Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

This case stems from a dispute over a petition to compel arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between IATSE and InSync. The district court granted IATSE’s petition to compel arbitration pursuant to the parties’ initial agreement and “stayed” the case. The court concluded that the district court's arbitration order was final under 28 U.S.C. 1291 because the stay lacked any legal or practical effect. Therefore, the court has jurisdiction to review the order. On the merits, the court concluded that, given the scope of the arbitration provision and the nature of the parties’ dispute, the arbitrator and not the district court must consider IATSE and InSync’s competing interpretations of the evergreen clause and decide whether the 2003–2007 CBA expired or was terminated. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "IATSE Local 720 V. InSync Show Prod." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Michael Parnow, Shawn Lisenby, Bob Andrade, Gabriel Bautista, and Saiyaz Abdul filed a class action against Universal Protection Service, LP and Universal Services of America, Inc. (collectively, UPS). Plaintiffs worked as armed security guards at the Yolo County Superior Court, under the employ of UPS. As part of their job, they have to provide equipment, such as guns, handcuffs, and radios, and have to pay the costs to maintain their certification to work as armed guards, but they are not reimbursed for equipment or training costs. When they filed an administrative complaint, they were all fired except plaintiff Lisenby, and none were paid their wages. The trial court granted a stipulated stay, pending the outcome of a then-pending case in the California Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court issued its decision, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint as a “representative action” under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) and also petitioned to compel class-wide arbitration. The agreement listed a number of disputes that were covered, including “any state or local statutes and ordinances relating to wage and hour or wage payment matters.” It excluded employees covered by collective bargaining agreements, and disputes involving workers compensation and unemployment insurance. UPS answered with a general denial, coupled with various affirmative defenses, including that the class action claims were barred by the arbitration agreement. UPS also filed a cross-complaint seeking a declaration that: (1) the trial court, not the arbitrator, should decide whether class action relief was barred by the arbitration agreement; and (2) that the arbitration agreement barred class actions. After plaintiffs answered the cross-complaint, UPS moved to compel individual arbitration and stay the proceedings. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, in part arguing that under American Arbitration Association (AAA) Rules, whether class arbitrations were permitted was a matter for the arbitrator to decide. Plaintiffs obtained judicial notice of the AAA Rules. The trial court denied the motion to compel individual arbitration, and stayed the suit pending the arbitration. UPS petitioned for a writ of mandate, seeking to set aside the order compelling it to submit to arbitration. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the agreements’ incorporation by reference of the AAA Rules vested the arbitrator with the power to decide the disputed issue. The alternative writ was discharged, the stay (issued previously) was vacated, and the petition for mandate was denied. View "Universal Protection Service v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Carlson sued Home Team, alleging that she was employed as Home’s office manager from February 4, 2013, until her wrongful termination on July 1, 2013. Carlson sought damages for wrongful termination, harassment, breach of her employment agreement, unpaid overtime, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Home moved to compel arbitration, because on Carlson’s first day of work, she was directed to Home’s electronic “onboarding system,” which contained company policies, including Home’s Agreement to Arbitrate. Carlson objected to the Agreement in an email, stating: “I would like to negotiate the terms.” In a conference call with Home’s human resources manager, Carlson asked who would pay for any arbitration and what firm would perform it. The HR Manager began to explain, but Carlson “cut [her] off,” saying that was all the information she needed and she would sign the Agreement. Home’s in-house counsel produced a copy of the Agreement that Carlson “signed electronically,” which was kept in her personnel file.The trial court denied Home’s motion. The court of appeal affirmed, finding the arbitration agreement procedurally and substantively unconscionable, and rejecting contentions that state law unconscionability principles are preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, and that the courts could sever unconscionable provisions. View "Carlson v. Home Team Pest Defense, Inc." on Justia Law

Appleberry worked for the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, under a collective bargaining agreement. Deeming her performance unsatisfactory, the agency placed her on a “performance improvement plan” and then found that she failed to improve. Eventually, relying on that failure, the agency fired her. When Appleberry brought her removal to arbitration, as authorized (but not required) by the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator concluded that she could not challenge the key bases for the removal, i.e., the agency determinations that she should be placed on the performance-improvement plan and that she failed under the plan; that the collective bargaining agreement, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7121, prescribed the exclusive process, including time limits, for challenging those determinations; but that Appleberry had abandoned that process after initiating it through filing grievances, allowing the time for completing challenges to run. The arbitrator barred reconsideration of “issues that were raised in [her] earlier grievances, or that could have been raised but were not.” The Federal Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the arbitrator should not have barred consideration of the performance-improvement-plan issues raised in her earlier, uncompleted grievances; the arbitrator properly enforced the grievance process designated as “exclusive” in the collective bargaining agreement. View "Appleberry v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

