Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Cumberland Teachers Association (union), appealed to the Supreme Court that confirmed an arbitrator's award in favor of the Cumberland School Committee (school committee). After protracted contract negotiations, the school committee and the union agreed on a three-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that would govern their relations for the 2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 academic years. "However, the parties soon discovered that they had left the negotiating table with two very different understandings of how a key component of their agreement would be implemented." An arbitrator was selected and the parties agreed that the issue to be decided by the arbitrator was whether “the Cumberland School Committee place[d] the aggrieved teachers at the correct salary level for the 2007-08 school year?” On appeal to the Supreme Court, the union argued that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded a contract provision when he found that there was no written agreement about how the new salary schedule would be implemented for the 2007-2008 year. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the union did not demonstrate that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the contract or that he was completely irrational in arriving at his decision and award. View "Cumberland Teachers Association v. Cumberland School Committee" on Justia Law

After a school district (District) approved the conversion of an existing public school into a charter school, a union (UTLA) claimed that the District failed to comply with collective bargaining agreement provisions (CBPs) concerning charter school conversion. UTLA petitioned to compel arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. The trial court denied the petition, finding that the collective bargaining provisions (CBPs) regulating charter school conversion were unlawful because they conflicted with the Education Code, and therefore, arbitration of those unlawful provisions should not be compelled. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the court's function in adjudicating a petition to compel arbitration was limited to determining whether there was a valid arbitration agreement that had not been waived. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a court faced with a petition to compel arbitration to enforce CBPs between a union and a school district should deny the petition if the CBPs at issue directly conflict with provisions of the Education Code; and (2) because UTLA had not identified with sufficient specificity which CBPs the District allegedly violated, the case was remanded for identification of those specific provisions and to address whether the provisions conflicted with the Education Code. View "United Teachers of L.A. v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2001 the Hotel hired plaintiff as a casino worker. Approximately six years into his employment, he filed a charge of sex and age discrimination with the EEOC. In his complaint under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(d), and Puerto Rico law, he alleges that, shortly after he made these filings, his supervisors embarked on a pattern of retaliation ultimately resulting in his dismissal. He filed a retaliation charge with the EEOC, which issued a right-to-sue letter. Citing two agreements signed by plaintiff, each containing an arbitration clause, the Hotel moved to compel arbitration. Plaintiff argued that the agreements he had signed impermissibly shorten the limitations period, impede public enforcement of antidiscrimination laws, and unduly burden workers' rights. The district court determined that the arbitration clauses were valid and dismissed without prejudice. The First Circuit affirmed, citing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1-16, and holding that the arbitrator can determine whether Puerto Rico law permits shortening of the limitations period. View "Escobar-Noble v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel" on Justia Law

HOP Energy appealed from the district court's confirmation of an arbitration award in favor of Local 553 Pension Fund. The district court held that HOP Energy was not exempt from withdrawal liability under the Multi-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA), 29 U.S.C. 1381-1461, because the purchaser of HOP Energy's New York City operating division lacked an obligation to contribute "substantially the same number of contribution base units" to the pension fund post-sale by HOP Energy had contributed pre-sale. The court agreed and held that the "contribution base units" were hours of employee pay. Although the purchaser of HOP Energy's New York City operating division had an obligation to contribute to the pension fund at the same contribution base unit rate, it had no obligation to contribute substantially the same number of hours of employee pay. Therefore, HOP was not exempt from withdrawal liability. View "Hop Energy, L.L.C. v. Local 553 Pension Fund" on Justia Law

This case arose from respondent's injury on the job and the arbitration agreement he signed as a condition of his employment. At issue was whether an appellate court had jurisdiction over an appeal from a trial court order confirming an arbitration award in part and vacating the award in part based on the existence of unresolved questions of law or fact necessary to a ruling, yet the trial court did not expressly direct a rehearing. Because the order left significant factual and legal issues open for further determination, it was interlocutory and not appealable unless authorized by statute. Accordingly, the court of appeals and the court did not have jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal. View "Bison Building Materials, Ltd., v. Aldridge" on Justia Law

