Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law
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Plaintiff worked for the Alexandria Redevelopment and Housing Authority (ARHA) before being discharged for violating ARHA’s “absenteeism and tardiness policies.” Plaintiff filed a complaint in circuit court claiming that she had been improperly discharged. The circuit court denied Plaintiff’s request for reinstatement and her claim for money damages but held that Plaintiff was entitled to have her claims arbitrated under ARHA’s grievance procedure. The Supreme Court reversed and entered final judgment in favor of ARHA, holding that the circuit court misapplied Va. Code 15.2-1507(A)(7)(b) and erred in ordering ARHA to arbitrate Plaintiff’s grievance. View "Alexandria Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. Walker" on Justia Law

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Officer Tori-Lynn Heaton filed a grievance with the City of Cranston seeking to be allowed to retire from the Cranston Police Department at nineteen years, six months, and one day with her full twenty year pension. The City denied the grievance. Because Officer Heaton deferred her retirement until she had served the full twenty years, the issue in dispute at the arbitration was whether the City violated its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 301 when it refused to credit Officer Heaton with a year of service for pension purposes. The arbitrator concluded that the City violated the ‘round-up’ rule of the CBA when it declined to credit Officer Heaton with a full additional year of service. Because there was no remedy available to Officer Heaton where she in fact completed a full twenty years of service before she retired, the arbitrator transmuted the arbitration award into a declaratory judgment. The trial justice granted the City’s motion to vacate, concluding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he fashioned an award on a dispute that was not arbitrable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the decision of the arbitrator was improper and outside the bounds of the arbitrator’s authority. View "City of Cranston v. Int’l Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 301" on Justia Law

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Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc., d.b.a. LegalShield, sued its former employee Todd Cahill, claiming Cahill had breached his contract, unlawfully misappropriated Pre-Paid’s trade secrets, and tortiously interfered with contract and business relations. Cahill removed the case from state to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, and moved to stay the district court proceedings under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) so the parties could pursue arbitration. Thereafter the district court stayed litigation pending arbitration. Cahill failed to pay his share of the arbitration fees, and the arbitrators terminated arbitration proceedings. Pre-Paid moved the district court to lift the stay and resume with litigation. The court granted the motion, adopting a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. Finding that the district court did not err in lifting the stay under 9 U.S.C. Section 3 of the FAA because the arbitration "ha[d] been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement” and Cahill was “in default in proceeding with such arbitration," the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. View "Pre-Paid Legal Services v. Cahill" on Justia Law

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When James Maddalena, a correctional officer with the Department of Corrections (DOC), admitted that another officer was smoking marijuana, in his presence, while on duty, Maddalena was terminated from employment with the DOC. The Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers (RIBCO) filed a grievance on behalf of Maddalena in accordance with its collective bargaining agreement (CBA), contending that Maddalena was terminated without just cause. The matter proceeded to arbitration. An arbitrator determined that there was not just cause for Maddalena’s termination and provided that Maddalena be suspended without pay for sixty days. A justice of the superior court granted the DOC’s motion to vacate the arbitration award and denied RIBCO’s motion to confirm the award, determining that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and reached an irrational result because his decision was based upon a manifest disregard of the CBA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in concluding that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the CBA and that the arbitration award was irrational. View "State Dep’t of Corr. v. R.I. Brotherhood of Corr. Officers" on Justia Law

