Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a dispute over the arbitration of a collective bargaining agreement that contained a no-layoff clause. The court held that because the clause was not explicit, unambiguous and comprehensive, there was nothing for the Union to grieve or for an arbitrator to decide. Having concluded that the dispute was not arbitrable for reasons of public policy, the court need not reach the issue of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division was reversed and the Village's application to stay the arbitration was granted. View "Matter of Johnson City Professional Firefighters Local 921" on Justia Law

Consolidating several appeals, the Supreme Court addressed the effect of a municipality's financial distress and recovery planning on an arbitration award agreed to pursuant to the Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act (Act). For approximately twenty years, the City of Scranton has been designated a distressed municipality under the Municipalities Financial Recovery Act. Pursuant to the Recovery Act, the City has its Commonwealth-mandated financial advisors who assist in creating a financial recovery plan (essentially a budget). In the most recent collective bargaining agreements between the City of Scranton and its Police and Firefighter Unions expired at the close of 2002. Negotiations as to future terms and work conditions for union members resulted in impasses. Accordingly, pursuant to the Act, arbitrators were selected to establish appropriate terms and conditions. Throughout the arbitrations, the City maintained that the arbitrators lacked legal authority to award relief impinging on the City's financial recovery plan. The City attempted to resist paying the ensuing award that resulted from the arbitration. The Commonwealth Court found that it was required to vacate the awards, holding that they did not conform to the City's Recovery Plan and would result in increased financial and operational burdens on an already distressed municipality. The Unions appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court focused on the distinction between the terms "arbitration award" and "arbitration settlement": the City argued that it was not mandated to pay "awards" but "settlements." The Supreme Court found the term "settlement" ambiguous, and the plain meaning could include the "award" given by the arbitrators in this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order that the award negatively impacted the City's Recovery Plan. View "City of Scranton v. Firefighters Local Union" on Justia Law

This case arose when Cat Tech sought indemnification from its insurers after Cat Tech damaged several components of a hyrotreating reactor owned by Ergon Refining, Inc. and arbitrators entered an award against Cat Tech for the damage. Insurers subsequently denied the claim, contending, inter alia, that the "your work" exclusion found in the policies precluded coverage for damage to the reactor. The district court found that insurers had no duty to indemnify Cat Tech. The court held that the information contained in the arbitration award was insufficient to properly apply the "your work" exclusion. As such, the court concluded that the district court erred when it relied on the award in granting insurer's summary judgment motion. On remand, the district court should conduct any additional fact-finding necessary to determine whether the damage suffered by Ergon's reactor was limited only to those components upon which Cat Tech worked, or instead included other components unrelated to Cat Tech's operations. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "American Home Assurance Co, et al. v. Cat Tech L.L.C." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiff's allegations that, while she was employed with defendant on one of its cruise ships, she was drugged by other employees, raped, and physically injured while she was unconscious, and when she reported to officials of the cruise line what had happened to her, they treated her with indifference and even hostility, failed to provide her with proper medical treatment on board, and interfered with her attempts to obtain medical treatment and counseling ashore. Plaintiff subsequently asserted five claims against defendant involving violations of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 30104, or the general maritime law applicable to the Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. 10313. Plaintiff's remaining five claims involved common law tort claims. At issue was whether plaintiff's claims fell within the scope of the arbitration clause in the crew agreement. The court held that the district court did not err in holding that Counts VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X of plaintiff's complaint did not fall within the scope of the arbitration provision where all five of these claims involved factual allegations about how the cruise line and its officials treated plaintiff after learning that she had been raped, including allegations that she was kept on the ship against her will, that she was prevented from getting medical attention off the ship, that her rape kit was destroyed in the incinerator, and that her confidentiality as a rape victim was intentionally violated. The court held, however, that the remaining five counts arose directly from her undisputed status as a "seaman" employed by defendant and fell within the scope of the arbitration provision. Therefore, the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to compel arbitration for Counts I, II, III, IV, and V. View "Doe v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Union, representing certain employees at ExxonMobil's Baton Rouge refinery and chemical plant, brought suit to compel ExxonMobil to arbitrate two labor grievances pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The court held that it was within the province of the courts to decide whether "a good faith claim by one party that the other party had violated a written provision" of the bargaining agreement had been asserted. The court also held that, in light of the clairty of the parties' agreement, the Union's claim that ExxonMobil violated Section 1131 of the agreement when the language of that section explicitly authorized its actions was not colorable and could not constitute a good faith claim within the meaning of the arbitration clause. The court agreed with ExxonMobil that Baton Rouge Oil & Chemical Workers Union v. ExxonMobil Corp foreclosed reliance on Section 1151 of the agreement as an independent basis for the arbitrability of the contracting-out grievance. The court further held that for the same reasons that the court held that the contracting-out grievance was not arbitrable under Section 1151, Section 1151 could not serve as a basis for requiring arbitration of the post-reduction claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of the Union's motion for summary judgment with regard to the contracting-out grievance, affirmed the district court's denial of the Union's motion for summary judgment with regard to the post-reduction grievance, and reversed the district court's denial of ExxonMobil's motion for summary judgment. View "Paper, Allied-Industrial Chemical and Energy Workers Int'l Union v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

