Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

In this case, the plaintiff, Patricia Olivieri, alleged that her employer, Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Incorporated, and her manager, Neil Isler, subjected her to sexual harassment and a hostile work environment. Olivieri claimed that Isler sexually assaulted and harassed her, and that after she reported his behavior, she faced retaliation and continued harassment from Stifel and other defendants. Olivieri's allegations included inappropriate comments, physical contact, and retaliatory actions such as changes in her job responsibilities and work environment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially granted the defendants' motion to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement in Olivieri's employment contract. However, after the enactment of the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA), Olivieri moved for reconsideration. The district court vacated its earlier decision, concluding that Olivieri's claims accrued after the EFAA's effective date, making her arbitration agreement voidable under the new law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the lower court, applying the continuing violation doctrine to determine that Olivieri's hostile work environment claims accrued after the EFAA's effective date of March 3, 2022. The court held that the EFAA applied to Olivieri's claims, rendering her arbitration agreement invalid and unenforceable. Consequently, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Inc." on Justia Law

A member of the United Mine Workers of America arbitrated a dispute against Consol Energy, Inc. and won. The Union then sued to confirm the arbitration award, while Consol and its subsidiaries counterclaimed to vacate the award. The Union argued that the subsidiaries could not unilaterally reduce health benefits promised to miners for life, even if they no longer mined coal. Consol, which served as the health-plan administrator, had sent a letter indicating potential changes to benefits after the agreement expired, prompting the arbitration.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the Union’s claim for lack of standing, reasoning that the Union was not injured as Consol had not actually modified the benefits. The court also declined to vacate the arbitration award on the merits of the Subsidiaries’ counterclaim. Both parties appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Union’s claim did not fall under § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, which only authorizes suits for actual violations of contracts, not anticipated future violations. Consequently, the Union’s claim was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Regarding the Subsidiaries’ counterclaim, the court determined that the Subsidiaries lacked standing as they were not named in the arbitration award and had not shown a concrete and imminent injury. The court vacated the district court’s orders on the Subsidiaries’ counterclaim and remanded it with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing.Thus, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the Union’s claim and vacated and remanded the Subsidiaries’ counterclaim for dismissal due to lack of standing. View "International Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Consol Energy Inc." on Justia Law

Brent Electric Company (Brent) and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union No. 584 (the Union) have had a long-standing relationship since 1996. In 2018, they entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that included an interest-arbitration clause allowing either party to unilaterally submit unresolved issues to arbitration if negotiations for a new CBA failed. In 2020, Brent terminated its authorization for the National Electrical Contractors Association (NECA) to negotiate on its behalf and later stopped contributing to the Union pension fund. The Union filed a grievance, and the Labor Management Committee ruled in favor of the Union. In 2021, Brent and the Union failed to negotiate a new CBA, leading the Union to unilaterally submit the dispute to arbitration. The arbitrator imposed a new CBA, which included both mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma dismissed Brent’s complaint to vacate the arbitration award and granted the Union’s motion for summary judgment to enforce the award. The district court found that the interest-arbitration clause in the 2018 CBA was broad and unambiguous, covering all unresolved issues, including permissive subjects of bargaining. The court also rejected Brent’s argument that the arbitration award violated public policy or the Federal Arbitration Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Tenth Circuit held that the presumption of arbitrability applied because the interest-arbitration clause was validly formed and unambiguously covered both mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining. The court rejected Brent’s argument that it had a statutory right to refuse the imposition of permissive subjects, noting that Brent had contractually agreed to the interest-arbitration clause. The court also found no violation of public policy, as the arbitration award did not include a self-perpetuating interest-arbitration clause. Finally, the court concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed its powers under the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Brent Electric Company v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers" on Justia Law

