Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Hilltop hired Huffman and others to review the files of mortgage loans originated by PNC Bank to determine whether lawful procedures were followed during foreclosure and other proceedings. Until the end of their employment in January 2013, they regularly worked more than 40 hours per week, but were not compensated at the overtime rate because Hilltop classified them as independent contractors. Each employment relationship was governed by a now-expired contract, including an arbitration clause and a survival clause. The clauses listed in the survival clause correspond to ones detailing services essential to the job, the term of employment, compensation, termination, and confidentiality; it did not list the arbitration clause. The workers filed a purported class action. The district court denied Hilltop’s motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The Sixth Circuit reversed, rejecting an argument that omission of the arbitration clause from the survival clause constituted a “clear implication” that the parties intended the arbitration clause to expire with the agreement. Sixth Circuit precedent indicates that the parties must proceed in arbitration on an individual basis.View "Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant, his employer, signed a written employment agreement detailing the terms of Plaintiff’s relationship with Defendant. Plaintiff later ceased working for Defendant, believing he had been fired. Defendant, however, believed that Plaintiff had resigned. Plaintiff’s termination became the subject of binding arbitration. The arbitration panel concluded that Plaintiff had been terminated for reasons other than cause and ordered Defendant to reinstate Plaintiff “to the position he held prior to his wrongful termination.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) specific performance is not an available remedy for breach of an employment contract unless it is explicitly provided for in the contract or by an applicable statute; and (2) the arbitration panel in this case exceeded its authority by holding otherwise, as the contract clearly did not entitle Plaintiff to reinstatement. Remanded. View "Cedar Fair, L.P. v. Falfas" on Justia Law

The Hillsborough County Nursing Home appealed the New Hampshire Public Employee Labor Relations Board's (PELRB) decision finding that the County committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to participate in the arbitration of employment grievances filed by AFSCME, Local 2715. The union represented certain nursing home employees. The Supreme Court concluded after review that because a procedural challenge to arbitrability is a matter to be determined by the arbitrator in the first instance, the PELRB did not err in refusing to make a threshold determination as to the procedural arbitrability of the grievances in this case. Here, the County did not argue that the grievances at issue were not substantively arbitrable. Rather, its position was that the Union was procedurally defaulted because it failed to follow the CBA's grievance procedure. "[P]rocedural arbitrability issues are to be decided by the arbitrator; the assertion of such issues affords no basis for refusing to participate in arbitration. Accordingly, we hold that the PELRB did not err in determining that the County committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to arbitrate the grievances." View "Appeal of Hillsborough County Nursing Home" on Justia Law

Kroger appealed the trial court's order denying its motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's employment discrimination action. The trial court concluded that Kroger failed to meet its burden to prove the existence of an arbitration agreement. The court concluded that the arbitration clause in the employment application, standing alone, was sufficient to establish that the parties agreed to arbitrate their employment-related disputes, and that plaintiff's claims against Kroger fell within the ambit of the arbitration agreement. However, Kroger failed to establish that the parties agreed to govern their arbitration by procedures different from those prescribed in the California Arbitration Act (CAA), Section 1280 et seq., and, therefore, the arbitration is to be governed by the CAA rather than the procedures set forth in the employer's Arbitration Policy. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court. View "Cruise v. Kroger Co." on Justia Law

When Respondent was promoted from her position was an hourly employee to a salaried managerial position at one of Appellants’ long-term care facilities, the parties signed an employment agreement and arbitration agreement. Appellants later terminated Respondent from her position. Respondent filed a class action lawsuit against Appellants seeking compensation for allegedly unpaid overtime hours. Appellants filed a motion to compel arbitration, but the circuit court overruled the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Respondent’s continued at-will employment and Appellants’ promise to resolve claims through arbitration did not provide valid consideration to support the arbitration agreement. View "Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc." on Justia Law

The Union appealed from the district court's order vacating an arbitration award. PSC argued that the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and the Standards of Conduct mandate that an employee found guilty of insubordination be discharged. PSC claimed that after the arbitrator found that the employee at issue in this case had been insubordinate, the arbitrator was required to uphold the employee's discharge. The court concluded that whether the employee's discharge was for just cause was a matter of contract interpretation that was within the arbitrator's authority. In this case, the arbitrator did not exceed his authority by concluding that PSC did not have just cause to discharge the employee and by reducing the penalty from discharge to suspension, because his award draws its essence from the CBA. The court reversed and remanded with directions that the arbitration award be reinstated. View "PSC Custom, LP v. United Steel, Paper, etc." on Justia Law

The Union filed suit against a nuclear energy facility to compel arbitration after a union employee was discharged without just cause. The court reversed the district court's denial of the Union's motion to compel arbitration where the Union's grievance, on its face, clearly falls within the scope of the arbitration clause. View "Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NextEra Energy Point Beach LLC" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Tenth Circuit on appeal involved involves a dispute concerning the scope of an arbitration clause between Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. and three of its former employees, plaintiffs Miguel Sanchez, Shane Schneider, and Eddie Howard. Plaintiffs sued Nitro-Lift, claiming it failed to pay overtime wages in violation of both the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and the Oklahoma Protection of Labor Act (OPLA). Nitro-Lift appealed two district court orders denying its motions to dismiss and compel arbitration, or in the alternative to stay the proceeding pending arbitration, arguing plaintiffs' wage disputes fell within the scope of the arbitration clause. The Tenth Circuit agreed with Nitro-Lift's argument with respect to the wage disputes and arbitration, and as such, reversed the district court's denial of Nitro-Lift's motion to compel arbitration. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Sanchez, et al v. Nitro Lift Technologies" on Justia Law

Defendant-Employer Tilly’s Inc. (and World of Jeans & Tops, Inc.) hired plaintiff-respondent Maria Rebolledo to work in its warehouse from July 6, 2000, to December 28, 2001. She was rehired on January 28, 2002, and terminated October 30, 2012. In December 2012 she filed a lawsuit on behalf of herself and a putative class of "similarly situated" persons (amended February 2013) alleging her Employer: (1) failed to provide meal periods; (2) failed to provide rest periods; (3) failed to pay wages of terminated or resigned employees; (4) knew and intentionally failed to comply with itemized wage statement provisions; and (5) violated the unfair competition law. Furthermore, plaintiff sought enforcement of Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. Upon review of the matter, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court's conclusion the parties' arbitration agreement expressly excluded statutory wage claims from the arbitration obligation. Therefore, the order was affirmed.View "Rebolledo v. Tilly's, Inc." on Justia Law

Former employees of RHI filed suit on behalf of themselves and others, alleging that RHI failed to pay overtime and improperly classified them as overtime-exempt employees in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201. Both had signed employment agreements that contained arbitration provisions: “[a]ny dispute or claim arising out of or relating to Employee’s employment, termination of employment or any provision of this Agreement” shall be submitted to arbitration. Neither agreement mentions classwide arbitration. RHI moved to compel arbitration on an individual basis. The district court granted the motion in part, compelling arbitration but holding that the propriety of individual versus classwide arbitration was for the arbitrator to decide. The court entered an order terminating the case. Rather than immediately appealing, RHI proceeded with arbitration until the arbitrator ruled that the employment agreements permitted classwide arbitration. The district court denied a motion to vacate the arbitrator’s partial award. The Third Circuit reversed. Because of the fundamental differences between classwide and individual arbitration, and the consequences of proceeding with one rather than the other, the availability of classwide arbitration is a substantive “question of arbitrability” to be decided by a court absent clear agreement otherwise.View "Opalinski v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law