Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Before suing for employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) must “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion,” 42 U. S. C. 2000e–5(b). Nothing said or done during conciliation may be “used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without written consent of the persons concerned.” After investigating a sex discrimination charge against Mach Mining, EEOC determined that reasonable cause existed to believe that the company had engaged in unlawful hiring practices and invited the parties to participate in informal conciliation. A year later, EEOC sent Mach another letter stating that conciliation efforts had been unsuccessful, then filed suit. Mach alleged that EEOC had not attempted to conciliate in good faith. The Seventh Circuit held that EEOC’s statutory conciliation obligation was unreviewable. The Supreme Court vacated, noting a “strong presumption” that Congress means to allow judicial review of administrative action. EEOC’s argument that review is limited to checking the facial validity of its two letters falls short of Title VII’s demands; the aim of judicial review is to verify that the EEOC actually tried to conciliate. The Court rejected Mach’s proposal for specific requirements or a code of conduct as conflicting with the wide latitude Congress gave EEOC and with Title VII’s confidentiality protections. A sworn affidavit from EEOC that it informed the employer about the specific discrimination allegation and tried to engage the employer in a discussion to give the employer a chance to remedy the allegedly discriminatory practice should suffice. Should the employer present concrete evidence that the EEOC did not provide the requisite information or attempt to engage in conciliation, a court must conduct the fact-finding necessary to resolve that limited dispute. View "Mach Mining, LLC v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of the St. Louis Rams Partnership, filed an action claiming age discrimination against the Partnership and three of its affiliates. The Rams moved to compel arbitration, citing an arbitration provision of Plaintiff’s employment contract. The trial court granted the motion and ordered that the court action be stayed pending arbitration. Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandamus preventing the trial court from compelling arbitration of this dispute. Four judges of the Supreme Court issued a permanent writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to compel arbitration and to issue an order to compel arbitration whereby the trial court appoints a neutral arbitrator and implies the specific terms of arbitration from applicable statutes in Missouri’s uniform arbitration act, holding (1) the terms of Plaintiff’s employment contract designating the commissioner of the National Football League (NFL) as the sole arbitrator with unfettered discretion to establish the rules for arbitration are unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable; and (2) Missouri’s uniform arbitration act provides a mechanism to imply the terms missing from the arbitration agreement and provides the rules for appointing an arbitrator to replace the NFL commissioner. View "State ex rel. Hewitt v. Hon. Kerr" on Justia Law

A skilled nursing facility (Plaintiff) terminated an employee (Employee) on the ground that she had failed to make a timely report of an allegation of resident abuse. An arbitrator agreed with Plaintiff that the Employee had improperly delayed reporting an incident of suspected abuse but ordered the Employee reinstated based upon its determination that Plaintiff had just cause to suspend Employee without pay for one month. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s application to vacate the arbitration award. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the arbitration award reinstating the Employee’s employment violated Connecticut’s clear public policy requiring the prompt reporting of any incident of suspected abuse of a nursing home resident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration award requiring the reinstatement of the Employee did not violate this public policy. View "Burr Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. New England Health Care Employees Union" on Justia Law

Serafin sued her former employer Balco, alleging wrongful termination, harassment, and defamation. The trial court granted Balco’s motion to stay the litigation until the completion of binding arbitration based upon an arbitration agreement Serafin signed when she was hired. The arbitrator ultimately found in Balco’s favor on all issues, and the trial court confirmed the award, entering judgment in Balco’s favor. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that Serafin never entered into a binding agreement to arbitrate her employment-related claims and that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court found the degree of procedural unconscionability minimal, and that, because a substantively unconscionable attorney fees provision was severed by the trial court before arbitration began, no substantive unconscionability was shown View "Serafin v. Balco Props. Ltd., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security issued a final decision removing Garcia from the U.S. Border Patrol for misconduct. Garcia received notice the same day. Under 5 U.S.C. 7121(e)(1), Garcia had the option to appeal his removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) or to invoke arbitration, under his union’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Article 34 of the CBA states that in cases involving adverse actions, such as removal, requests for arbitration “must be filed . . . not later than thirty (30) calendar days after the effective date of the action.” His union mailed a letter to the Agency requesting arbitration 28 days after the effective date of Garcia’s removal. The Agency did not receive this request until seven days later. After an arbitrator was appointed, the Agency moved to dismiss. The Arbitrator found the plain meaning of “filed” in the CBA requires actual receipt of the request for arbitration, relying on the definition of “file” used in federal court proceedings. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the request for arbitration need only be mailed within the 30-day time period. View "Garcia v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Appellant was associated with Appellee, Raymond James Financial Services, as a securities broker. After Appellee decided to terminate Appellant’s contract, Appellant brought an arbitration proceeding before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, alleging that he had been fired because of his sexual orientation and his status as a recovering alcoholic, in violation of Vermont law. After granting the parties’ request that Florida law be applied to the proceedings, an arbitration panel awarded Appellant $600,000 in back pay on his claim of discrimination based on disability. The district court vacated the award, concluding that the arbitrators lacked authority to grant the remedy because Appellant brought no claims under Florida law. The First Circuit reversed, holding that although the arbitration decision may have been incorrect as a matter of law, the arbitrators’ decision to impose liability on Appellee under Florida law did not willfully flout the governing law or otherwise exceed the bounds of the arbitrators’ authority to resolve the parties’ dispute. Remanded for entry of an order confirming the arbitration award. View "Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fenyk" on Justia Law

