Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The union contracts state that a cost-of-living allowance will be applied to offset health insurance costs for hourly-rated employees and not be applied to hourly wage rates. The contracts state that the COLA will be equal to 1¢ per hour for each full 0.3 of a point change in the Consumer Price Index calculation. An employer was calculating the COLA on a weekly basis and maintained that the adjustment was only $0.08 per week; the union argued that the adjustment should be calculated at $3.20 per week ($0.08 x 40 hours per week). In November 2008, an arbitrator rejected management's argument that the contracts included a scrivener's error and that the COLA should be calculated on a weekly, rather than hourly basis.The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the unions. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, preempts employers' state law fraud counterclaims. An attempt to assert a federal common law "fraudulent procurement" defense was barred by the three-month limitations period for challenging the arbitrator's award.

Defendant appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, compelling arbitration of a dispute related to healthcare benefits under an expired collective bargaining agreement. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and issuing an order compelling the arbitration. The court reversed and held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment and compelling arbitration where both parties vigorously disputed issues of both law and fact, including whether the 1994 agreement was ambiguous and whether the summary plan descriptions constituted an intrinsic or extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. The parties also point to various other extrinsic evidence and vehemently disagree as to whether the bargained for fully-paid health insurance premiums for life or just for the term of the agreement. Under these circumstances, the court held that the question of whether the right to fully-paid premiums vested under the 1994 agreement was best decided in the first instance by the district court and therefore, remanded for further proceedings.

In June 2009, defendant filed an arbitration demand against plaintiff alleging claims for wrongful termination and breach of contract based on plaintiff's failure to pay a performance bonus. Defendant subsequently filed a new demand for arbitration in October 2010, which included his original claims plus claims of fraud and breach of contract, after the arbitrator denied his motion to amend the original arbitration demand when he discovered evidence suggesting that plaintiff had padded estimated revenues for defendant's companies by $17 million. Plaintiff argued on appeal that the district court erred by not granting its motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order; that defendant's withdrawal from the first arbitration waived his right to a second arbitration; and that the first arbitration's October Order, denying defendant leave to amend, was an enforceable arbitration award. The court held that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 16(b)(4), precluded the court's review of the district court's order refusing to enjoin the arbitration. The court also held that a final decision with respect to an arbitration required an official dismissal of all claims and thus, where the district court stayed proceedings in lieu of dismissal, the decision was not final. The court further concluded that an arbitration award was a final adjudication of a claim on the merits and a procedural ruling that denied leave to amend was not an award since the decision had no effect on the merits of the proposed claims. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition for relief under G.L.c. 211, 3, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, 148 and 150, when plaintiff filed an action in superior court against his former employers and their officers. At issue was whether the justice erred by denying plaintiff's second petition of relief from an order granting defendants' motion to compel arbitration as to some of plaintiff's claims and staying his remaining claims pending arbitration. The court held that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion by denying relief where plaintiff offered several arguments that the justice's order was wrong on the merits and each of his arguments could be addressed in an appeal from a final judgment and where plaintiff had an alternative interlocutory remedy, namely, a petition for relief under G.L.c. 231, 118.

The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainment ("BLET") filed a claim with the Union Pacific Railroad Company ("UP") seeking reinstatement and backpay for a member of the BLET when UP terminated him while he was working under a governing collective-bargaining agreement between the UP and the United Transportation Union ("UTU"). At issue was whether the National Railroad Adjustment Board ("NRAB") properly dismissed the claim. The court affirmed the dismissal and held that the NRAB did not ignore the Article C-17 contract provision in the agreement while interpreting the contract; that the NRAB's interpretation of Article C-17 did not violate 45 U.S.C. 153 First (j); the NRAB acted well within its power by invoking a "claim-processsing" rule; the NRAB was well within its authority in construing the agreement as enunciating the "usual manner" in this workplace; once the NRAB determined that the agreement was controlling, the other agreements and bargaining history became largely irrelevant; and the district court did not abuse its discretion where discovery would not have justified setting aside the NRAB's interpretation of the agreement, nor would it have uncovered a due process violation by the NRAB.

Plaintiff, a labor organization that represented a bargaining unit of defendant's employees, filed a formal grievance with defendant, challenging defendant's discontinuation of dues "checkoff," or deduction of dues from employees' paychecks, and seeking collection and remittance of all back dues with interest. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that the parties' dispute over checkoff of union dues was subject to arbitration pursuant to their expired collective-bargaining agreement. The court held that plaintiff's contractual right to checkoff of union dues survived expiration of the agreement and therefore, subjected the parties' disputes to arbitration.

Respondent filed a sex discrimination suit against petitioner alleging violations of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab. Code 21.001-.556, where petitioner terminated its employment of respondent citing as the basis for its decision a reduction in force due to worsening business conditions. The parties sought arbitration and petitioner appealed the arbitrator's reward. At issue was whether the Texas General Arbitration Act ("TAA"), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 171.001-.098, precluded an agreement for judicial review of an arbitration award for reversible error, and if not, whether the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. 1-16, preempted enforcement of such an agreement. The court held that the TAA presented no impediment to an agreement that limited the authority of an arbitrator in deciding a matter and thus allowed for judicial review of an arbitration award for reversible error. The court also held that the FAA did not preempt enforcement of an agreement to expanded judicial review of an arbitration award enforceable under the TAA. The court further held that, on remand, the court of appeals must determine whether the record was sufficient to review petitioner's complaints. Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals must be reversed and the case remanded to that court for consideration of the merits of petitioner's challenges to the arbitration award.

Appellant and appellee entered into two collective bargaining agreements ("2002 Agreement" and "2006 Agreement") covering retiree healthcare benefits that contained dispute resolution procedures. Appellant brought a suit to compel appellee to arbitration pursuant to the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, and 28 U.S.C. 1337, when appellee unilaterally modified certain retirees' healthcare coverage in October 2008. Before the district court ruled on the motion, appellee again unilaterally modified the health care coverage wherein appellant filed another grievance under the 2002 and 2006 Agreements and amended its first complaint to include the grievance. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that the district court properly dismissed the amended complaint where the district court concluded that the matters were not arbitrable because they occurred after the agreements terminated and were thus not within the scope of arbitrability as defined by Article XI, Section 4.

The employee claimed sex and disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the employer's motion to compel arbitration. The First Circuit affirmed. The company established the existence of a valid agreement. The court rejected an argument that the Spanish translation differed from the English version and held that the mutual obligation to arbitrate is supported by consideration. Claims under Title VII and the ADA are subject to arbitration; a contract reference to remedies available under the employer's rules is ambiguous and could be interpreted as allowing all of the remedies provided by the statutes. The employee, having signed a receipt, had adequate notice of the obligation to arbitrate.

Trans State Airlines, LLC ("TSA") appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Air Line Pilots Association International ("ALPA") enforcing an arbitrator's award of backpay to a pilot after TSA fired him. At issue was whether the award violated public policy against large loans to union officials embodied in the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), 29 U.S.C. 401-531. After concluding that TSA had standing to pursue an appeal and that the arbitrator's unreviewed decision in a prior arbitration did not preclude TSA's public policy challenge, the court held that the lack of control, combined with the purpose and structure of the section 60 payments in ALPA's Administrative Manual, weighed against finding the payments were an illegal loan.