Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from petitioners' suit against defendants, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 206 et seq., forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1589, unjust enrichment, and violations of California and New York labor laws. At issue was whether the district court erred by refusing to resolve petitioners' claim of exemption from arbitration under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1, and Section 12-1517 of the Arizona Aribration Act (AAA), 12-517 A.R.S., before compelling arbitration pursuant to those acts. The court agreed that petitioners made a strong argument that the district court erred but, nonetheless, held that this case did not warrant the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. Therefore, the court denied the petition for mandamus.View "Van Dusen, et al. v. US District Court for the District of AZ, Phoenix" on Justia Law

The National Treasury Employees' Union (Union) sought review of an adverse ruling by the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority) where the Union filed a grievance alleging that the IRS was processing its members' dues revocation forms without following contractually-mandated procedures. After the parties filed exceptions to the arbitrator's award with the Authority, the Authority denied the parties' exceptions and confirmed the award in its entirety. The Union petitioned the court for review. The court held that because the Authority's decision upholding the arbitrator's award was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the court had no warrant to disturb the Authority's decision. View "Natural Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of retail sales employees of defendant, appealed from an order of the district court vacating an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded her authority in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. At issue was whether a district court had the authority to vacate an arbitration award where it believed that the arbitrator improperly interpreted the terms of an arbitration agreement. The court held that, because the district court did not undertake the appropriate inquiry - whether, based on the parties' submission for the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator had the authority to reach an issue, not whether the arbitrator decided the issue correctly - and instead substituted its own legal analysis for that of the arbitrator's, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. The court also held that, because the court found that the arbitrator acted within her authority to reach an issue properly submitted to her by the parties and reached her decision by analyzing the terms of the agreement in light of applicable law, the award should not have been vacated. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to confirm the award.

Appellant Cheryl Waiters was employed by the city of Cleveland. When the city discharged Waiters from employment, the union of which Waiters was a member filed a grievance and later demanded arbitration. The arbitrator found the city had discharged Waiters without just cause and ordered that she be reinstated to employment. Waiters then filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel her reinstatement to her former position with back pay and an award of attorney fees. The city subsequently reinstated Waiters to her former job. The court of appeals denied Waiters's writ, concluding that her claim for reinstatement was moot and that she failed to establish her entitlement to back pay or attorney fees. Waiters appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that (1) Waiters's reinstatement claim was rendered moot when she was reinstated; (2) as a bargaining-unit employee who was represented by the union in the grievance and arbitration process, Waiters was relegated to the arbitration proceeding in which the dispute concerning the amount of back pay she would be entitled to was being decided; and (3) Waiters was not entitled to attorney fees.

In the fall of 2008 William Hartford, a high school science teacher, was fired after his Montana teaching certificate expired by his inadvertence in failing to renew it. Hartford sought to file a grievance, alleging that he had been terminated without just cause in violation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) entered into between Kalispell School District (District) and the Kalispell Education Association (KEA). The district superintendent, and later the board of trustees, denied Hartford's request, claiming the matter did not constitute a valid grievance under the CBA on grounds that Hartford was not a member of the bargaining unit at any point during his employment in the fall of 2008 and that he was not a "teacher" as defined under Montana law during his employment in the fall of 2008. Hartford and the KEA filed a petition in the district court to compel arbitration as provided in the CBA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hartford and the KEA and ordered the matter submitted to arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the questions raised by the matter were properly submitted to arbitration.

The union contracts state that a cost-of-living allowance will be applied to offset health insurance costs for hourly-rated employees and not be applied to hourly wage rates. The contracts state that the COLA will be equal to 1¢ per hour for each full 0.3 of a point change in the Consumer Price Index calculation. An employer was calculating the COLA on a weekly basis and maintained that the adjustment was only $0.08 per week; the union argued that the adjustment should be calculated at $3.20 per week ($0.08 x 40 hours per week). In November 2008, an arbitrator rejected management's argument that the contracts included a scrivener's error and that the COLA should be calculated on a weekly, rather than hourly basis.The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the unions. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, preempts employers' state law fraud counterclaims. An attempt to assert a federal common law "fraudulent procurement" defense was barred by the three-month limitations period for challenging the arbitrator's award.

Defendant appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, compelling arbitration of a dispute related to healthcare benefits under an expired collective bargaining agreement. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and issuing an order compelling the arbitration. The court reversed and held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment and compelling arbitration where both parties vigorously disputed issues of both law and fact, including whether the 1994 agreement was ambiguous and whether the summary plan descriptions constituted an intrinsic or extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. The parties also point to various other extrinsic evidence and vehemently disagree as to whether the bargained for fully-paid health insurance premiums for life or just for the term of the agreement. Under these circumstances, the court held that the question of whether the right to fully-paid premiums vested under the 1994 agreement was best decided in the first instance by the district court and therefore, remanded for further proceedings.

In June 2009, defendant filed an arbitration demand against plaintiff alleging claims for wrongful termination and breach of contract based on plaintiff's failure to pay a performance bonus. Defendant subsequently filed a new demand for arbitration in October 2010, which included his original claims plus claims of fraud and breach of contract, after the arbitrator denied his motion to amend the original arbitration demand when he discovered evidence suggesting that plaintiff had padded estimated revenues for defendant's companies by $17 million. Plaintiff argued on appeal that the district court erred by not granting its motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order; that defendant's withdrawal from the first arbitration waived his right to a second arbitration; and that the first arbitration's October Order, denying defendant leave to amend, was an enforceable arbitration award. The court held that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 16(b)(4), precluded the court's review of the district court's order refusing to enjoin the arbitration. The court also held that a final decision with respect to an arbitration required an official dismissal of all claims and thus, where the district court stayed proceedings in lieu of dismissal, the decision was not final. The court further concluded that an arbitration award was a final adjudication of a claim on the merits and a procedural ruling that denied leave to amend was not an award since the decision had no effect on the merits of the proposed claims. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of a single justice of this court denying his petition for relief under G.L.c. 211, 3, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Wage Act, G.L.c. 149, 148 and 150, when plaintiff filed an action in superior court against his former employers and their officers. At issue was whether the justice erred by denying plaintiff's second petition of relief from an order granting defendants' motion to compel arbitration as to some of plaintiff's claims and staying his remaining claims pending arbitration. The court held that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion by denying relief where plaintiff offered several arguments that the justice's order was wrong on the merits and each of his arguments could be addressed in an appeal from a final judgment and where plaintiff had an alternative interlocutory remedy, namely, a petition for relief under G.L.c. 231, 118.

The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainment ("BLET") filed a claim with the Union Pacific Railroad Company ("UP") seeking reinstatement and backpay for a member of the BLET when UP terminated him while he was working under a governing collective-bargaining agreement between the UP and the United Transportation Union ("UTU"). At issue was whether the National Railroad Adjustment Board ("NRAB") properly dismissed the claim. The court affirmed the dismissal and held that the NRAB did not ignore the Article C-17 contract provision in the agreement while interpreting the contract; that the NRAB's interpretation of Article C-17 did not violate 45 U.S.C. 153 First (j); the NRAB acted well within its power by invoking a "claim-processsing" rule; the NRAB was well within its authority in construing the agreement as enunciating the "usual manner" in this workplace; once the NRAB determined that the agreement was controlling, the other agreements and bargaining history became largely irrelevant; and the district court did not abuse its discretion where discovery would not have justified setting aside the NRAB's interpretation of the agreement, nor would it have uncovered a due process violation by the NRAB.