award issued pursuant to section 7-473c. View "Brass City Local, CACP v. City of Waterbury" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Missouri resident, filed suit in state court against her former employer, Ferrellgas, a propane supplier, as well as James Ferrell and Pamela Brueckmann, Kansas residents and employees and officers of Ferrellgas. Plaintiff alleged gender discrimination claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act against Ferrellgas (Counts I and II), and tort claims against all defendants (Counts IIIVI). After removal to the district court, the district court granted defendants' motion to compel arbitration in part.The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court erred in concluding that no language in plaintiff's employment agreement suggested that she consented to arbitrate tort claims arising from actions which predated her employment. The court explained that, though plaintiff's claims are based on alleged misrepresentations and omissions made before and at the time she accepted employment, they are subject to arbitration because they arise out of and relate to the resulting employee agreement and employee relationship. The court also concluded that Ferrell and Brueckmann, officers and agents of Ferrellgas who were not parties to the Employee Agreement, may enforce the arbitration clause. The court concluded that a signatory plaintiff cannot avoid arbitration when she treated signatory and non-signatory defendants as a single unit. In this case, each of plaintiff's tort claims against defendants is a single one that should be referred in its entirety to arbitration. View "Morgan v. Ferrell" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court summarily affirming an arbitration award dismissing Union Interacional UAW, Local 2415's wage grievance claim against Bacardi Corporation, holding that the Union did not identify an error in the arbitration award so egregious as to permit this Court to vacate it.The arbitrator found that the Union's claim was not procedurally arbitrable because the Union failed to comply with the contractual wage grievance procedure. On appeal, the Union argued that either the arbitrator should have deemed the procedural arbitrability defect waived or that the procedural defect did not justify dismissing the entire claim. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, while the Union's waiver arguments had merit, the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority in dismissing the entire claim for lack of procedural arbitrability. View "Union Internacional, UAW Local 2415 v. Bacardi Corp." on Justia Law

T & H Services performed operation and maintenance services at Fort Carson Army base in Colorado Springs, Colorado, under a contract with the United States Army (the Army Contract) that was governed by several federal labor-standards statutes, including the Service Contract Act, and the Davis-Bacon Act. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 113 (the Union) represented some T&H employees under a collective-bargaining agreement (the CBA) that included a provision for binding arbitration of disputes “limited to matters of interpretation or application of express provisions of [the CBA].” Several Union members who repaired weather-damaged roofs at Fort Carson in the summer of 2018 were paid the hourly rate for general maintenance workers under Schedule A of the CBA. The Union, believing that the workers should have been classified as roofers under the Davis-Bacon Act and paid the corresponding hourly rate under the schedule, filed a grievance and sought arbitration of the dispute. When T&H refused, claiming that the dispute was not arbitrable under the CBA, the Union filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado to compel arbitration under section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The district court agreed with T&H that the dispute was not arbitrable and granted summary judgment to the company. The Union appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 113 v. T&H Services" on Justia Law