Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

An Employee was terminated for engaging in outside employment in violation of company policy during his absence on approved medical leave. The Employee sued, arguing that the Employer violated his right to reinstatement under the Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (CFRA) and the federal Family and Medical Leave Act. The trial court granted the Employer’s motion to compel arbitration. The arbitrator relied on the federal “honest belief” defense and rejected Plaintiff’s contentions. The Court of Appeals vacated the award in the Employer’s favor, concluding that the arbitrator violated Plaintiff’s right to reinstatement under the CFRA when he applied the honest belief defense to Plaintiff’s claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although the arbitrator may have committed error in adopting the honest belief defense, any error did not deprive the Employee of an unwaivable statutory right because the arbitrator relied on the substantial evidence that the Employee violated his Employer’s written policy prohibiting outside employment while he was on medical leave. View "Richey v. Autonation, Inc." on Justia Law

This labor dispute arose out of a negotiation between the State and other governmental entities (collectively, the State) and United Public Workers (UPW) regarding the renewal and modification of a collective bargaining agreement. The State and UPW failed to reach an agreement, and the case proceeded to arbitration. Because the parties were unable to select a neutral arbitrator, the Hawai’i Labor Relations Board (HLRB) ordered the American Arbitration Association to select the neutral arbitrator. Both parties challenged the actions of the HLRB. The circuit court affirmed the HLRB’s rulings. On appeal, UPW asserted that the circuit court had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute regarding the selection of the arbitrator. The Intermediate Court of Appeals disagreed, determining that HLRB had exclusive original jurisdiction under Haw. Rev. Stat. 89-14. UPW appealed, arguing that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the dispute regarding selection of the arbitrator under Haw. Rev. Stat. 658A. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the HLRB had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute over the selection of the arbitrator under chapter 89, as the arbitration was required by statute as part of the legislatively mandated process for resolving impasses in collective bargaining; and (2) chapter 658A was not applicable to this case. View "State v. Nakaneula" on Justia Law

When Cruise applied for employment with Kroger in 2007, she completed an employment application, which contained a clause requiring arbitration of employment-related disputes and incorporating by reference Kroger’s Mediation & Binding Arbitration Policy. When Cruise sued, alleging employment discrimination, thel court denied Kroger’s motion to compel arbitration, ruling that Kroger failed to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement. The court was not persuaded the undated four-page arbitration policy attached to Kroger’s moving papers was extant at the time Cruise read and signed the employment application, and that it was the same Arbitration Policy to which the employment application referred. The court of appeal reversed. The arbitration clause in the employment application, standing alone, was sufficient to establish the parties agreed to arbitrate their employment-related disputes, and that Cruise’s claims against Kroger fall within the ambit of the arbitration agreement. The only impact of Kroger’s inability to establish the contents of the 2007 Arbitration Policy is that Kroger failed to establish the parties agreed to govern their arbitration by procedures different from those prescribed in the California Arbitration Act, so the arbitration will be governed by the CAA, rather than by the procedures set forth in the Arbitration Policy. View "Cruise v. Kroger Co." on Justia Law

Montano filed a putative class action against Wet Seal, alleging that it failed to offer all required meal and rest periods to its California non-exempt retail employees; failed to provide all regular and overtime pay when due or when employment terminated; and failed to provide accurate semi-monthly itemized wage statements, in violation of the Labor and Business and Professions Codes, Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 7, and Title 8 of the California Code of Regulations. She included a representative claim under the Private Attorneys General Act. Montano propounded discovery requests and Wet Seal responded with objections but no substantive information. Montano moved to compel discovery responses. Before the hearing, Wet Seal moved to compel arbitration of Montano’s individual claims and to stay the action pending completion of arbitration, based on a “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims." The trial court ultimately denied the motion for arbitration and granted the discovery motion. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Montano v. Wet Seal Retail, Inc." on Justia Law

Bower was hired by Inter-Con in 2007 and executed an arbitration agreement, covering claims for compensation and wages. In 2008, Bower executed a second arbitration agreement that added clauses prohibiting claims on behalf of a class or in a representative capacity and covering claims for breaks and rest periods. After his 2011 termination, Bower filed a putative class action, claiming failure to: provide meal and rest periods, pay wages, provide accurate itemized wage statements, pay wages upon termination, with claims under the Unfair Competition Act and the Private Attorneys General Act. Instead of moving to compel arbitration, Inter-Con answered, asserting, as an affirmative defense, that Bower’s claims were subject to arbitration. Inter-Con responded to discovery, but objected based on the arbitration agreement, and agreed to provide responses only to Bower in his individual capacity. Inter-Con did respond to an interrogatory concerning the number of class members employed during the class period and propounded its own discovery. Bower moved for leave to file an amended complaint to allege a broader class and additional theories and to compel further discovery responses. Inter-Con then moved to compel arbitration. The court held that “Defendant waived the right to arbitrate by propounding and responding to class discovery.” The court of appeal affirmed. View "Bower v. Inter-Con Sec. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