PTO sought review of a decision of the FLRA upholding an arbitrator's award in favor of the Union. The arbitrator concluded that PTO committed an unfair labor practice in violation of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7116(a)(1) and (5), when it repudiated a provision in an agreement requiring that it make an annual request of the OPM to increase PTO's special schedule pay rates and, if OPM refused, to discuss "substantially equivalent alternatives" with POPA. PTO challenged the FLRA's determination that the provision constituted an "appropriate arrangement" under 5 U.S.C. 7106(b)(3). The court granted PTO's petition on the ground that, under the collateral estoppel doctrine, the FLRA was bound by its earlier decision concluding the provision did not constitute an appropriate arrangement. View "U.S. Dept. of Commerce v. FLRA" on Justia Law

San Juan Coal Company and the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 953 entered into binding arbitration to determine whether union members on a certain schedule were entitled to holdover pay. The arbitrator concluded that the union members were entitled to the extra pay, but on review, the district court overturned the arbitral award. Because the arbitrator’s interpretation was colorable, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court improperly substituted its interpretation of the agreement: "[a]n arbitrator's interpretation of an agreement, even one that is flawed or based on questionable findings of fact, is due the utmost judicial deference. It matters not that a reviewing court might offer a more cogent reading of the agreement; the arbitrator's interpretation must be upheld wholly unless it is without any textual basis." View "San Juan Coal Co. v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers Local 953" on Justia Law

Local 36 obtained an arbitration award against Whitney d/b/a Whitney Industrial, a non-signatory to any collective bargaining agreement, under an alter-ego theory. Whitney appealed the district court's order enforcing the arbitration award. The court held that a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement need not participate in the arbitration while expressly reserving jurisdictional questions, file a preemptive declaratory judgment action, notify the arbitrator of its refusal to participate, or timely initiate a court action to vacate the arbitrator's award in order to have "the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate . . . decided by the court, not the arbitrator." Accordingly, the court agreed with Whitney that the joint adjustment board had no authority to determine whether his new company was the alter ego of Whitney Mechanical, and thus, bound by the collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded. View "Local 36 Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc. v. Whitney" on Justia Law

Wachovia appealed from the district court's refusal to vacate an arbitration award entered against it after it sued several former employees on what the arbitrators determined were frivolous claims. Wachovia argued that the arbitrators violated section 10(a)(3) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(3), and "manifestly disregarded" the law when they awarded attorneys' fees and costs under the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Act (FCPA), S.C. Code Ann. 15-36-10. The court held that arbitrators have broad discretion to set applicable procedure and the court would not overturn an award for violating section 10(a)(3)'s protection against "any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced" where the arbitrators attempted to address the one party's unhappiness with the fairness of the hearing and that party refused to take advantage of the opportunity provided. The court could not hold that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded the law when they awarded the attorneys' fees and costs where, in this case, the court found whether the arbitrators erred by not applying the FCPA's procedural requirements was a question that was itself not clearly defined and was subject to debate. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Wachovia Securities, LLC v. Brand, II" on Justia Law

In 2006, plaintiff was a citizen of California and agreed to relocate to Illinois to work for defendant. When he quit about five months after moving, his family was still in California. He filed suit in state court, seeking relocation benefits the company allegedly promised. The company, which has its principal place of business in California removed to federal court, asserting that plaintiff was a citizen of Massachusetts. Plaintiff had a home in Massachusetts when the case was removed, was registered to vote there, and had a Massachusetts driver's license. The district court ordered arbitration under one of the contracts between the parties. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal and denied sanctions. Relocation benefits are "employment related" and subject to arbitration under the agreement. The court noted that the company also failed to follow the rules. The company "should be able to tell the difference between residence and domicile, and should not have any difficulty complying with Rule 38."View "Heinen v. Northrop Grumman Corp." on Justia Law