Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) operates the Metrorail and Metrobus systems in Washington, D.C., Maryland, and Virginia and employs a police force, the Metro Transit Police Department (MTPD). The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) is the bargaining agent for MTPD officers. WMATA fired two MTPD officers, but the Board of Arbitration overturned both discharges and ordered WMATA to reinstate the officers. WMATA reinstated the officers, but as a result of their initial terminations, the officers lost the certifications to serve as police officers in Maryland. Consequently, WMATA discharged the officers for a second time. The FOP filed this action in federal court on behalf of each officer, alleging that WMATA failed to comply with the arbitration awards. The district court granted summary judgment for the FOP. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding (1) WMATA’s decision to terminate the officers for a second time did not violate the earlier arbitration awards; and (2) the officers’ grievances belonged before the Board of Arbitration, not a federal court. View "Fraternal Order of Police v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth." on Justia Law

Alleging illegal tip pooling Conners filed a collective action against her former employer (a restaurant) under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The employer then implemented a new arbitration policy that requires all employment-related disputes between current employees and the employer to be resolved though individual arbitration. The policy purports to bind all current employees who did not opt out; each employee received an opt-out form. Citing public policy, the district court declared the policy unenforceable insofar as it could prevent current employees from joining this collective action. On interlocutory appeal, the Eighth Circuit vacated, holding that former employees like Conners lack standing under Article III of the United States Constitution to challenge the arbitration agreement, which applied only to current employees. View "Conners v. Gusano's Chicago Style Pizzeria" on Justia Law

The City of Bozeman dismissed Robert Chase, a building inspector, and Chase claimed that the dismissal was improper. The Montana Public Employees’ Association (MPEA) gave notice to the City Manager of its decision to arbitrate Chase’s grievance according to the grievance procedure but failed to timely request a list of potential arbitrators from the Montana Board of Personnel Appeals. More than one year after the dispute arose, MPEA contacted the City to proceed with arbitration. The City declined to cooperate. More than four years after the dispute first arose, MPEA filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the City must participate in arbitration. The City asserted a counterclaim for declaratory relief. The district court granted summary judgment and issued declaratory relief to the City, concluding that Chase’s grievance did not survive MPEA’s failure to follow the agreement’s time limits and that MPEA waived any right to arbitrate through its four-year delay. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) whether a dispute remains arbitrable despite the failure to follow the an arbitration agreement’s procedures, including time limits, is a question of procedural arbitrability that is for an arbitrator and not for a court to decide; and (2) the City’s waiver argument was an issue for an arbitrator to decide. View "Mont. Pub. Employees Ass’n v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

Petitioner Universal Protection Service, L.P. petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate and/or prohibition to challenge the superior court's order granting real party in interest Floridalma Franco's demand to arbitrate her employment-related disputes with Universal and ruling the arbitrator would decide the arbitrability of Franco's class action claims. Universal argued the court legally erred in its ruling because the parties' arbitration agreement did not clearly and unmistakably submit arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, and thus it was for the superior court to decide whether the agreement authorized class and/or representative arbitration. The Court of Appeal concluded the court erred by granting Franco's petition, but nevertheless agreed with Franco that the parties' reference to American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules, which unambiguously stated that the arbitrator was to decide whether the parties' arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration, constituted clear and unmistakable evidence of their intent that the arbitrator decide this issue (which was a threshold question of arbitrability). Because the trial court reached the correct conclusion, the Court of Appeal denied Universal's petition. View "Universal Protection Services v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Franco filed a purported class action as an employee of Athens Services, claiming Labor Code and wage-order violations. He also sued in a representative capacity under the Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code 2698) and alleged violation of state unfair competition law. (Bus. & Prof. Code 17200). Athens petitioned to compel arbitration based on Franco’s employment agreement, alleging that it was engaged in interstate commerce under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. 1-16). The trial court agreed. The appeal court concluded that provisions requiring arbitration and waiving class actions were unenforceable. On remand, Athens informed the court that Franco’s actual employer was Arakelian. Franco amended the complaint to add Arakelian, which filed another petition to compel arbitration, arguing that authorities cited by the prior decision had been overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2010. The trial court denied the petition, citing the law of the case doctrine and finding that Arakelian waived its right to compel arbitration by failing to earlier identify itself as Franco’s true employer. The court of appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court vacated. The court of appeal reversed denial of the petition to compel arbitration, in light of the rule announced by the California Supreme Court in Iskanian. View "Franco v. Arakelian Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

