Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Emswiler sued his employer, CSX, a railroad, and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen after his seniority on the roster of train engineers was adjusted. Emswiler alleged breach of collective bargaining agreement, breach of duty of fair representation, and disability discrimination under Ohio law. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly determined it could not reach the merits of claims for breach of CBA and disability discrimination due to his failure to pursue arbitral mechanisms mandated by the Railway Labor Act, which governs disputes between management and labor in the railroad industry, 45 U.S.C. 151, 153. The RLA divides disputes into two categories: Major disputes concern the formation of collective bargaining agreements, whereas minor disputes deal with the interpretation of existing CBAs. This is a minor dispute. Emswiler’s claim for breach of duty of fair representation lacked merit. View "Emswiler v. CSX Transp. Inc." on Justia Law

Gove worked for TDC, which had a contract with Loring. TDC employees were informed that CSD had been awarded the Loring contract and would be providing services previously furnished by TDC. Gove applied online for a CSD position, similar to the one that she held with TDC. The application included a provision that any dispute with respect to any issue prior to employment, arising out of the employment process, would resolved in accord with the Dispute Resolution Policy and Arbitration Agreement adopted by CSD for its employees. When Gove was interviewed by CSD, she was visibly pregnant and was asked whether she had other children. Gove was not hired, although CSD continued to have a need for the position and continued to advertise the position. Gove filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission, which found reasonable grounds, but was unable to persuade the parties to reach agreement. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Maine Human Rights Act. CSD moved to compel arbitration. The district court found that the arbitration clause was ambiguous as to whether it covered an applicant who was never hired and should be construed against CSD. The First Circuit affirmed. View "Gove v. Career Sys. Dev. Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the Eleventh Circuit's authority to review an order remanding an action based on an antecedent and erroneous ruling that an agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable. Petitioner St. Hugh Williams filed in a Florida court a complaint that, while working onboard the M/V Norwegian Sky, he was injured as a result of the negligence and other tortious conduct of the owner of the ship, NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. NCL removed the action to the district court on the ground that Petitioner was contractually bound to arbitrate his complaint under the United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, but Petitioner moved to remand the action to state court. The district court ruled that the arbitration clause was unenforceable and granted Petitioner's motion to remand. NCL appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit later held in "Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.," (652 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2011)), that an agreement to arbitrate under the Convention is enforceable. Petitioner argued that the Eleventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction, but the Court found that it had jurisdiction to review the denial of the motion to compel under "City of Waco v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.," (293 U.S. 140 (1934)). The Court reversed the order denying the motion to compel of NCL, vacated the order remanding Petitioner's complaint to state court, and remanded the case with instructions to compel arbitration. View "Williams v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd." on Justia Law

The Cumberland Teachers Association (union), appealed to the Supreme Court that confirmed an arbitrator's award in favor of the Cumberland School Committee (school committee). After protracted contract negotiations, the school committee and the union agreed on a three-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that would govern their relations for the 2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 academic years. "However, the parties soon discovered that they had left the negotiating table with two very different understandings of how a key component of their agreement would be implemented." An arbitrator was selected and the parties agreed that the issue to be decided by the arbitrator was whether “the Cumberland School Committee place[d] the aggrieved teachers at the correct salary level for the 2007-08 school year?” On appeal to the Supreme Court, the union argued that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded a contract provision when he found that there was no written agreement about how the new salary schedule would be implemented for the 2007-2008 year. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the union did not demonstrate that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the contract or that he was completely irrational in arriving at his decision and award. View "Cumberland Teachers Association v. Cumberland School Committee" on Justia Law

