Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Paul brought state law claims for disability discrimination and retaliation against her former employer after her 12-year employment as a CT Technologist came to an end following a work-related injury. The employer removed the action to federal court on the basis of complete preemption under the Labor Management Relations Act, contending plaintiff’s claims implicated rights under the collective bargaining agreement, which included a mandatory arbitration requirement. The district court denied remand to state court and dismissed for failure to submit to mandatory arbitration. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Although plaintiff’s claim of unlawful discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment by refusing to reasonably accommodate her disability implicates an employment relationship created and defined by the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the employer did not demonstrate that resolution of the claim is so “inextricably intertwined” with interpretation of CBA terms as to trigger complete preemption. View "Paul v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of OH" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a Title VII discrimination suit against his employer, the Department of Homeland Security. At issue on appeal was whether the parties had reached an enforceable settlement. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that plaintiff was bound by the terms of his attorney's settlement offer. Further, the court never held that the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee was implicated by defective representation in Title VII proceedings and plaintiff had introduced no evidence to suggest that his attorney's representation was less than competent. View "Quesada v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

This insurance coverage dispute arose from charges of sexual harassment brought by a one-time employee against Appellant, the former president of Jasmine Company, Inc. Appellant sought a defense to and indemnity for the harassment claims from Appellee, Jasmine's liability insurance provider. The district court ruled that Appellant was not entitled to coverage from Appellee because, under the doctrine of issue preclusion, a prior arbitration between Appellant and the purchaser of his business conclusively established that Appellant's conduct fell within an exclusion to Appellee's insurance policy. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the arbitration presented Appellant with the full and fair opportunity for adjudication on the issue at hand; and (2) therefore, the district court was correct to bar Appellant from disputing the applicability of the exclusion based on the doctrine of issue preclusion. View "Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A collective-bargaining agreement between Baltimore County and Baltimore County Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 4 (FOP) contained an arbitration clause and a retiree health-insurance provision. FOP believed the provision locked in place the health-insurance subsidy as it existed at the time of an officer's retirement. After the agreement expired and the County decreased the health-insurance subsidy, FOP initiated arbitration. The County protested, arguing (1) it had no duty to arbitrate because the collective-bargaining agreement had expired, and (2) the health-insurance subsidy was not locked in place but was subject to change from year to year. FOP was successful in arbitration and on appeal before the circuit court, but the court of special appeals vacated the arbitration award. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) an arbitration clause may survive the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement when it concerns rights that vested during the life of the agreement; and (2) when deciding the issue of arbitrability requires interpretation of the underlying agreement and consideration of the merits of the dispute, the issue of arbitrability should initially be determined by the arbitrator. View "Baltimore County Fraternal Order of Police Lodge v. Baltimore County" on Justia Law

SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC, doing business as Warren Manor Health & Rehabilitation Center ("SSC"), and Bernard Turk, the administrator of Warren Manor Health & Rehabilitation Center ("Warren Manor") (referred to collectively as "the Warren Manor defendants"), appealed a circuit court judgment denying their joint motion to compel arbitration of the medical-malpractice wrongful-death claims asserted against them by Ethel Gordon ("Gordon"), the administratrix of the estate of Jimmy Lee Gordon, Gordon's husband, pursuant to an arbitration agreement they allege Gordon had entered into with SSC. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the circuit court properly denied the Warren Manor defendants' motion to compel arbitration of Gordon's claims against them because the trial court had yet to conduct a trial to resolve the issue identified by the Supreme Court in "Gordon I" — whether a valid arbitration agreement existed between Gordon and SSC. "Only if that issue is answered in the affirmative may the Warren Manor defendants properly move to compel arbitration. If that trial results in a judgment holding that there is no valid arbitration agreement, then the Warren Manor defendants may file a timely appeal challenging the trial court's ruling excluding any evidence they wished to submit at trial." View "SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Under the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement, the City of Newport provided health insurance benefits to its retired firefighters. After the City decided to modify those benefits, Local 1080, International Association of Firefighters, ALF-CIO (Union) filed grievances and sought arbitration. The City responded by seeking relief in the superior court to determine the arbitrability of disputes over changes to these benefits. The superior court determined that this dispute was not arbitrable. The Union disagreed and petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the parties did not intend to arbitrate disputes regarding retiree healthcare, and therefore, such disputes must be resolved, if at all, judicially rather than through arbitration. View "City of Newport v. Local 1080, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

