Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Watch House, alleging that he was discharged in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. The district court granted Watch House's motion to compel arbitration and dismissed plaintiff's suit without prejudice. The court concluded that the three-part test in Lizalde v. Vista Quality Markets remains an accurate statement of Texas law and applied Lizalde to the language of Watch House's Arbitration Plan at issue. The court agreed with plaintiff that the Plan is illusory because it fails to include an In re Halliburton-type savings clause that requires advance notice of termination. In this case, the Plan provides that Watch House may make unilateral changes to the Plan, purportedly including termination, and that such a change “shall be immediately effective upon notice to” employees. Watch House’s retention of this unilateral power to terminate the Plan without advance notice renders the Plan illusory under a plain reading of Lizalde, which is supported by recent decisions from Texas intermediate courts. Consequently, plaintiff is not bound by the Plan and Watch House may not compel arbitration. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nelson v. Watch House Int'l, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant CWPSC, Inc. (CW Painting) appealed a trial court order denying its motion to compel its former employee, plaintiff-respondent Martha Carbajal, to arbitrate her wage and hour claims under the arbitration provision in her employment agreement. The trial court denied the motion because it found the arbitration provision was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. After review, the Court of Appeal found: (1) the arbitration provision was procedurally unconscionable because it was part of an adhesion contract CW Painting imposed on Carbajal as a term of her employment; (2) the arbitration provision was substantively unconscionable because it allowed CW Painting to obtain injunctive relief in court while requiring Carbajal to seek relief through arbitration, it waives the statutory requirement that CW Painting post a bond or undertaking to obtain injunctive relief, and it effectively waives Carbajal’s statutory right to recover her attorney fees if she prevailed on her Labor Code claims; and (3) pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, the party asserting the FAA bore the burden to show it applied by presenting evidence establishing the contract with the arbitration provision has a substantial relationship to interstate commerce, and CW Painting failed to timely present such evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s order. View "Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner City of Concord appealed a New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board (PELRB) decision that a grievance filed by respondent, the Concord Police Supervisor[s’] Association (Union), and a retired bargaining unit member was arbitrable pursuant to the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The City and the Union were parties to a CBA that expired on December 31, 2012. Lieutenant Paul Leger retired on January 31, 2013, while negotiations for a successor CBA were ongoing. Negotiations for the successor CBA culminated in an agreement signed on December 19, 2013, nearly eleven months after Leger retired. In March 2014, more than a year after Leger retired, he and the Union filed a grievance with the City because he did not receive the cost of living wage adjustment effective January 1, 2013. The City denied the grievance, and the Union subsequently demanded arbitration. Finding no reversible error in the PELRB's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Appeal of City of Concord " on Justia Law

Muller, an employee of the U.S. Government Printing Office, is a union member. The union and GPO are signatories to a multi-party Master Labor Management Agreement, which creates a negotiated grievance procedure for GPO employees to contest adverse employment actions as an alternative to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board. Muller was reassigned within the GPO, resulting in demotion to a lower grade and a reduction in pay. Muller challenged his reassignment through the negotiated procedure. An arbitrator dismissed the grievance as “not arbitrable,” because a four-month deadline for holding a hearing, required by the agreement, had passed. The Federal Circuit reversed; the contractual provision does not require dismissal of the grievance in the event of noncompliance with the four-month deadline. The deadline is merely a nonbinding housekeeping rule to encourage timely arbitration, one that is addressed to the arbitrator as well as the parties. There is no past practice requiring dismissal under the circumstances of this case. View "Muller v. Gov't Printing Office" on Justia Law

In this appeal by allowance, we consider the breadth of the authority of an interest arbitration panel acting pursuant to the Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act. In 2009, the contract between appellee City of Philadelphia and appellant the Michael G. Lutz Lodge No. 5 of the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) expired, and the parties failed to negotiate a new one. The matter went to binding interest arbitration. An arbitration panel put a new collective bargaining agreement in place effective July 2009 to June 2013. One issue before the panel concerned advance notification and premium overtime for police officers for court appearances. The panel's authority came into question when it made decisions on the notification and overtime issues. The Supreme Court found that the interest arbitration panel's authority was limited to addressing issues properly submitted to the panel, or those questions reasonably subsumed within those issues. Here, the panel exceeded its authority by speaking to an issue that was neither bargained over, raised in prior related proceedings before the panel, nor reasonably subsumed within the issue that was properly before the panel. Accordingly, the Court reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court which affirmed the underlying interest arbitration award. View "Michael G. Lutz Lodge v. City of Phila." on Justia Law

