Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The case involves Ampler Burgers Ohio LLC, doing business as Burger King, and its employees Lesley McLaughlin, Sheila Spaulding, and Teresa Stephens (collectively, the Petitioners) against Kenna Bishop (the Respondent). The dispute arose from allegations of sexual harassment and other violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act during Bishop's employment at a Burger King franchise. As part of her hiring process, Bishop signed an arbitration agreement with Ampler Burgers LLC, an affiliated company of her actual employer, Ampler Burgers Ohio LLC. The agreement required all disputes related to her employment to be arbitrated.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied the Petitioners' motion to compel arbitration, citing five reasons: Ampler Burgers Ohio LLC was not a party to the arbitration agreement; the agreement lacked mutual consideration; the dispute was not subject to the agreement; the agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable; and the Petitioners had waived their right to arbitration.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that the arbitration agreement could be enforced by Ampler Burgers Ohio LLC as it was an affiliated entity of the signatory, Ampler Burgers LLC. The court also determined that the agreement was supported by mutual consideration and covered the disputes raised in the complaint. The court disagreed with the lower court's finding of unconscionability, stating that the agreement's requirements applied equally to all parties. Finally, the court concluded that the Petitioners did not waive their right to arbitration by engaging in limited litigation activities prior to filing the motion to compel arbitration. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "Ampler Burgers Ohio LLC v. Bishop" on Justia Law

Carlos Ramirez, an employee, filed a class action lawsuit against his former employer, Golden Queen Mining Company, alleging various violations of the Labor Code and unfair competition. The employer moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion, stating that the employer failed to demonstrate the existence of an executed arbitration agreement. The employer appealed, arguing that it had made a prima facie showing that a written arbitration agreement existed and that Ramirez’s statements that he did not recall being presented with or signing an arbitration agreement were insufficient to rebut its initial showing.The Superior Court of Kern County had initially denied the employer's motion to compel arbitration on the grounds that the employer failed to demonstrate the existence of an executed arbitration agreement. The court found that the employer's evidence, which included an unsigned arbitration agreement and a handbook acknowledgement purportedly signed by Ramirez, was insufficient to establish the existence of an arbitration agreement.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court concluded that Ramirez did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut the employer’s initial showing that an arbitration agreement existed. The court found that Ramirez's failure to recall signing the document did not create a factual dispute about the signature’s authenticity. The court also noted that Ramirez’s declaration did not state whether he had reviewed the arbitration agreement or other documents purportedly signed by him, nor did it address whether he recalled signing the handbook acknowledgement, which included a statement that he agreed to the terms of the arbitration agreement. The court therefore reversed the order denying the motion to compel arbitration and remanded the case for further proceedings to address Ramirez’s unconscionability defense. View "Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co." on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Education Association Stateside Region (FEA-SR), a teachers' union, and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The parties were negotiating a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) when they reached an impasse. The Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP) was called in to resolve the remaining issues. The FSIP issued an order resolving the impasse, but FEA-SR refused to sign the agreement, arguing that the FSIP lacked jurisdiction to resolve certain issues. FEA-SR filed an arbitral grievance claiming that the Department of Defense's submission of the agreement for agency head review without FEA-SR's signature violated the contractual ground rules and constituted bad faith bargaining.The arbitrator found in favor of FEA-SR, concluding that the Department of Defense had committed unfair labor practices by cutting negotiations short and submitting an unexecuted agreement for agency head review. The FLRA, however, set aside the arbitrator's award, finding that the arbitrator could not review whether the FSIP had jurisdiction over the disputed issues and that the agreement was "executed" when the FSIP issued its order.FEA-SR petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of the FLRA's decisions. The court held that it had jurisdiction to review the petition because the FLRA's decisions involved an unfair labor practice. However, on the merits, the court rejected FEA-SR's claims and denied the petition for review. The court agreed with the FLRA that the arbitrator lacked authority to review the FSIP order and that the agreement was executed when the FSIP issued its order. View "Federal Education Association Stateside Region v. FLRA" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Connecticut and the Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2836, AFL-CIO. The plaintiff, the state, sought to vacate an arbitration award reinstating a union member to his employment as the director of student conduct at a state university. The defendant union sought to confirm the award. The grievant’s employment had been terminated in connection with a domestic dispute involving his wife. The university conducted its own investigation and subsequently informed the grievant that his employment was being terminated as a result of his off-duty conduct. The union contested the grievant’s discharge, and an arbitration hearing was held. The arbitrator concluded that the university did not have just cause to terminate the grievant’s employment and ordered his reinstatement.The state contended that the award violated public policy. The trial court rendered judgment granting the state’s application to vacate the award and denying the union’s motion to confirm the award, from which the union appealed. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the state failed to demonstrate that enforcement of the arbitration award reinstating the grievant to his position of director of student conduct violated public policy. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to grant the union’s motion to confirm the award and to deny the state’s application to vacate the award. View "State v. Connecticut State University Organization of Administrative Faculty" on Justia Law

