Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Labor Management Relations Act forbids employers from directly giving money to unions, 29 U.S.C. 186(a); an exception allows an employer and a union to operate a trust fund for the benefit of employees. Section 186(c)(5)(B) requires the trust agreement to provide that an arbitrator will resolve any “deadlock on the administration of such fund.” Several construction companies and one union established a trust fund to subsidize employee vacations. Six trustees oversaw the fund, which is a tax-exempt entity under ERISA 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(9). A disagreement arose over whether the trust needed to amend a tax return. Three trustees, those selected by the companies, filed suit, seeking authority to amend the tax return. The three union-appointed trustees intervened, arguing that the dispute belongs in arbitration.The court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While ERISA plan participants or beneficiaries may sue for a breach of statutory fiduciary duty in federal court without exhausting internal remedial procedures, this complaint did not allege a breach of fiduciary duties but rather alleges that the employer trustees’ own fiduciary duties compelled them to file the action to maintain the trust’s compliance with tax laws. These claims were “not directly adversarial to the [union trustees] or to the Fund.” View "Baker v. Iron Workers Local 25" on Justia Law

At issue in this labor dispute case is who decides whether the arbitrator was validly (i.e., mutually rather than unilaterally) appointed: the challenged arbitrator himself, or instead a court. The district court concluded that the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) assigns to the arbitrator himself the authority to determine the validity of his own appointment.The DC Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for the district court to determine whether the challenged arbitrator was validly appointed. The court concluded that the dispute over the arbitrator's appointment involves the kind of question that is presumptively for judicial rather than arbitral resolution. The court also concluded that the parties' CBA does not overcome this presumption through a clear and unmistakable assignment of power to the challenged arbitrator himself to decide the validity of his own appointment. View "District No. 1, Pacific Coast District, Marine Engineers' Beneficial Ass'n v. Liberty Maritime Corp." on Justia Law

Bannister worked in the administrative offices at a skilled nursing facility, for approximately three decades before Marinidence purchased the facility. A year later, Marinidence terminated Bannister. She sued, alleging discrimination, retaliation, and defamation. Marinidence moved to compel arbitration, alleging that, when it took over the facility, Bannister electronically signed an arbitration agreement while completing the paperwork for new Marinidence employees. After Bannister presented evidence that she never saw the agreement during the onboarding process, the trial court denied the motion.The court of appeal affirmed. Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. The party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent’s signature. Where, as here, the respondent challenges the validity of the signature, the petitioner must “establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the signature was authentic.” The court noted conflicting evidence, including Bannister’s evidence that she was not the only person who could have executed the arbitration agreement and the onboarding process was completed for other employees without their participation. View "Banister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the State's request for attorney's fees in this appeal arising from a grievance arbitration, holding that the State "incurred" attorney's fees for the purposes of Haw. Rev. Stat. 658A-25.In the arbitration, the State was represented by an attorney employed by the State's Department of Attorney General. The union requested attorney's fees and costs, which the circuit court denied. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. Thereafter, the State filed a request for appellate attorney's fees and costs, citing section 658A-25 and Haw. R. App. P. 39(a). The ICA granted the State's request for costs but denied its request for attorney's fees on the grounds that the State "failed to demonstrate that it incurred, as an expense, liability, or legal obligation to pay, appellate attorney's fees[.]" The Supreme Court reversed and granted the State's request for attorney's fees, holding that the fees were erroneously denied on the grounds that they were not "incurred." View "In re Arbitration between United Public Workers and State" on Justia Law

Franklin, a nurse, was employed by a staffing agency, USSI, and had signed an Arbitration Agreement. USSI assigned Franklin to work at the Hospital. Franklin signed a Travel Nurse Assignment Contract that also includes an arbitration provision. The Hospital is not a signatory to either the Arbitration Agreement or the Assignment Contract. There is no contract between Franklin and the Hospital nor between the Hospital and USSI. The Hospital contracts with RightSourcing, which contracts with USSI to provide the contingent nursing staff. The Hospital retains supervision over the provision of clinical services. RightSourcing bills the Hospital and remits payment to USSI.Franklin brought a class and collective action against the Hospital, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the California Labor Code, and the California Business and Professions Code, alleging that the Hospital required Franklin to work during meal breaks and off the clock but failed to pay her for that work and failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements or reimburse travel expenses.The district court granted the Hospital’s motion to compel arbitration. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Hospital, a nonsignatory, could compel arbitration because Franklin’s claims were intimately founded in and intertwined with her contracts with USSI; under California law, she was equitably estopped from avoiding the arbitration provisions. View "Franklin v. Community Regional Medical Center, FKA" on Justia Law

