Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's enforcement of the arbitration agreement in his employment contract with defendant. Plaintiff sued defendant on a single count of Jones Act negligence, pursuant to 46 U.S.C. 30104, claiming that defendant breached its duty to supply him with a safe place to work. The court held that, given the United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) and governing Supreme Court and Circuit Court precedent, the court must enforce the arbitration clause in plaintiff's employment contract, at least at this initial arbitration-enforcement stage. Therefore, after review and oral argument, the court affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration of plaintiff's Jones Act negligence claim. View "Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), LTD" on Justia Law

Defendant began working for plaintiff in 2006 and entered into agreements that contained restrictive covenants and an arbitration provision. In 2009 defendant left the company and allegedly began acting in violation of the covenants. The company filed suit, but did not mention the arbitration clause. The district court denied the company's request for a preliminary injunction; months later, it denied the company's motion to stay pending arbitration and enjoined arbitration. The company made the demand under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 2, more than 10 months after it initiated suit. The Third Circuit affirmed. The company waived the right to enforce the arbitration agreement. The existence of a contractual "no waiver" provision did not require a court to disregard the company's conduct; its failure to notify defendant of its intent to seek arbitration substantively prejudiced defendant's approach to the case. In addition to substantive legal prejudice, defendant spent considerable time and money to educate his attorney in preparation for a trial. View "Gray Holdco Inc. v. Cassady" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Chevron Mining, Inc. (CMI) appealed a district court's denial of its motion to vacate an arbitration award that reinstated CMI employee John Weston following his termination for just cause. CMI argued on appeal that the arbitrator's decision to reverse CMI's just-cause determination based on "forgivable" rule violations did not "draw its essence" from the governing collective bargaining agreement and that the award imposed contradicted and modified the CBA's terms. Upon review of the arbitration award, the collective bargaining agreement at issue and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit found that the arbitrator's award was compliant with the governing CBA, and affirmed the arbitration award. View "Chevron Mining Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America" on Justia Law

After two years of contributing to a multiemployer pension plan established under a collective bargaining agreement, the company closed the covered facility, triggering withdrawal liability. The union notified the company of its liability under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1001, as amended by the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. 1301-1461, and set a 20-year schedule requiring payment of $652 per month. The union sent another letter, months later, saying that it had miscalculated monthly payments, but not the underlying withdrawal liability, and advised the company to increase monthly payments to $978. The company timely paid the original amount, but refused to pay the revised sum. The company requested arbitration, but after a finding that it was not required to pay the higher amount in the interim, withdrew. The district court dismissed the union's suit based on the calculation. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded without reaching the statutory interpretation issue, based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. A plan may correct perceived errors in calculation and revise an assessment as long as the employer is not prejudiced. At that point the exhaustion provisions of the MPPAA apply to the revised assessment as they would to the original. View "Nat'l Shopmen Pension Fund v. DISA Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

An Alaska state trooper was terminated in part due to dishonesty. The Public Safety Employees Association (PSEA) filed a grievance on behalf of the discharged trooper and then invoked arbitration. An arbitrator reinstated the trooper, ruling that the State did not have cause to terminate him. The superior court upheld the arbitrator's ruling. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the arbitrator committed gross error and that the reinstatement of the trooper was unenforceable. Upon review of the arbitrator's decision and subsequent superior court ruling, the Supreme Court held that the arbitrator's award in this case was not enforceable as a violation of public policy: "the State should be free to heighten its enforcement of ethical standards. . . We are [. . . ] troubled by the arbitrator's suggestion that the State's past lenience toward minor dishonesty requires it to be permanently lenient." Because the arbitrator's award was neither unenforceable nor grossly erroneous, the Court affirmed the superior court and the arbitration decision. View "Alaska v. Public Safety Employees Association" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from petitioners' suit against defendants, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 206 et seq., forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1589, unjust enrichment, and violations of California and New York labor laws. At issue was whether the district court erred by refusing to resolve petitioners' claim of exemption from arbitration under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1, and Section 12-1517 of the Arizona Aribration Act (AAA), 12-517 A.R.S., before compelling arbitration pursuant to those acts. The court agreed that petitioners made a strong argument that the district court erred but, nonetheless, held that this case did not warrant the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. Therefore, the court denied the petition for mandamus.View "Van Dusen, et al. v. US District Court for the District of AZ, Phoenix" on Justia Law

The National Treasury Employees' Union (Union) sought review of an adverse ruling by the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority) where the Union filed a grievance alleging that the IRS was processing its members' dues revocation forms without following contractually-mandated procedures. After the parties filed exceptions to the arbitrator's award with the Authority, the Authority denied the parties' exceptions and confirmed the award in its entirety. The Union petitioned the court for review. The court held that because the Authority's decision upholding the arbitrator's award was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the court had no warrant to disturb the Authority's decision. View "Natural Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of retail sales employees of defendant, appealed from an order of the district court vacating an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded her authority in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. At issue was whether a district court had the authority to vacate an arbitration award where it believed that the arbitrator improperly interpreted the terms of an arbitration agreement. The court held that, because the district court did not undertake the appropriate inquiry - whether, based on the parties' submission for the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator had the authority to reach an issue, not whether the arbitrator decided the issue correctly - and instead substituted its own legal analysis for that of the arbitrator's, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. The court also held that, because the court found that the arbitrator acted within her authority to reach an issue properly submitted to her by the parties and reached her decision by analyzing the terms of the agreement in light of applicable law, the award should not have been vacated. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to confirm the award.

Appellant Cheryl Waiters was employed by the city of Cleveland. When the city discharged Waiters from employment, the union of which Waiters was a member filed a grievance and later demanded arbitration. The arbitrator found the city had discharged Waiters without just cause and ordered that she be reinstated to employment. Waiters then filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel her reinstatement to her former position with back pay and an award of attorney fees. The city subsequently reinstated Waiters to her former job. The court of appeals denied Waiters's writ, concluding that her claim for reinstatement was moot and that she failed to establish her entitlement to back pay or attorney fees. Waiters appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that (1) Waiters's reinstatement claim was rendered moot when she was reinstated; (2) as a bargaining-unit employee who was represented by the union in the grievance and arbitration process, Waiters was relegated to the arbitration proceeding in which the dispute concerning the amount of back pay she would be entitled to was being decided; and (3) Waiters was not entitled to attorney fees.

In the fall of 2008 William Hartford, a high school science teacher, was fired after his Montana teaching certificate expired by his inadvertence in failing to renew it. Hartford sought to file a grievance, alleging that he had been terminated without just cause in violation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) entered into between Kalispell School District (District) and the Kalispell Education Association (KEA). The district superintendent, and later the board of trustees, denied Hartford's request, claiming the matter did not constitute a valid grievance under the CBA on grounds that Hartford was not a member of the bargaining unit at any point during his employment in the fall of 2008 and that he was not a "teacher" as defined under Montana law during his employment in the fall of 2008. Hartford and the KEA filed a petition in the district court to compel arbitration as provided in the CBA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hartford and the KEA and ordered the matter submitted to arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the questions raised by the matter were properly submitted to arbitration.