After Roger Hudspeth's employment with the Bank of the Commonwealth was terminated, Hudspeth filed a complaint against the Bank, alleging the Bank failed to pay him compensation owed for his employment. The Bank filed a motion to stay and compel arbitration before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), arguing (1) the Bank was a "customer" as defined by the FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (Customer Code), (2) Hudspeth was an associated person of a "member," and (3) because the dispute was between a customer and an associated person of a member, arbitration was mandatory under the Customer Code. The circuit court denied the Bank's motion, concluding that the Bank was not a customer under the Customer Code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Customer Code was susceptible to an interpretation under which the Bank could be considered a customer, and (2) because under the Federal Arbitration Act any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, the circuit court erred when it denied the Bank's motion in this case. Remanded. View "Bank of the Commonwealth v. Hudspeth" on Justia Law

Employee injured her wrist as a result of an equipment malfunction while performing her job and was sent to the hospital, where she was tested for drugs in accordance with a drug policy negotiated as part of a collective bargaining agreement. She tested positive for marijuana and was subsequently terminated. The parties submitted the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the CBA. The arbitrator sustained the Union's grievance, finding that employer lacked just cause to terminate a nine-year and otherwise satisfactory employee, who was not given adequate advance notice of the drug policy and the consequences. The district court ruled in favor of the Union. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The outcome reached by the arbitrator was based on his interpretation of the relevant contractual language, which is all a court is asked to determine in conducting "exceedingly deferential," "very limited" review. View "TitanTire Corp.of Bryan v. United Steelworkers of Am," on Justia Law

Appellants, current and former shuttle bus drivers at the Minneapolis-St.Paul International Airport, brought suit against appellees in Minnesota state court alleging misclassifications of its drivers as franchisees rather than employees. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting the motion to compel arbitration, erred in enforcing the class action waiver clauses in the drivers' contracts, and erred in dismissing the federal action instead of staying it pending arbitration. The court held that the district court did not err in granting the motion to compel arbitration where appellants agreed to have an arbitrator determine threshold questions of arbitrability and therefore, appellants agreed to have the arbitrator decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1, transportation worker exemption applied. The court also held that AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion foreclosed appellants' claim that the district court erred in concluding the class action waivers were enforceable where the Supreme Court recently held that the FAA preempted a state-law-based challenge to the enforceability of class action waivers. The court held that, under the circumstances, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the action rather than staying it pending completion of the arbitration. View "Green, et al. v. SuperShuttle Int'l, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was hired as a nurse by defendant in October 2006, had to take leave for cancer treatment, then was informed that she had been terminated on December 12, 2006 because she did not have "any accrued PTO time or FMLA." The district court dismissed claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, finding that plaintiff assented to a valid agreement to arbitrate the claims. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The employee handbook stated: "Dispute Resolution Process Please refer to the Eby Companies Dispute Resolution Procedure (DRP) for details." That policy does refer to arbitration and contains a signature line. Plaintiff claims she did not receive or sign the policy and defendant did not provide a signed acknowledgment. There was no indication that plaintiff was notified of the existence of the arbitration agreement, much less that she manifested an intent to agree to its terms.View "Hergenreder v. Bickford Senior Living Grp., L.L.C." on Justia Law

These consolidated cases arose out of a 2007 labor dispute between the Painters Union and Nevada contractors over whether the Union's card check established its majority status under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), thereby requiring the contractors to bargain with the Union pursuant to Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. One set of cases arose from the Union's charges before the NLRB that the contractors failed to bargain in good faith during the following card check. The other case arose from the district court, where the Union sought an order to arbitrate whether the card check established the Union's majority status under the terms of the CBA. In the petitions for review from the NLRB's decision, the court enforced the NLRB's order, and denied the Union's and Flooring Solutions' petitions for review. In the appeal from the district court, the court held that the dispute over whether the Union established majority status pursuant to the CBA's card check provision was primarily contractual and subject to arbitration. Therefore, the court withdrew its prior decision and replaced it with this opinion reversing the district court's order denying arbitration. The court remanded for the district court to order all parties to arbitrate whether, under the CBA's card check provision, the Union established majority status. View "Int'l Union of Painter and Allied Trades v. J&R Flooring, Inc., et al.; Int'l Union of Painter and Allied Trades v. Nat'l Labor Relations Board; Flooring Solutions of NV v. Nat'l Labor Relations Board; Nat'l Labor Relations Board v. Flooring Solutions of " on Justia Law