Henry Searcy, Jr. sought certification as an agent under the NFLPA’s 2012 Regulations Governing Contract Advisors but failed the required exam twice. After an arbitrator sided with the NFLPA, Searcy sued the NFLPA, its Executive Director, Prometric LLC, and Prometric’s Vice President and General Counsel. He alleged breach of contract, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with a contractual relationship, and sought vacatur of the arbitration award under the FAA.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against Prometric Defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and against the NFLPA Defendants for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against Prometric Defendants and instructed the District Court to reconsider its dismissal of claims against the NFLPA Defendants, specifically examining whether Section 301 of the LMRA preempted Searcy’s state law claims.Upon further review, the District Court concluded it had jurisdiction and dismissed the claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Searcy appealed again. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the District Court erred in finding subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against the NFLPA Defendants. The court determined that Section 301 of the LMRA does not completely preempt Searcy’s state law claims, as these claims do not require interpretation of the NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal on different grounds and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). View "Searcy v. Smith" on Justia Law

Eniola Famuyide filed a lawsuit against Chipotle Mexican Grill and its subsidiary, alleging sexual assault and harassment in the workplace. Famuyide claimed that a co-worker began harassing her shortly after she started working in May 2021 and sexually assaulted her in November 2021. She reported the incident to her manager, took a leave of absence, and later faced issues accessing the company’s online portal, leading her to believe she had been terminated. Chipotle later informed her that the termination was an error. Famuyide's complaint included claims of hostile work environment, retaliation, and other related charges under Minnesota law.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the case and denied Chipotle's motion to compel arbitration. The court determined that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 applied, as the dispute arose after the Act's enactment date of March 3, 2022. Chipotle argued that the dispute arose before this date, pointing to the initial harassment and assault in 2021 and letters from Famuyide’s counsel in February 2022. However, the court found that no formal dispute existed between the parties until after the Act's enactment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that a "dispute" under the Act did not arise until after March 3, 2022, as there was no conflict or controversy between Famuyide and Chipotle before that date. The court rejected Chipotle's arguments that the dispute arose either at the time of the assault or upon receipt of the February 2022 letters from Famuyide’s counsel. The court also declined to consider a March 1, 2022, letter from Chipotle’s counsel, as it was not part of the record. The district court's order was affirmed. View "Famuyide v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc." on Justia Law

Peter Quach filed a lawsuit against California Commerce Club (Commerce Club) after being terminated from his job at the casino where he had worked for nearly 30 years. Quach's complaint included claims of wrongful termination, age discrimination, retaliation, and harassment, and he demanded a jury trial. Commerce Club had previously provided Quach with a signed arbitration agreement from 2015, which mandated binding arbitration for employment-related disputes. Instead of moving to compel arbitration, Commerce Club answered the complaint and engaged in extensive discovery, including propounding interrogatories and taking Quach’s deposition.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied Commerce Club’s motion to compel arbitration, finding that Commerce Club had waived its right to arbitrate by engaging in litigation for 13 months. The court noted that Commerce Club had actively participated in discovery and requested a jury trial, actions inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. Commerce Club appealed, and the Second Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that Quach had not shown sufficient prejudice from Commerce Club’s delay in seeking arbitration.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and abrogated the state’s arbitration-specific prejudice requirement, aligning with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. The court held that under California law, as under federal law, courts should apply the same principles to determine waiver of the right to compel arbitration as they do for other contracts. The court concluded that Commerce Club had waived its right to compel arbitration by engaging in litigation conduct inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. View "Quach v. Cal. Commerce Club, Inc." on Justia Law

Danny Lopez, an airline fuel technician, filed a wage-and-hour lawsuit under California law against his employer, Menzies Aviation (USA), Inc. Lopez alleged that Menzies violated state requirements for meal periods, rest periods, overtime wages, minimum wages, and other employment conditions. Menzies sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement Lopez signed as part of his employment.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Menzies' motion to compel arbitration. The court found that Lopez, as a transportation worker engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, was exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) under 9 U.S.C. § 1. The court reasoned that Lopez’s role in fueling airplanes used in interstate and foreign commerce was integral to the transportation process, thus qualifying him for the exemption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that a fuel technician who places fuel in planes used for foreign and interstate commerce is a transportation worker engaged in commerce. The court emphasized that such a worker plays a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders. The court clarified that there is no requirement for the worker to have hands-on contact with goods or be directly involved in their transportation to fall within the FAA exemption. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Lopez was exempt from the arbitration requirements of the FAA and affirmed the district court’s denial of Menzies' motion to compel arbitration. View "LOPEZ V. AIRCRAFT SERVICE INTERNATIONAL, INC." on Justia Law