The Unions, representing employees in five Sheriff’s Department bargaining units, entered into collective bargaining agreements with the County of Los Angeles that contained grievance procedures for resolving complaints concerning the interpretation or application of the agreements. The grievance procedures consisted of progressive steps culminating in arbitration. The Unions filed class grievances seeking overtime pay for “donning and doffing” and related activities (putting on, taking off, and maintaining their uniforms and equipment) and “off-the-clock” supervisory activities by certain employees. The county denied the grievances; the Unions filed requests for class arbitration of the grievances, which the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (ERCOM) granted. The County sought a declaratory judgment that ERCOM’s order granting class or consolidated arbitration violated the parties’ agreements. The trial court refused to compel such arbitrations, ruling that Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 gave it discretion, in the interest of judicial economy, to stay the arbitration while it resolved issues between the parties that were not subject to arbitration, which resolution might make arbitrations unnecessary. The court of appeal reversed, holding that all of the issues between the parties were subject to individual arbitrations. View "Ass'n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Before it was acquired by DirecTV, 180 Connect entered into an employment arbitration agreement with Marenco, which prohibited filing a class or collective action, or a representative or private attorney general action. After acquiring 180 Connect, DirecTV retained employees, including Marenco. Marenco later filed suit, alleging that DirecTV had issued debit cards in payment of wages to a putative class of employees. Plaintiffs who used their cards to withdraw cash at ATM machines were required to pay an activation fee and a cash withdrawal fee, resulting in DirecTV’s failure to pay plaintiffs’ full wages in violation of the Unfair Competition Law and Labor Code 212. DirecTV moved to compel arbitration of Marenco’s individual claims, and stay the class claims. Marenco argued that DirecTV lacked standing to enforce the agreement and that the agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable under California law. The U.S. Supreme Court then issued its 2011 decision, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts the California rule of unconscionability. The trial court ordered arbitration of Marenco’s individual claims, holding that DirecTV had standing; the class action waiver is not unconscionable; and prohibition of representative actions does not violate the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 157). The court of appeal affirmed. View "Marenco v. DirecTV, LLC" on Justia Law

An Employee was terminated for engaging in outside employment in violation of company policy during his absence on approved medical leave. The Employee sued, arguing that the Employer violated his right to reinstatement under the Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (CFRA) and the federal Family and Medical Leave Act. The trial court granted the Employer’s motion to compel arbitration. The arbitrator relied on the federal “honest belief” defense and rejected Plaintiff’s contentions. The Court of Appeals vacated the award in the Employer’s favor, concluding that the arbitrator violated Plaintiff’s right to reinstatement under the CFRA when he applied the honest belief defense to Plaintiff’s claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, although the arbitrator may have committed error in adopting the honest belief defense, any error did not deprive the Employee of an unwaivable statutory right because the arbitrator relied on the substantial evidence that the Employee violated his Employer’s written policy prohibiting outside employment while he was on medical leave. View "Richey v. Autonation, Inc." on Justia Law

This labor dispute arose out of a negotiation between the State and other governmental entities (collectively, the State) and United Public Workers (UPW) regarding the renewal and modification of a collective bargaining agreement. The State and UPW failed to reach an agreement, and the case proceeded to arbitration. Because the parties were unable to select a neutral arbitrator, the Hawai’i Labor Relations Board (HLRB) ordered the American Arbitration Association to select the neutral arbitrator. Both parties challenged the actions of the HLRB. The circuit court affirmed the HLRB’s rulings. On appeal, UPW asserted that the circuit court had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute regarding the selection of the arbitrator. The Intermediate Court of Appeals disagreed, determining that HLRB had exclusive original jurisdiction under Haw. Rev. Stat. 89-14. UPW appealed, arguing that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the dispute regarding selection of the arbitrator under Haw. Rev. Stat. 658A. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the HLRB had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute over the selection of the arbitrator under chapter 89, as the arbitration was required by statute as part of the legislatively mandated process for resolving impasses in collective bargaining; and (2) chapter 658A was not applicable to this case. View "State v. Nakaneula" on Justia Law

When Cruise applied for employment with Kroger in 2007, she completed an employment application, which contained a clause requiring arbitration of employment-related disputes and incorporating by reference Kroger’s Mediation & Binding Arbitration Policy. When Cruise sued, alleging employment discrimination, thel court denied Kroger’s motion to compel arbitration, ruling that Kroger failed to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement. The court was not persuaded the undated four-page arbitration policy attached to Kroger’s moving papers was extant at the time Cruise read and signed the employment application, and that it was the same Arbitration Policy to which the employment application referred. The court of appeal reversed. The arbitration clause in the employment application, standing alone, was sufficient to establish the parties agreed to arbitrate their employment-related disputes, and that Cruise’s claims against Kroger fall within the ambit of the arbitration agreement. The only impact of Kroger’s inability to establish the contents of the 2007 Arbitration Policy is that Kroger failed to establish the parties agreed to govern their arbitration by procedures different from those prescribed in the California Arbitration Act, so the arbitration will be governed by the CAA, rather than by the procedures set forth in the Arbitration Policy. View "Cruise v. Kroger Co." on Justia Law