Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Tillman filed suit pro se, alleging that Macy’s discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of Title VII when it terminated her employment in 2009. Macy’s filed a motion to compel arbitration, based on a claimed agreement between the parties to participate in a dispute-resolution program called Solutions. The Solutions process had four steps, the last of which is binding arbitration. After the May’s store at which she had worked since 2001 was acquired by Macy’s, Tillman received a document describing the Solutions process and noting that employees were automatically “covered” by arbitration by virtue of continuing employment, but could opt out of binding arbitration. Tillman’s packet was mailed and was not returned as undeliverable. Tillman stated that she did not receive it. In 2006, Tillman attended a mandatory video describing the Solutions Program. Tillman does not deny receiving a brochure distributed at the meeting. In 2007, Macy’s sent another brochure that stated that she had the entire Solutions program, specifically including Step 4 Arbitration. Tillman stated that she did not receive this mailing. Macy’s sent another Election Form and brochure. Tillman did not return the form; again claiming that she did not receive it. The district court denied Macy’s motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Macy’s provided sufficient notice of its offer to enter into an arbitration agreement, and Tillman accepted by continuing her employment and not returning either opt-out form. Arbitration should be required, notwithstanding the absence of an employee-signed agreement. View "Tillman v. Macy's Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Ralphs alleging violations of the California Labor Code and California Business and Professions Code 17200 et seq. On appeal, Ralphs challenged the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that Ralphs' arbitration policy was unconscionable under California law. The court concluded that Ralphs' arbitration was procedurally unconscionable where, among other things, agreeing to Ralphs' policy was a condition of applying for employment and the terms were not disclosed to plaintiff until three weeks after she had agreed to be bound by it. In regards to substantive unconscionability, the court concluded, among other things, that Ralphs' terms required that the arbitrator impose significant costs on the employee up front, regardless of the merits of the employee's claims, and severely limited the authority of the arbitrator to allocate arbitration costs in the award. Further, the state law supporting such a conclusion was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2. Accordingly, the court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chavarria v. Ralphs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a teacher in the Manchester-Essex Regional School District until he was informed by the District Superintendent's intention to terminate his employment for inappropriate sexual conduct toward a student. Plaintiff sought review of the Superintendent's action. An arbitrator affirmed Plaintiff's dismissal. Plaintiff then filed suit in Massachusetts superior court challenging his dismissal and seeking to vacate the arbitrator's decision. Three weeks later, Plaintiff filed this complaint in federal court alleging state and federal law violations. The next day, Plaintiff amended his state-court complaint so it contained the exact same claims as his federal-court complaint. The state court rejected Plaintiff's claims and affirmed the arbitrator's decision. Later, the federal district court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff, finding that Plaintiff's claims were barred by res judicata. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that none of the reasons presented by Plaintiff why res judicata did not bar his federal claims from adjudication in federal court were persuasive. View "Atwater v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

The Unions filed a grievance against Alcan, claiming that Alcan violated a collective bargaining agreement. On appeal, the Unions challenged the district court's order vacating the arbitrator's award of severance pay. The court reversed the judgment because a federal court must defer to the arbitrator's interpretation where the arbitrator was at least arguably construing or applying the collective bargaining agreement. The court denied the Unions' request for attorneys' fees. Alcan acted promptly to seek an order vacating the arbitration award and the company did not act dishonestly or in bad faith. View "Alcan Packaging Co. v. Graphic Communications, et al." on Justia Law

E&Y appealed from the district court's order denying its motion to dismiss or stay proceedings, and to compel arbitration, in a putative class action brought by its former employees. At issue on appeal was whether an employee could invalidate a class-action waive provision in an arbitration agreement when that waiver removed the financial incentive for her to pursue a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq. The court held that the FLSA did not include a "contrary congressional command" that prevented a class-action waiver provision in an arbitration agreement from being enforced by its terms. The court also held that, in light of the supervening decision of the Supreme Court in American Express Co v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the employee's argument that proceeding individually in arbitration would be "prohibitively expensive" was not a sufficient basis to invalidate the action waiver provision at issue here under the "effective vindication doctrine." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a dispute between the Union and Carlisle over the arbitrability of a grievance concerning disability benefits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Carlisle and denied the Union's cross-motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Carlisle's claim for declaratory judgment was barred by the doctrine of res judicata where there was no basis for the district court to conclude that the Union acquiesced in the splitting of Carlisle's claims. Therefore, the Union did not waive its right to rely on the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded with directions to dismiss Carlisle's action View "Carlisle Power Trans. Products v. United Steel, etc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff terminated Defendant from employment. Thereafter, Defendant began arbitration proceedings seeking severance compensation he felt was contractually due. After arbitration hearings had commenced, the hearings were postponed for two months due to a medical situation afflicting Plaintiff's counsel. During the recess, Plaintiff formally requested pre-hearing and hearing third-party subpoenas directed at Defendant's current employer. The tribunal denied the issuance of the subpoenas. After the arbitration hearings resumed, the tribunal found Defendant was entitled to compensation pursuant to the terms of his employment agreement dealing with his termination without cause. The tribunal also found Defendant was entitled to pre-award interest. Plaintiff subsequently sought vacatur of the award, which the trial court denied. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arbitration tribunal did not engage in misconduct by denying the issuance of the pre-hearing and hearing subpoenas; and (2) the tribunal did not exceed its authority in awarding pre-award interest to Defendant. View "Doral Fin. Corp. v. Garcia-Velez" on Justia Law

After working at the company for four months, Benes charged his employer with sex discrimination. The EEOC arranged for mediation in which, after an initial joint session, the parties separated and a go-between relayed offers. Upon receiving a settlement proposal that he thought too low, Benes stormed into the room used by his employer’s representatives and said loudly: “You can take your proposal and shove it up your ass and fire me and I’ll see you in court.” The firm fired him. He filed suit under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3(a), abandoning his claim of sex discrimination. A magistrate judge granted the employer summary judgment, finding that Benes had been fired for misconduct during the mediation, not for making or supporting a charge of discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that section 2000e–3(a) does not establish a privilege to misbehave in mediation, but only bans retaliation “because [a person] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” View "Benes v. A.B. Data, Ltd." on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute between the parties over who could claim certain longshore work handling cargo at the Port of Seward, Alaska. At issue on appeal was whether Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 187, permitted an action challenging the union's conduct at the arbitration when plaintiff had admittedly failed to challenge the arbitration award itself in court under Section 301 of the LMRA. The court reversed the district court's dismissal for lack of statutory standing because nothing in section 303 precluded plaintiffs to first exhaust a petition to vacate the arbitration award before they could claim section 303's remedy. Nothing in section 303 barred an employer - whether primary or neutral - from seeking compensatory damages for a union's alleged unfair labor practice, even if that practice occurred during arbitration. View "American President Lines, Ltd. v. ILWU" on Justia Law

In two unconsolidated cases, UBCJA and SWRCC (collectively, Carpenters) appealed the district court's confirmation of two arbitration awards in favor of Plasterers. The court concluded that these cases were not moot because future arbitrable jurisdictional disputes raising the same legal issue seem reasonably likely to occur; in Case No. 11-7161, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying briefing and argument on the timing issue; in Case No. 11-7155, the district court correctly declined to give Jordan Interiors I estoppel effect in Frye; and, on the merits, the court rejected Carpenters' challenges to the arbitrators' authority to enter their respective awards. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grants of summary judgment to the Plasterers, thereby confirming the arbitrators' awards in their favor. View "United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Operative Plasterers' & Cement Masons' Int'l Ass'n" on Justia Law