A labor dispute arose between the City of Cleveland and the Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (the union representing dispatch supervisors) over overtime scheduling. The dispute was submitted to arbitration, where the arbitrator denied the union's grievance. The union then sought to vacate the arbitration award by filing an application in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, serving the city but not the attorneys who represented the city in the arbitration.The Common Pleas Court initially denied the city's motion to dismiss the union's application, but later reversed its decision after the Eighth District Court of Appeals ruled in a different case that failure to serve the adverse party's counsel deprived the court of jurisdiction. Consequently, the Common Pleas Court dismissed the union's application and confirmed the arbitration award in favor of the city. The Eighth District affirmed this decision, citing two defects: the union's application was in the form of a pleading rather than a motion, and it failed to serve the city's arbitration counsel.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that under R.C. 2711.13, a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award must serve either the adverse party or its counsel, not necessarily both. However, the court also held that the union's application did not meet the statutory requirements because it was filed as a pleading (a complaint) rather than a motion. The court emphasized that a motion must state with particularity the grounds for the requested order, which the union's filing failed to do. Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Eighth District's decision regarding the service requirement but affirmed the decision that the union's application did not meet the statutory form requirements, leaving the arbitration award in favor of the city intact. View "Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

A former employee sued her employer, Charter Communications, Inc., alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), as well as wrongful discharge. Charter moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement the employee had signed during the onboarding process. The employee opposed, arguing the arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable.The Los Angeles County Superior Court found the agreement to be a contract of adhesion and substantively unconscionable due to provisions that shortened the time for filing claims, allowed Charter to recover attorney fees contrary to FEHA, and imposed an interim fee award for compelling arbitration. The court refused to enforce the agreement, finding it permeated with unconscionability. The Second Appellate District, Division Four, affirmed, identifying additional unconscionable provisions and disagreeing with another appellate decision regarding interim fee awards.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and agreed that certain provisions of the arbitration agreement were substantively unconscionable, including the lack of mutuality in covered and excluded claims, the shortened limitations period for filing claims, and the potential for an unlawful award of attorney fees. The court clarified that the discovery limitations were not unconscionable, as the arbitrator had the authority to order additional discovery if necessary.The Supreme Court held that the agreement's unconscionable provisions could potentially be severed, and the matter was remanded for further consideration of whether the unconscionable provisions could be severed to enforce the remainder of the agreement. The court also concluded that the Court of Appeal’s decision did not violate the Federal Arbitration Act. View "Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

Allied Painting & Decorating, Inc. withdrew from the International Painters and Allied Trades Industry Pension Fund in 2005. Twelve years later, the Fund demanded $427,195 from Allied, claiming it was owed for the withdrawal. The key issue was whether the Fund's delay in sending the demand violated the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), which requires that such demands be made "as soon as practicable" after withdrawal.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reviewed the case after Allied contested the demand, arguing that the delay caused significant prejudice. The Arbitrator initially found that the Fund did not act "as soon as practicable" but concluded that Allied failed to prove severe prejudice, thus rejecting Allied's laches defense. The District Court, however, found that Allied was prejudiced by the delay and vacated the Arbitrator's Award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's order vacating the Arbitrator's Award. The Third Circuit held that the Fund's failure to send the demand "as soon as practicable" after Allied's withdrawal violated the MPPAA. The court clarified that the "as soon as practicable" requirement is a statutory mandate independent of any laches defense, meaning that the Fund's delay alone was sufficient to invalidate the demand, regardless of whether Allied could prove prejudice. Consequently, the Fund could not recover the claimed withdrawal liability from Allied. View "Allied Painting & Decorating Inc v. International Painters and Allied Trades Industry Pension" on Justia Law