Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Air Method Corporation terminated a helicopter pilot, Jeff Stackpole, following a 2010 incident. Defendant Office and Professional Employees International Union Local 109 (OPEIU) represented Mr. Stackpole throughout the arbitration process. After the arbitration award was granted in Mr. Stackpole’s favor, Plaintiff filed a complaint against OPEIU Local 109 pursuant to the Railway Labor Act, seeking to vacate the award. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of Defendants, thereby upholding the arbitration award. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the arbitration award. View "Air Methods Corporation v. OPEIU, et al" on Justia Law

D.R. Horton petitioned for review of the Board's holding that D.R. Horton had violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., by requiring its employees to sign an arbitration agreement that, among other things, prohibited an employee from pursuing claims in a collective or class action. After addressing issues regarding the composition of the Board, the court concluded that the Board's decision did not give proper weight to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 2. The court upheld the Board, though, on requiring D.R. Horton to clarify with its employees that the arbitration agreement did not eliminate their rights to pursue claims of unfair labor practices with the Board. View "D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The NECA-IBEW Health and Welfare Fund provides health benefits to members of a local union of electrical workers. The Fund negotiated a Local Agreement with Sav-Rx, a provider of prescription-drug benefits, under which Sav-Rx reimburses pharmacies for dispensing medication and then invoices the Fund for some of its costs. The Local Agreement does not call for arbitration. A few months later, Sav-Rx negotiated a different agreement with the national organization of the IBEW, with which the local is affiliated. The National Agreement offers locals reduced charges and more services than the Local Agreement and contains a mandatory arbitration clause. Local unions and funds could opt into the National Agreement, but the Fund's trustees never voted on the matter. Over the next eight years the Fund accepted from Sav-Rx services provided by the National Agreement. The Fund sued Sav-Rx for invoicing the Fund at rates not authorized by either the Local or National Agreement. The district court dismissed, finding that Fund had accepted the benefits of the National Agreement and was bound to it; Sav-Rx established that the Fund knew it was accepting benefits under the National Agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "NECA-IBEW Rockford Local Union 364 Health & Welfare Fund v. A&A Drug Co." on Justia Law

Verizon New England, Inc. ("Verizon") had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Local 2327, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (the "Union") that was originally signed in 2003. When, in 2008, FairPoint Communications ("FairPoint") purchased Verizon's telecommunication operations in Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, FairPoint agreed to hire all former Verizon employees, represented by the Union, in those states. In 2010, the Union filed a grievance against FairPoint based on allegedly wrongful transfer of work. An arbitration panel entered an award against FairPoint, concluding that the facts constituted a wrongful conveyance. FairPoint filed suit in district court, arguing that the arbitral panel had exceeded its authority by wrongfully adding and subtracting terms from the CBA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Union. Nonetheless, the district court denied costs and fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) no grounds existed on which to vacate the arbitral award; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying costs and fees. View "N. New England Telephone Operations LLC v. Local 2327, Int'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, ALF-CIO" on Justia Law

Tillman filed suit pro se, alleging that Macy’s discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of Title VII when it terminated her employment in 2009. Macy’s filed a motion to compel arbitration, based on a claimed agreement between the parties to participate in a dispute-resolution program called Solutions. The Solutions process had four steps, the last of which is binding arbitration. After the May’s store at which she had worked since 2001 was acquired by Macy’s, Tillman received a document describing the Solutions process and noting that employees were automatically “covered” by arbitration by virtue of continuing employment, but could opt out of binding arbitration. Tillman’s packet was mailed and was not returned as undeliverable. Tillman stated that she did not receive it. In 2006, Tillman attended a mandatory video describing the Solutions Program. Tillman does not deny receiving a brochure distributed at the meeting. In 2007, Macy’s sent another brochure that stated that she had the entire Solutions program, specifically including Step 4 Arbitration. Tillman stated that she did not receive this mailing. Macy’s sent another Election Form and brochure. Tillman did not return the form; again claiming that she did not receive it. The district court denied Macy’s motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Macy’s provided sufficient notice of its offer to enter into an arbitration agreement, and Tillman accepted by continuing her employment and not returning either opt-out form. Arbitration should be required, notwithstanding the absence of an employee-signed agreement. View "Tillman v. Macy's Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Ralphs alleging violations of the California Labor Code and California Business and Professions Code 17200 et seq. On appeal, Ralphs challenged the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that Ralphs' arbitration policy was unconscionable under California law. The court concluded that Ralphs' arbitration was procedurally unconscionable where, among other things, agreeing to Ralphs' policy was a condition of applying for employment and the terms were not disclosed to plaintiff until three weeks after she had agreed to be bound by it. In regards to substantive unconscionability, the court concluded, among other things, that Ralphs' terms required that the arbitrator impose significant costs on the employee up front, regardless of the merits of the employee's claims, and severely limited the authority of the arbitrator to allocate arbitration costs in the award. Further, the state law supporting such a conclusion was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2. Accordingly, the court affirmed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Chavarria v. Ralphs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a teacher in the Manchester-Essex Regional School District until he was informed by the District Superintendent's intention to terminate his employment for inappropriate sexual conduct toward a student. Plaintiff sought review of the Superintendent's action. An arbitrator affirmed Plaintiff's dismissal. Plaintiff then filed suit in Massachusetts superior court challenging his dismissal and seeking to vacate the arbitrator's decision. Three weeks later, Plaintiff filed this complaint in federal court alleging state and federal law violations. The next day, Plaintiff amended his state-court complaint so it contained the exact same claims as his federal-court complaint. The state court rejected Plaintiff's claims and affirmed the arbitrator's decision. Later, the federal district court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff, finding that Plaintiff's claims were barred by res judicata. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that none of the reasons presented by Plaintiff why res judicata did not bar his federal claims from adjudication in federal court were persuasive. View "Atwater v. Driscoll" on Justia Law

The Unions filed a grievance against Alcan, claiming that Alcan violated a collective bargaining agreement. On appeal, the Unions challenged the district court's order vacating the arbitrator's award of severance pay. The court reversed the judgment because a federal court must defer to the arbitrator's interpretation where the arbitrator was at least arguably construing or applying the collective bargaining agreement. The court denied the Unions' request for attorneys' fees. Alcan acted promptly to seek an order vacating the arbitration award and the company did not act dishonestly or in bad faith. View "Alcan Packaging Co. v. Graphic Communications, et al." on Justia Law

E&Y appealed from the district court's order denying its motion to dismiss or stay proceedings, and to compel arbitration, in a putative class action brought by its former employees. At issue on appeal was whether an employee could invalidate a class-action waive provision in an arbitration agreement when that waiver removed the financial incentive for her to pursue a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq. The court held that the FLSA did not include a "contrary congressional command" that prevented a class-action waiver provision in an arbitration agreement from being enforced by its terms. The court also held that, in light of the supervening decision of the Supreme Court in American Express Co v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the employee's argument that proceeding individually in arbitration would be "prohibitively expensive" was not a sufficient basis to invalidate the action waiver provision at issue here under the "effective vindication doctrine." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a dispute between the Union and Carlisle over the arbitrability of a grievance concerning disability benefits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Carlisle and denied the Union's cross-motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Carlisle's claim for declaratory judgment was barred by the doctrine of res judicata where there was no basis for the district court to conclude that the Union acquiesced in the splitting of Carlisle's claims. Therefore, the Union did not waive its right to rely on the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and remanded with directions to dismiss Carlisle's action View "Carlisle Power Trans. Products v. United Steel, etc." on Justia Law