Joseph Work, a former employee of Intertek, filed a collective action against the company for unpaid overtime, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and relief for the collective class. Intertek objected to the judicial forum and requested arbitration. The dispute centered on whether the agreed-upon Arbitration Agreement provided for individual or class arbitration. Work sought class arbitration, while Intertek sought individual arbitration. Intertek filed a Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration, arguing that the Arbitration Agreement did not contain an express delegation clause and was silent on class arbitration.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ruled that the issue of class arbitrability was delegated to the arbitrator. The court held that the Arbitration Agreement incorporated certain JAMS Rules by reference, which delegate questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator, including the question of class arbitrability. The district court granted Work’s motion to dismiss and denied Intertek’s motion to compel individual arbitration.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Intertek argued that consent to class arbitration was absent and that the language in the Arbitration Agreement was not clear. The court rejected both arguments, affirming the district court's decision. The court held that the Arbitration Agreement was not ambiguous and that it clearly incorporated the JAMS Rules by reference. The court concluded that the language in the Arbitration Agreement was "clear and unmistakable" in its incorporation of the JAMS Rules, which provide that the arbitrator decides the question of arbitrability. View "Work v. Intertek" on Justia Law

The case involves an employee, Pamela Cook, who filed a lawsuit against her employer, the University of Southern California (USC), and two coworkers, alleging discrimination and harassment. USC moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement signed by Cook as a condition of her employment. The agreement required Cook to arbitrate all claims against USC, its agents, affiliates, and employees, regardless of whether they arose from the employment relationship. The trial court denied the motion, finding the arbitration agreement was permeated by unconscionability, which could not be severed from the agreement. USC appealed this decision.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County had previously denied USC's motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Procedurally, the court found the agreement to be a contract of adhesion, made a condition of Cook's employment. Substantively, the court found the agreement to be unconscionable due to its infinite scope, covering all of Cook's claims regardless of their relation to her employment, and its infinite duration, surviving the termination of Cook's employment indefinitely. The court also found a lack of mutuality in the agreement, as it required Cook to arbitrate her claims against USC and all of USC’s “related entities,” but did not require USC’s “related entities” to arbitrate their claims against Cook.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Four affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the lower court's findings of both procedural and substantive unconscionability. The court found that the arbitration agreement was one-sided, overly broad in scope, and indefinite in duration. The court also agreed with the lower court's refusal to sever the unconscionable provisions and enforce the remainder of the agreement, finding that the agreement was permeated with unconscionability. View "Cook v. University of Southern California" on Justia Law