The Department of Labor brought an enforcement action against Larry Browne and his companies, alleging that Browne and his entities violated the Fair Labor Standards Act's (FLSA) minimum wage, overtime, record-keeping, and antiretaliation requirements by misclassifying delivery drivers as independent contractors rather than employees. The district court denied Browne's motion to compel arbitration pursuant to EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).The Ninth Circuit concluded, in light of Waffle House, that a private arbitration agreement does not bind the Secretary of Labor when bringing a FLSA enforcement action that seeks relief on behalf of one party to the arbitration agreement against the other party to that agreement. In Waffle House, the Supreme Court ruled that the EEOC was not party to Waffle House's arbitration agreement, and it was not bound by the agreement because the FAA "does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so." The panel explained that this same reasoning dictates that the Secretary cannot be compelled to arbitrate this case. Here, as in Waffle House, the remedial statute at issue unambiguously authorizes the Secretary to obtain monetary relief on behalf of specific aggrieved employees. The panel explained that, like the EEOC in Waffle House, the Secretary is not party to the arbitration agreement between Browne and his entities and the delivery drivers. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration. View "Walsh v. Arizona Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of Uber's motion to compel arbitration in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging a single cause of action for wage violations under the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), Lab. Code, 2698 et seq. Plaintiff was an Uber driver under a written agreement stating she was an independent contractor and all disputes would be resolved by arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), and the agreement delegated to the arbitrator decisions on the enforceability or validity of the arbitration provision.The court concluded, as has every other California court presented with this or similar issues, that the threshold question of whether plaintiff is an employee or an independent contractor cannot be delegated to an arbitrator. The court found that this issue has been resolved adversely to Uber in two cases decided during and after briefing in this case: Provost v. YourMechanic, Inc. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 982, and Contreras v. Superior Court (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 461. The court was not persuaded to depart from the analyses in Provost and Contreras and all the authorities they cite. The court rejected Uber's claims to the contrary and affirmed the trial court's order. View "Rosales v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff's challenge to an arbitration award in favor of Defendant, holding that the district court did not err.After Plaintiff was summarily dismissed from his employment he challenged his dismissal by filing a complaint and submitting the grievance to arbitration pursuant to his union's collective bargaining agreement with the union. The arbitrator issued an arbitral award dismissing Plaintiff's complaint. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's petition for judicial review. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that the arbitrator's ruling was not in manifest disregard of the law. View "Torres-Burgos v. Crowley Liner Service, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's statutory employment discrimination and civil rights claims. Plaintiff, a former corporate attorney who became an investment banker with defendants, entered into an agreement that set her compensation and benefits, as well as provided that all disputes arising from her employment would be resolved through binding arbitration. Plaintiff also signed a second document that specified the arbitration procedures.The panel concluded that employment disputes are encompassed by the arbitration provisions, and plaintiff knowingly waived her right to a judicial forum. The panel applied Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), where the Supreme Court has held that, while not all statutory claims may be appropriate for arbitration, if a party agreed to arbitration, the party will be held to that agreement unless the party could prove a congressional intent to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. In this case, plaintiff carries the burden to show such an intention. The panel extended Gilmer to Title VII claims and held that there must be at least a knowing agreement to arbitrate employment disputes before an employee may be deemed to have waived judicial remedies.The panel assumed, without deciding, that the knowing waiver requirement remains good law and is applicable to these statutes despite the district court's failure to utilize the proper analysis to establish that the standard applies to these statutory claims. Instead, the panel held that this appeal is resolved on the arbitration agreement's clear language encompassing employment disputes and evidence that plaintiff knowingly waived her right to a judicial forum to resolve her statutory claims. The panel remanded to the district court with the direction that all claims be sent to arbitration and the case be dismissed without prejudice. View "Zoller v. GCA Advisors, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of a putative class, filed suit against his employers, SSP, alleging violations of various provisions of California’s wage and hour laws. SSP moved to compel arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between it and the labor union representing plaintiff.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of SSP's motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that the CBA between SSP and the union provides for arbitration of claims arising under the agreement, but it does not waive the right to a judicial forum for claims based on statutes. In this case, the trial court correctly concluded that arbitrability was a question for the court, not the arbitrator, and that plaintiff's claims are not subject to arbitration. View "Wilson-Davis v. SSP America, Inc." on Justia Law