In 2000, plaintiff accepted the Gray law firm’s offer of employment as an associate attorney, including a provision requiring both parties to submit all disputes relating to the employment relationship to binding arbitration. In 2005, Gray merged into DLA Piper. In 2006, plaintiff signed a “Confidential Resignation Agreement and General Release of Claims.” DLA agreed to continue to provide insurance and other benefits until August 2006, when his employment would officially terminate. The Termination Agreement is silent concerning dispute resolution. Plaintiff later sued, alleging: breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; breach of contract; promissory fraud; and constructive fraud, arguing that the firm had “undervalued” his benefits by computing them based on “artificially reduced salary figures.” DLA sought to compel arbitration. Plaintiff asserted the Termination Agreement constituted a novation, extinguishing the arbitration provision, and that even if the provision had survived, claims involving the benefit plan were not subject to arbitration. The court compelled arbitration. In 2013, the arbitrator determined DLA had breached the Termination Agreement and plaintiff had suffered emotional distress, and awarded $41,000 in contract damages plus interest, $45,000 in emotional distress damages, and $7,535.67 in costs. The court of appeal affirmed confirmation of the award. View "Jenks v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action suit against his employer, alleging various Labor Code violations and unfair business practice. Plaintiff had entered into an agreement with his employer, providing that all disputes arising out of his employment would be resolved by arbitration, and the agreement prohibited class arbitration. The trial court denied the employer's motion to compel arbitration under the test laid out in Gentry v. Superior Court. After the trial court's ruling, the Supreme Court held, in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, that Gentry’s rule against employment class waivers was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The court concluded, however, that this matter is not subject to the FAA and that Gentry’s holding has not been overturned under California law in situations where the FAA does not apply. Accordingly, the court found that the agreement’s class waiver provision is unenforceable. Neither party asserts that class arbitration is appropriate. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Garrido v. Air Liquide Industrial U.S. LP" on Justia Law

Miranda is a former employee of Anderson Enterprises; Hansen is the company’s general manager. During his employment, Miranda signed an “Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy” by which agreed to arbitrate all employment claims and waived the right to arbitrate claims as a class or collective action. In 2013, Miranda filed a purported class action lawsuit, asserting wage and hour claims, including a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA; Lab. Code, 2698) claim. The trial court found the arbitration agreement valid and enforceable, dismissed the class and representative claims without prejudice based on the arbitration agreement’s waiver, directed Miranda to arbitrate his individual claims, and stayed the superior court proceedings pending completion of arbitration of the individual claims. The court of appeal reversed as to the representative PAGA claim, based on a subsequently-issued California Supreme Court opinion, Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC (2014), under which the waiver is unenforceable. The court noted that Miranda had represented that he would not pursue his individual claims through arbitration and concluded that the PAGA ruling was, therefore, appealable. View "Miranda v. Anderson Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

The Union filed a grievance against Verizon under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), after Verizon eliminated communications technician positions. At issue on appeal was whether the arbitrator exceeded his power by issuing a substituted award after he determined that he had exceeded his power in the original award. In this case, the arbitrator decided, at least initially, that the issue submitted included both the “minimal additional training” and the “previously held” language in the CBA. While the arbitrator was later persuaded that this was error, Rule 40 of the AAA Labor Arbitration Rules precluded him from making that determination and issuing the substituted award. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the arbitrator exceeded his power. View "Local Union 824, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Verizon Florida, LLC" on Justia Law

Three petitioners sued their former employer and certain of its agents and associates (collectively, “Employer”) asserting minimum wage and overtime claims individually and on behalf of others similarly situated. The district court entered orders compelling individual arbitration of Petitioners’ claims and denying their motions for class certification. Each petitioner signed the same long-form arbitration agreement, which included a clause waiving the right to initiate or participate in class actions. Petitioners sought extraordinary writ relief, contending that Employer’s failure to countersign the long-form agreement made it unenforceable, that the class action waiver violated state and federal law, and, in the case of one petitioner, Employer waived its right to compel arbitration by litigating with him in state and federal court. The Supreme Court denied writ relief, holding that Petitioners’ arguments were unavailing and that the district court did not err in compelling individual arbitration of their claims. View "Tallman v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law