Former employees brought a putative class action against their former employer, NMG, alleging violations of the California Labor Code, and NMG moved to compel arbitration under its mandatory arbitration program for employment-related disputes. NMG submitted evidence that, at the time of plaintiff’s employment (2007-2009), it distributed to each new employee a copy of its “Mandatory Arbitration Agreement,” brochures explaining the arbitration program, and an employee handbook that included a brief description of the program The trial court initially ordered arbitration of all claims except a claim under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) Lab. Code, 2698, but later reconsidered and denied the motion, concluding the arbitration agreement at issue was illusory. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its initial order; an arbitrator, rather than a court, must determine any challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement; and the arbitration agreement is enforceable and encompasses all claims, including his PAGA claim. The court found multiple unconscionable aspects to the NMG Arbitration Agreement. View "Pinela v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc." on Justia Law

After the County of Kaua’i and Kaua’i Police Department filled five police sergeant positions through internal promotions, the State of Hawaii Organization of Police Officers (SHOPO) challenged, through the grievance procedures of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) governing the parties, the non-promotions of three police officers. The parties were unable to resolve the grievances, and the matter was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator found that the promotions were subjective, arbitrary, and capricious in violation of the CBA and awarded the three officers promotions and back pay. The circuit court vacated the arbitrator’s remedy, concluding that it was beyond the scope of the arbitrator’s authority to award promotions. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated in part the circuit court’s orders and remanded to the circuit court for confirmation of the arbitrator’s decision in its entirety, concluding that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in awarding promotions and that the circuit court erred in finding otherwise. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitrator acted within the scope of his authority under the CBA. View "In re Grievance Arbitration Between State of Haw. Org. of Police Officers" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of Chase, filed a putative class action alleging violations of state and federal overtime laws. The district court denied Chase's motion to compel arbitration. The court affirmed, concluding that the arbitration clause in the employment contracts cover only claims or controversies “required to be arbitrated by the FINRA Rules.” The court agreed with the district court's ruling that it thus incorporated the arbitrability restrictions of the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes (FINRA Rules) and the district court's application of the current version of FINRA Rule 13204, which prohibits arbitration of claims brought as putative class or collective actions. View "Lloyd v. J.P. Morgan Chase" on Justia Law

Suzanne Listro, a social worker employed by the Department of Children and Families, was charged with manslaughter in the first degree and risk of injury to a child after a foster child in her care died. The Department dismissed Listro for cause due to her “serious misconduct.” Listro was later acquitted of the criminal charges. The collective bargaining unit for the Department’s social workers (the Union) filed a grievance on Listro’s behalf challenging her termination. An arbitrator denied Listro’s grievance. The superior court vacated the arbitrator’s award, concluding that the arbitrator exceeded her authority in using negligence as a standard and basis for her award. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that “negligence arguably came within the purview of the [collective bargaining] agreement” and was an appropriate term of the arbitrator to use to describe Listro’s conduct, which was the basis of her dismissal for just cause. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of the just cause provision of the collective bargaining agreement and the notice to Listro that her conduct on the evening of the child's death provided the basis for termination, the trial court improperly granted the Union’s application to vacate the arbitrator’s award. View "AFSCME, Council 4, Local 2663 v. Dep’t of Children & Families" on Justia Law

This case arose from an interest arbitration award that retroactively increased employee health care premiums for a period when there was no enforceable collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Superior Court struck a portion of the award that granted the retroactive increase, ruling that the award: (1) was an unconstitutional taking in violation of the due process clause; (2) violated Washington's wage rebate act (WRA); and (3) was arbitrary and capricious. Kitsap County appealed this ruling and the Washington Supreme Court granted direct review. Finding the arbitration award proper, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Kitsap County Deputy Sheriffs' Guild v. Kitsap County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging various wage and hour violations of the Labor Code, as well as other causes of action. On appeal, defendants challenged the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration of claims based on the alleged misclassification of plaintiff as an independent contractor rather than an employee. The court found that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., applies to the parties’ arbitration agreement, and all of plaintiff’s claims are arbitrable; defendants did not waive their right to arbitration even though they waited 14 months after the complaint was filed to move to compel arbitration; plaintiff cannot demonstrate prejudice from the delay, which is determinative; and the court reversed the trial court’s order denying the petition to compel arbitration and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter an order compelling arbitration of all of plaintiff’s claims. View "Khalatian v. Prime Time Shuttle" on Justia Law