This case arose out of collective bargaining negotiations between the Utah Transit Authority (UTA) and Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union (Union). Those negotiations came to a standstill in 2009 when the parties entered into arbitration and litigation to resolve their disputes. The district court granted UTA's partial motion for summary judgment in the ensuing litigation, and the Union appealed. Before the matter could be addressed on appeal, however, the arbitrator entered a binding ruling largely in favor of the Union. With this ruling in hand, the parties once again entered into negotiations and successfully hammered out a new collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court dismissed the Union's appeal because the dispute had been resolved and the case was moot. View "Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of Amalgamated Transit Union" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought suit against Defendant, the Cranston School Department, seeking grievance arbitration of adverse actions taken against them as to their respective coaching positions at Cranston West High School. Plaintiffs, both of whom were teachers at Cranston West, separately filed grievances against Defendant in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that was in place between the Cranston Teacher's Alliance and the school department. Defendant responded that the CBA did not apply to Plaintiffs in their capacity as coaches, and it refused to submit to arbitration. Plaintiffs filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that they were entitled to binding arbitration as guaranteed by the CBA. The superior court ruled in favor of Defendant, determining that Plaintiffs, in their capacity as coaches, were not entitled to avail themselves of the CBA's grievance procedures. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice was correct in determining that Plaintiffs' coaching positions were contractually distinct from their teaching positions and did not constitute professional employment; and (2) Plaintiffs in their coaching capacities had no right to pursue relief based on the rights bargained for by the alliance on behalf of its teacher-members and as contained in the CBA. View "Sacco v. Cranston Sch. Dep't" on Justia Law

In 2002, county voters adopted an amendment to the county charter relating to the resolution by binding arbitration of collective bargaining impasses with the county's law enforcement employees and uniformed firefighters. In 2003, the county council adopted an ordinance implementing that charter provision. In 2011, the county council amended the 2003 ordinance to provide that binding arbitration did not require the council to appropriate funds or enact legislation necessary to implement a final written award in arbitration. An uncodified section of the 2011 council bill also provided that, if any part of the 2011 ordinance were held invalid, the entire county code section enacted by the 2003 ordinance, as amended through the 2011 ordinance, would be deemed repealed by operation of law, with the result that impasses would be addressed by a code section that did not authorize binding arbitration. Petitioners sought a declaratory judgment that the 2011 ordinance violated the 2002 charter amendment. The circuit court held the 2002 charter amendment violated the Maryland Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2002 charter amendment bound the county council; and (2) portions of the 2011 ordinance, as well as its uncodified section 3, violated the charter and were invalid. Remanded. View "Atkinson v. Anne Arundel County" on Justia Law

Avaya Inc. ("Avaya") appealed a district court's ruling compelling arbitration of its labor dispute with the Communication Workers of America ("CWA") over the legal status of a class of Avaya employees called "backbone engineers." The union viewed the backbone engineers as non-represented "occupational" employees and legitimate objects for its organizing campaigns, while Avaya saw them as managers outside the scope of the company's labor agreements. CWA contended the parties' collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") required any dispute over the status of backbone engineers to be resolved in arbitration. Avaya maintained the parties did not consent to arbitrate the status of its backbone engineers and accused CWA of trying to unilaterally enlarge the CBA to encompass disputes over company management. Having reviewed the CBA and the evidence submitted to the district court, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Avaya's position and reversed the district court's order compelling arbitration. View "CWA v. Avaya, Inc." on Justia Law