Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

In this dispute between the Board of Education of the Town of New Milford (Board) and the New Milford Education Association (Union) the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the Board's application to vacate a grievance arbitration award and granting the Union's application to confirm the grievance arbitration award, holding that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law and properly concluded that the Union's grievance was arbitrable.The Union, which represented the teachers employed by the Board, filed a grievance alleging that the Board had violated an agreement between the parties. The arbitrator decided the grievance in the Union's favor. The trial court denied the Board's application to vacate the grievance arbitration award and granted the Union's application to confirm the award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) correctly denied the Board's application to vacate the grievance arbitration award on the grounds that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law by concluding that the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata did not apply to bar the Union's grievance; and (2) the trial court properly concluded that the Union's grievance was arbitrable under the terms of the agreement. View "Board of Education of Town of New Milford v. New Milford Education Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that this lawsuit brought by security guards at Oracle Park (the former AT&T Park in San Francisco) against San Francisco Baseball Associates LLC (the Giants) alleging a violation of Cal. Lab. Code 201, subd. (a) was preempted under federal law and must be submitted to arbitration, holding that the trial court correctly denied the Giants' motion to compel arbitration.In this action, the guards claimed that they were discharged after every Giants homestead, at the end of the baseball season, and after other events at the park, and that they were entitled under section 201 to receive their unpaid wages immediately after each discharge. The Giants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that this action was preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act because the controversy required interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) entered into between the parties. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) while the CBA may be relevant to this lawsuit, the dispute turned on the meaning of "discharge" under section 201 rather than an interpretation of the CBA itself; and (2) therefore, the lawsuit was not preempted, and state courts may decide it on the merits. View "Melendez v. San Francisco Baseball Associates LLC" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order vacating an arbitration award originally in favor of the union. The court held that the arbitration award drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. In this case, the arbitrator appropriately considered the relevant language of the Recognition Clause, even though it did not quote the Recognition Clause in its entirety. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "National Elevator Bargaining Assoc. v. International Union of Elevator Constructors" on Justia Law

The Washington South Education Association was the representative of all licensed teachers within the Northfield schools. The Northfield School Board and the Association negotiated and entered into the CBA, which was in effect from July 1, 2017 to June 30, 2018. Paul Clayton was a middle-school physical-education teacher at the Northfield Middle High School (the School) and was a member of the Association. Therefore, Clayton’s employment was subject to the CBA. In late fall 2017, administrators at the School received complaints about Clayton’s workplace conduct. The complaints alleged that Clayton created a hostile work environment by intimidating his colleagues and advised a student (his daughter) to punch another student in the face. In response to the allegations, Clayton was placed on paid leave while the administrators investigated the complaints and interviewed a number of the School’s staff. Upon the conclusion of their investigation, the administrators wrote a letter to the School’s superintendent describing their findings and noting that while they gave Clayton the opportunity to respond, Clayton declined to respond in a follow-up meeting and then a second meeting scheduled to receive his rebuttal a few days later. After receiving the administrators’ letter, the superintendent wrote a letter to Clayton offering him an opportunity to meet with her to discuss the matter, and attached to the letter a summary of the allegations against Clayton. About a week later, the superintendent met with Clayton and his Association representation. Clayton did not file a notice of appeal of his ultimate suspension. Shortly thereafter, Clayton and the Association, now represented by the Vermont affiliate of the National Education Association (Vermont-NEA), submitted a grievance alleging a violation the CBA. The Board declined to accept the grievance, noting Clayton did not follow the prescribed termination procedures outlined in the CBA. Vermont-NEA thereafter invoked the CBA's arbitration procedures. A trial court agreed with the Board, and Clayton and the Association appealed. The Vermont Supreme Court determined Clayton and the Association failed to exhaust statutory remedies as required by 16 V.S.A. 1752, thus the trial court properly enjoined arbitration. View "Northfield School Board v. Washington South Education Association" on Justia Law