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) operates the Metrorail and Metrobus systems in Washington, D.C., Maryland, and Virginia and employs a police force, the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD). The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) is the bargaining agent for MTPD officers. WMATA fired two MTPD officers, but the Board of Arbitration overturned both discharges and ordered WMATA to reinstate the officers. WMATA reinstated the officers, but as a result of their initial terminations, the officers lost the certifications to serve as police officers in Maryland. Consequently, WMATA discharged the officers for a second time. The FOP filed this action in federal court on behalf of each officer, alleging that WMATA failed to comply with the arbitration awards. The district court granted summary judgment for the FOP. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding (1) WMATA’s decision to terminate the officers for a second time did not violate the earlier arbitration awards; and (2) the officers’ grievances belonged before the Board of Arbitration, not a federal court. View "Fraternal Order of Police v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth." on Justia Law

Alleging illegal tip pooling Conners filed a collective action against her former employer (a restaurant) under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The employer then implemented a new arbitration policy that requires all employment-related disputes between current employees and the employer to be resolved though individual arbitration. The policy purports to bind all current employees who did not opt out; each employee received an opt-out form. Citing public policy, the district court declared the policy unenforceable insofar as it could prevent current employees from joining this collective action. On interlocutory appeal, the Eighth Circuit vacated, holding that former employees like Conners lack standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to challenge the arbitration agreement, which applied only to current employees. View "Conners v. Gusano's Chicago Style Pizzeria" on Justia Law

The City of Bozeman dismissed Robert Chase, a building inspector, and Chase claimed that the dismissal was improper. The Montana Public Employees’ Association (MPEA) gave notice to the City Manager of its decision to arbitrate Chase’s grievance according to the grievance procedure but failed to timely request a list of potential arbitrators from the Montana Board of Personnel Appeals. More than one year after the dispute arose, MPEA contacted the City to proceed with arbitration. The City declined to cooperate. More than four years after the dispute first arose, MPEA filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the City must participate in arbitration. The City asserted a counterclaim for declaratory relief. The district court granted summary judgment and issued declaratory relief to the City, concluding that Chase’s grievance did not survive MPEA’s failure to follow the agreement’s time limits and that MPEA waived any right to arbitrate through its four-year delay. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) whether a dispute remains arbitrable despite the failure to follow the an arbitration agreement’s procedures, including time limits, is a question of procedural arbitrability that is for an arbitrator and not for a court to decide; and (2) the City’s waiver argument was an issue for an arbitrator to decide. View "Mont. Pub. Employees Ass’n v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

Petitioner Universal Protection Service, L.P. petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition to challenge the superior court's order granting real party in interest Floridalma Franco's demand to arbitrate her employment-related disputes with Universal and ruling the arbitrator would decide the arbitrability of Franco's class action claims. Universal argued the court legally erred in its ruling because the parties' arbitration agreement did not clearly and unmistakably submit arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, and thus it was for the superior court to decide whether the agreement authorized class and/or representative arbitration. The Court of Appeal concluded the court erred by granting Franco's petition, but nevertheless agreed with Franco that the parties' reference to American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules, which unambiguously stated that the arbitrator was to decide whether the parties' arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration, constituted clear and unmistakable evidence of their intent that the arbitrator decide this issue (which was a threshold question of arbitrability). Because the trial court reached the correct conclusion, the Court of Appeal denied Universal's petition. View "Universal Protection Services v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law