In May 2014, the City of Reno decided to lay off thirty-two firefighters. The City stated that its decision was based on a lack of funds. A collective bargaining agreement between the City and the International Association of Firefighters, Local 731 (union) provides that the right to lay off employees due to lack of funds is reserved to the City without negotiation. The union and the firefighters who would be laid off (collectively, IAFF) filed a complaint in the district court, claiming that the City had the funds to continue the firefighters’ employment. The IAFF also filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The City filed a motion to dismiss due to the IAFF’s failure to exhaust contractual and administrative remedies. The district court proceeded to enjoin the City from proceeding with the layoffs while the IAFF exhausted its contractual grievance and administrative remedies. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the underlying grievance was not arbitrable under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, and therefore, the district court lacked authority to rule on the request for injunctive relief. View "City of Reno v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 731" on Justia Law

A union initiated arbitration proceedings after a police officer with the town of Stratford was terminated for lying in connection with his employment. A three-member arbitration panel determined that the officer’s termination was excessive and ordered that the town reinstate the officer. The town filed an application to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the award encouraged police officer dishonesty and thereby violated public policy against lying by law enforcement personnel. The trial court denied the application. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the arbitration award violated a clear public policy against intentional dishonesty by police officers in connection with their employment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there is a public policy against intentional police officer dishonesty in connection with his or her employment, but (2) in this case, the arbitration award reinstating the officer’s employment did not violate that public policy. Remanded. View "Stratford v. AFSCME, Council 15, Local 407" on Justia Law

In 2009, the Public Service Company of Colorado entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local #111, a union that represented some of the Company’s employees. About two years later, the Company unilaterally modified its retired workers’ healthcare benefits by increasing their copayment obligations for prescription drugs. The Union claimed that the Company had violated the collective-bargaining agreement by doing so and demanded arbitration. The Company refused to arbitrate, and the Union sued and asked the district court to stay the case and compel arbitration. When the district court denied that motion, the Union filed an interlocutory appeal. The issues this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review were: (1) whether the Tenth Circuit ha jurisdiction to hear the appeal; and (2) whether the district court should have sent the case to arbitration. The Court concluded that appellate jurisdiction existed under the Federal Arbitration Act, and that the district court properly denied compelling arbitration because the collective-bargaining agreement’s arbitration provision was not susceptible to an interpretation that covers disputes over retired workers’ healthcare benefits. The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "IBEW Local #111 v. Public Service Co." on Justia Law

When Khazin began working for TD, he signed an employment agreement and agreed to arbitrate all disputes. Khazin was responsible for due diligence on financial products offered by TD . When he discovered that one product was priced in a manner noncompliant with securities regulations, he reported to his supervisor, Demmissie, and recommended changing the price. Demmissie instructed Khazin to analyze the “revenue impact,” which revealed that remedying the violation would save customers $2,000,000, but would cost TD $1,150,000 and negatively impact Demmissie’s divisions. Demmissie allegedly told Khazin not to correct the problem. Demmissie and TD’s human resources department later confronted Khazin about a purported billing irregularity that, he claims, was unrelated to his duties and nonexistent. His employment was terminated. Khazin sued, asserting violation of the Dodd-Frank Act, premised on the allegation that he had been terminated in retaliation for “whistleblowing.” Khazin contended that the Act prevented TD from compelling the arbitration of his whistleblower retaliation claim, 18 U.S.C. 1514A(e)(2). The district court held that the provision did not prohibit enforcement of arbitration agreements executed before Dodd-Frank was passed. The Third Circuit concluded that Khazin’s whistleblower claim is subject to arbitration because it is not covered by the restrictions. View "Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp" on Justia Law

Matthew Tubaugh, a police officer with the City of Livingston, was discharged from the police force after a series of incidents. Tubaugh protested his discharge pursuant to his rights under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) then in effect between the City and the Montana Public Employees Association. An arbitrator determined that there was just cause to discipline Tubaugh but that the proper disciplinary action was a three-month suspension without pay. The district court vacated the arbitrator’s award. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to confirm the arbitration award, holding that the district court (1) incorrectly determined that the arbitrator exceeded her authority in her interpretation of the CBA; (2) erred in holding that the arbitrator violated public policy by requiring the City to reinstate Tubaugh to his previous position or to one of comparable pay; (3) erred by determining that the arbitrator’s award should be vacated because of its findings related to a fitness for duty examination; and (4) erred by holding that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by directing removal of the fitness for duty examination from Tubaugh’s personnel file. View "Livingston v. Mont. Pub. Employees Ass’n" on Justia Law