When De Melo was hired, he signed SCI’s “Owner/Operator Agreement,” five pages long, typed in small font, with 27 clauses. The arbitration clause provides that if the parties are unable to settle a dispute, disputes “within the jurisdictional maximum for small claims will be settled in the small claims court.” All other disputes shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Federal Arbitration Act. The clause prohibits consolidating claims in arbitration or arbitrating any claim as a representative member of a class or in a private attorney general capacity. All parties may examine up to three witnesses per party. Each deposition is limited to two hours. Any objections based on privilege and/or confidential information are reserved for arbitration. The arbitrators have authority to award actual monetary damages only. No punitive or equitable relief is authorized. All parties bear their own costs; no attorney’s fees or other costs may be granted. "The arbitrator’s decision shall be final and legally binding and judgment may be entered thereon.” De Melo’s native language is Portuguese; he cannot fully understand documents written in English. No one asked if he wanted the documents translated nor explained the documents. He was not given time to carefully review the documents; no one told him he could have an attorney review them. De Melo filed a claim with the Labor Commissioner, seeking unpaid overtime, meal, and rest period wages, reimbursement of unlawful wage deductions and business expenses, and statutory penalties. (Lab. Code, 203, 226, 2802.) . The court of appeal affirmed the denial of a petition to compel arbitration, finding that the arbitration clause was procedurally and substantively unconscionable and that severance of the substantively unconscionable provisions was not possible because the clause was permeated with unconscionability. View "Subcontracting Concepts (CT), LLC v. De Melo" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of Sohnen's motion to compel arbitration of workplace discrimination claims brought by plaintiff, an employee of Sohnen. The court held that the record demonstrated consent to arbitration where plaintiff's continued employment was a manifestation of agreement to the arbitration provisions. The court also held that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable where the record contained no evidence of surprise, nor of sharp practices demonstrating substantive unconscionability. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Diaz v. Sohnen Enterprises" on Justia Law

Hamilton had been employed by the EEOC for 20 years, with no disciplinary problems, until one day in 2016, when, while engaged in mediation, he suddenly began using racial epithets, engaging in physical violence, and refusing to follow orders. The EEOC removed him from federal service. The union filed a grievance, which led to arbitration. During a hearing, the EEOC called 11 witnesses; the union called Hamilton. Although the arbitrator found that certain aspects of the EEOC’s case had not been proved, he credited the testimony of EEOC witnesses to conclude that Hamilton “had a major physical and/or mental breakdown.” Because Hamilton denied taking any of the actions he was charged with, the arbitrator concluded that Hamilton “did not remember.” The arbitrator found that the EEOC had not shown that Hamilton’s behavior had any negative effect on its reputation and had failed to consider that Hamilton’s behavior “was caused by his obvious medical condition,” and set aside Hamilton’s removal, awarding back pay. The arbitrator denied the union’s request for arbitration costs and attorney fees. The Federal Circuit vacated the denial of attorneys’ fees; 5 U.S.C. 7701(g) provides that an adjudicator may require an agency to pay the employee’s reasonable attorney fees if the employee is the prevailing party and the adjudicator determines that payment by the agency “is warranted in the interest of justice.” On remand, the arbitrator must reconsider the issue and include a statement of reasons. View "AFGE Local 3599 v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission" on Justia Law

If an employee brings a solitary Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) claim, a trial court may not split that claim, sending the employee to arbitration (when he has agreed to it) to recover his underpaid wages but retaining jurisdiction to award the additional, statutorily prescribed amounts.The Court of Appeal held that splitting a PAGA claim in this manner was both legally impermissible and inconsistent with labor and arbitration law. The court explained that where, as here, the employee-plaintiff elected to file a solitary PAGA claim, splitting that claim into two effectively rewrites his complaint into one asserting an individual claim for underpaid wages (which is shunted to arbitration) and a PAGA claim (which is not). Accordingly, the court held that the trial court properly denied the motion to compel arbitration in this case and affirmed the judgment. View "Zakaryan v. The Men's Warehouse, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was terminated from VWB, he filed a class action against the company alleging various wage and hour violations under California labor law. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of VWB's petition to compel arbitration and held that the trial court correctly found that plaintiff's employment came within the Federal Arbitration Act's exemption granted to transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce. The trial court correctly found that plaintiff, employed as a delivery driver for VWB, engaged in interstate commerce through his participation in the continuation of the movement of interstate goods to their destinations. Therefore, plaintiff was exempt from the FAA. The court need not address plaintiff's alternative argument that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable. View "Nieto v. Fresno Beverage Co." on Justia Law

William Carroll, M.D., Loring Rue, M.D., and Gustavo Heudebert, M.D. (collectively, defendants), appealed a circuit court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration of claims asserted against them by Paul F. Castellanos, M.D. Dr. Castellanos alleged that he was an "internationally recognized" physician with a specialty practice as a "laryngologist and bronchoesophagologist (airway surgeon)" who was "recruited to come to the University of Alabama at Birmingham in 2005 to establish a center of excellence for the treatment of voice and aero digestive disorders at University of Alabama, Birmingham Academic and Medical Center" ("UAB Medical Center"). University of Alabama Health Services Foundation, P.C. ("UAHSF") and Dr. Castellanos executed a "Physician Employment Contract" describing the details of his employment, which contained an arbitration provision. The questions whether the individual defendants, as nonsignatories to the employment contract, could enforce the arbitration provision in that contract and whether the arbitration provision encompassed Dr. Castellanos's claims against the individual defendants were questions for the arbitrator, not the court, pursuant to the arbitration provision in the employment contract. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the circuit court erred in denying the individual defendants' motion to compel arbitration. The Court therefore reversed the order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Carroll v. Castellanos" on Justia Law