The case involves an employee, Massiel Hernandez, and her employer, Sohnen Enterprises. Hernandez signed an arbitration agreement with Sohnen, which stated that any disputes would be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). When Hernandez filed a complaint against Sohnen for disability discrimination and Labor Code violations, the parties agreed to arbitrate. However, Sohnen failed to pay the arbitration fees within 30 days of the due date. Hernandez then filed a motion to withdraw from arbitration and litigate in state court, as permitted under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.97. The trial court granted the motion, finding that Sohnen had breached the arbitration agreement.Sohnen appealed, arguing that the FAA, not California law, governed the arbitration agreement and preempted section 1281.97. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Five, agreed with Sohnen. The court found that the arbitration agreement was governed by the FAA, including both its substantive and procedural provisions. As a result, the procedures of section 1281.97 did not apply, and the trial court's order was reversed. The court also held that even if section 1281.97 did apply, it would still reverse the order because the FAA preempts the provisions of section 1281.97 that mandate findings of breach and waiver when an agreement falls within the scope of the FAA and does not expressly adopt California arbitration laws. View "Hernandez v. Sohnen Enterprises" on Justia Law

The Trustees of the New York State Nurses Association Pension Plan (the Trustees) and White Oak Global Advisors, LLC (White Oak) entered into an investment management agreement, which included an arbitration clause. The Trustees later brought several fiduciary duty claims against White Oak under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which were resolved through arbitration. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of the Trustees, which the Trustees sought to confirm in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.White Oak appealed the confirmation, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction and that the court erroneously interpreted the award. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's jurisdiction, finding that the Trustees' petition to confirm the award was cognizable under ERISA § 502(a)(3). The court also affirmed the district court's interpretation of the award regarding the disgorgement of pre-award interest and the "Day One" fees. However, the court vacated and remanded the district court's confirmation of the disgorgement of White Oak's "profits," finding the award too ambiguous to enforce. The court also vacated and remanded the district court's order for White Oak to pay the Trustees' attorneys' fees and costs, finding the district court's findings insufficiently specific. View "Trustees of the NYSNAPP v. White Oak Glob. Adv." on Justia Law

Isabel Garcia, an employee of RAC Acceptance East, LLC (RAC), filed a lawsuit against RAC, Stoneledge Furniture LLC (Stoneledge), and Inderjit Singh, alleging ten claims related to sexual harassment. RAC, Stoneledge, and Singh sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement they claimed Garcia electronically signed during her employment onboarding process. Garcia denied signing the agreement and argued that RAC failed to prove she executed the agreement.The trial court denied the petitions to compel arbitration. It found that while RAC had initially shown an agreement to arbitrate by providing the agreement, Garcia's denial of signing the agreement shifted the burden back to RAC to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her electronic signature was authentic. The court found that RAC failed to meet this burden as the declaration provided by RAC did not present sufficient details of the onboarding process to establish how Garcia must have signed the agreement. The court also found that the agreement did not have the appearance of an electronically signed document created in Taleo, the third-party electronic workforce management platform used by RAC.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the trial court did not err in deciding whether any agreement to arbitrate existed in the first place, rather than delegating that decision to an arbitrator. The appellate court also found that RAC failed to prove the existence of the arbitration agreement. The court concluded that RAC's evidence did not show that only Garcia could have placed the electronic signature on the arbitration agreement. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying RAC’s request for an evidentiary hearing. View "Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves the interpretation of Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which outlines procedures for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal court. The petitioners, current and former delivery drivers for an on-demand delivery service operated by the respondents, filed a lawsuit alleging violations of federal and state employment laws. The respondents moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the suit. The petitioners agreed that their claims were arbitrable but argued that Section 3 of the FAA required the District Court to stay the action pending arbitration rather than dismissing it entirely. The District Court issued an order compelling arbitration and dismissed the case without prejudice. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Supreme Court held that when a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, Section 3 of the FAA compels the court to issue a stay, and the court lacks discretion to dismiss the suit. The Court reasoned that the statutory text, structure, and purpose all point to this conclusion. The Court further explained that the FAA's structure and purpose confirm that a stay is required. The Court concluded that staying rather than dismissing a suit comports with the supervisory role that the FAA envisions for the courts. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Smith v. Spizzirri" on Justia Law