After a school district (District) approved the conversion of an existing public school into a charter school, a union (UTLA) claimed that the District failed to comply with collective bargaining agreement provisions (CBPs) concerning charter school conversion. UTLA petitioned to compel arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the collective bargaining provisions (CBPs) regulating charter school conversion were unlawful because they conflicted with the Education Code, and therefore, arbitration of those unlawful provisions should not be compelled. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the court's function in adjudicating a petition to compel arbitration was limited to determining whether there was a valid arbitration agreement that had not been waived. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a court faced with a petition to compel arbitration to enforce CBPs between a union and a school district should deny the petition if the CBPs at issue directly conflict with provisions of the Education Code; and (2) because UTLA had not identified with sufficient specificity which CBPs the District allegedly violated, the case was remanded for identification of those specific provisions and to address whether the provisions conflicted with the Education Code. View "United Teachers of L.A. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2001 the Hotel hired plaintiff as a casino worker. Approximately six years into his employment, he filed a charge of sex and age discrimination with the EEOC. In his complaint under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(d), and Puerto Rico law, he alleges that, shortly after he made these filings, his supervisors embarked on a pattern of retaliation ultimately resulting in his dismissal. He filed a retaliation charge with the EEOC, which issued a right-to-sue letter. Citing two agreements signed by plaintiff, each containing an arbitration clause, the Hotel moved to compel arbitration. Plaintiff argued that the agreements he had signed impermissibly shorten the limitations period, impede public enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, and unduly burden workers' rights. The district court determined that the arbitration clauses were valid and dismissed without prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed, citing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1-16, and holding that the arbitrator can determine whether Puerto Rico law permits shortening of the limitations period. View "Escobar-Noble v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel" on Justia Law

HOP Energy appealed from the district court's confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of Local 553 Pension Fund. The district court held that HOP Energy was not exempt from withdrawal liability under the Multi-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA), 29 U.S.C. 1381-1461, because the purchaser of HOP Energy's New York City operating division lacked an obligation to contribute "substantially the same number of contribution base units" to the pension fund post-sale by HOP Energy had contributed pre-sale. The court agreed and held that the "contribution base units" were hours of employee pay. Although the purchaser of HOP Energy's New York City operating division had an obligation to contribute to the pension fund at the same contribution base unit rate, it had no obligation to contribute substantially the same number of hours of employee pay. Therefore, HOP was not exempt from withdrawal liability. View "Hop Energy, L.L.C. v. Local 553 Pension Fund" on Justia Law

This case arose from respondent's injury on the job and the arbitration agreement he signed as a condition of his employment. At issue was whether an appellate court had jurisdiction over an appeal from a trial court order confirming an arbitration award in part and vacating the award in part based on the existence of unresolved questions of law or fact necessary to a ruling, yet the trial court did not expressly direct a rehearing. Because the order left significant factual and legal issues open for further determination, it was interlocutory and not appealable unless authorized by statute. Accordingly, the court of appeals and the court did not have jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal. View "Bison Building Materials, Ltd., v. Aldridge" on Justia Law

PTO sought review of a decision of the FLRA upholding an arbitrator's award in favor of the Union. The arbitrator concluded that PTO committed an unfair labor practice in violation of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7116(a)(1) and (5), when it repudiated a provision in an agreement requiring that it make an annual request of the OPM to increase PTO's special schedule pay rates and, if OPM refused, to discuss "substantially equivalent alternatives" with POPA. PTO challenged the FLRA's determination that the provision constituted an "appropriate arrangement" under 5 U.S.C. 7106(b)(3). The court granted PTO's petition on the ground that, under the collateral estoppel doctrine, the FLRA was bound by its earlier decision concluding the provision did not constitute an appropriate arrangement. View "U.S. Dept. of Commerce v. FLRA" on Justia Law

San Juan Coal Company and the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 953 entered into binding arbitration to determine whether union members on a certain schedule were entitled to holdover pay. The arbitrator concluded that the union members were entitled to the extra pay, but on review, the district court overturned the arbitral award. Because the arbitrator’s interpretation was colorable, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court improperly substituted its interpretation of the agreement: "[a]n arbitrator's interpretation of an agreement, even one that is flawed or based on questionable findings of fact, is due the utmost judicial deference. It matters not that a reviewing court might offer a more cogent reading of the agreement; the arbitrator's interpretation must be upheld wholly unless it is without any textual basis." View "San Juan Coal Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers Local 953" on Justia Law