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Before suing for employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) must “endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion,” 42 U. S. C. 2000e–5(b). Nothing said or done during conciliation may be “used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without written consent of the persons concerned.” After investigating a sex discrimination charge against Mach Mining, EEOC determined that reasonable cause existed to believe that the company had engaged in unlawful hiring practices and invited the parties to participate in informal conciliation. A year later, EEOC sent Mach another letter stating that conciliation efforts had been unsuccessful, then filed suit. Mach alleged that EEOC had not attempted to conciliate in good faith. The Seventh Circuit held that EEOC’s statutory conciliation obligation was unreviewable. The Supreme Court vacated, noting a “strong presumption” that Congress means to allow judicial review of administrative action. EEOC’s argument that review is limited to checking the facial validity of its two letters falls short of Title VII’s demands; the aim of judicial review is to verify that the EEOC actually tried to conciliate. The Court rejected Mach’s proposal for specific requirements or a code of conduct as conflicting with the wide latitude Congress gave EEOC and with Title VII’s confidentiality protections. A sworn affidavit from EEOC that it informed the employer about the specific discrimination allegation and tried to engage the employer in a discussion to give the employer a chance to remedy the allegedly discriminatory practice should suffice. Should the employer present concrete evidence that the EEOC did not provide the requisite information or attempt to engage in conciliation, a court must conduct the fact-finding necessary to resolve that limited dispute. View "Mach Mining, LLC v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a former employee of the St. Louis Rams Partnership, filed an action claiming age discrimination against the Partnership and three of its affiliates. The Rams moved to compel arbitration, citing an arbitration provision of Plaintiff’s employment contract. The trial court granted the motion and ordered that the court action be stayed pending arbitration. Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandamus preventing the trial court from compelling arbitration of this dispute. Four judges of the Supreme Court issued a permanent writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to compel arbitration and to issue an order to compel arbitration whereby the trial court appoints a neutral arbitrator and implies the specific terms of arbitration from applicable statutes in Missouri’s uniform arbitration act, holding (1) the terms of Plaintiff’s employment contract designating the commissioner of the National Football League (NFL) as the sole arbitrator with unfettered discretion to establish the rules for arbitration are unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable; and (2) Missouri’s uniform arbitration act provides a mechanism to imply the terms missing from the arbitration agreement and provides the rules for appointing an arbitrator to replace the NFL commissioner. View "State ex rel. Hewitt v. Hon. Kerr" on Justia Law

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A skilled nursing facility (Plaintiff) terminated an employee (Employee) on the ground that she had failed to make a timely report of an allegation of resident abuse. An arbitrator agreed with Plaintiff that the Employee had improperly delayed reporting an incident of suspected abuse but ordered the Employee reinstated based upon its determination that Plaintiff had just cause to suspend Employee without pay for one month. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s application to vacate the arbitration award. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the arbitration award reinstating the Employee’s employment violated Connecticut’s clear public policy requiring the prompt reporting of any incident of suspected abuse of a nursing home resident. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration award requiring the reinstatement of the Employee did not violate this public policy. View "Burr Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. New England Health Care Employees Union" on Justia Law

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Serafin sued her former employer Balco, alleging wrongful termination, harassment, and defamation. The trial court granted Balco’s motion to stay the litigation until the completion of binding arbitration based upon an arbitration agreement Serafin signed when she was hired. The arbitrator ultimately found in Balco’s favor on all issues, and the trial court confirmed the award, entering judgment in Balco’s favor. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that Serafin never entered into a binding agreement to arbitrate her employment-related claims and that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because it was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The court found the degree of procedural unconscionability minimal, and that, because a substantively unconscionable attorney fees provision was severed by the trial court before arbitration began, no substantive unconscionability was shown View "Serafin v. Balco Props. Ltd., LLC" on Justia Law

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In 2013, the Department of Homeland Security issued a final decision removing Garcia from the U.S. Border Patrol for misconduct. Garcia received notice the same day. Under 5 U.S.C. 7121(e)(1), Garcia had the option to appeal his removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) or to invoke arbitration, under his union’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Article 34 of the CBA states that in cases involving adverse actions, such as removal, requests for arbitration “must be filed . . . not later than thirty (30) calendar days after the effective date of the action.” His union mailed a letter to the Agency requesting arbitration 28 days after the effective date of Garcia’s removal. The Agency did not receive this request until seven days later. After an arbitrator was appointed, the Agency moved to dismiss. The Arbitrator found the plain meaning of “filed” in the CBA requires actual receipt of the request for arbitration, relying on the definition of “file” used in federal court proceedings. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the request for arbitration need only be mailed within the 30-day time period. View "Garcia v. Dep't of Homeland Sec." on Justia Law

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Appellant was associated with Appellee, Raymond James Financial Services, as a securities broker. After Appellee decided to terminate Appellant’s contract, Appellant brought an arbitration proceeding before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, alleging that he had been fired because of his sexual orientation and his status as a recovering alcoholic, in violation of Vermont law. After granting the parties’ request that Florida law be applied to the proceedings, an arbitration panel awarded Appellant $600,000 in back pay on his claim of discrimination based on disability. The district court vacated the award, concluding that the arbitrators lacked authority to grant the remedy because Appellant brought no claims under Florida law. The First Circuit reversed, holding that although the arbitration decision may have been incorrect as a matter of law, the arbitrators’ decision to impose liability on Appellee under Florida law did not willfully flout the governing law or otherwise exceed the bounds of the arbitrators’ authority to resolve the parties’ dispute. Remanded for entry of an order confirming the arbitration award. View "Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fenyk" on Justia Law