Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Norma Slater-Moore hired the Goeldner Law Firm and its attorneys to represent her in what ultimately was an unsuccessful lawsuit and its appeal. Slater-Moore and Goeldner entered into two separate contracts during the course of that litigation, both containing nearly identical provisions stating that any attorney-fee disputes would be submitted to arbitration. Slater-Moore later sued Goeldner for legal malpractice and breach of contract, disputing, among other allegations, the amount she was billed for attorney fees. Goeldner successfully moved the Circuit Court to compel arbitration of the attorney-fee dispute, and Slater-Moore appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. Because the Supreme Court found ]no grounds for revocation of a valid agreement to arbitrate the fee dispute, the Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Slater-Moore v. Goeldner" on Justia Law

Freeman worked at PPG until his firing in 2008; PGW subsequently assumed PPG’s liabilities. PPG maintains a 40 percent interest in PGW. After losing his job, Freeman, age 60, sued PGW under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The parties entered a binding arbitration agreement, listing three potential arbitrators. Lally-Green, a law school teacher, formerly a state judge, appeared at the top of both lists. Lally-Green acknowledged that she “knew some people at PPG” and had taught a seminar with a PPG attorney. The parties proceeded with Lally-Green as their arbitrator. The proceeding was fair and thorough. Lally-Green concluded that Freeman lost his job because he “had limited recent sales experience ... [and] received average performance ratings in a poorly performing region.” Three months later, Freeman moved to vacate the decision, claiming that Lally-Green had failed to disclose campaign contributions that she had received from PPG and its employees during her campaign for a seat on the state’s highest court. These contributions totaled $4,500. Lally-Green had raised $1.7 million during her unsuccessful campaign. The district court denied the motion. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting that the law firm representing Freeman had contributed $26,000 to Lally-Green’s campaign. View "Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a binding arbitration clause in an attorney-client retainer agreement and whether that clause was enforceable where the client filed suit for legal malpractice. This case presented two important countervailing public policies: Louisiana and federal law explicitly favor the enforcement of arbitration clauses in written contracts; by the same token, Louisiana law also imposes a fiduciary duty "of the highest order" requiring attorneys to act with "the utmost fidelity and forthrightness" in their dealings with clients, and any contractual clause which may limit the client's rights against the attorney is subject to close scrutiny. After its careful study, the Supreme Court held there is no per se rule against arbitration clauses in attorney-client retainer agreements, provided the clause is fair and reasonable to the client. However, the attorneys' fiduciary obligation to the client encompasses ethical duties of loyalty and candor, which in turn require attorneys to fully disclose the scope and the terms of the arbitration clause. An attorney must clearly explain the precise types of disputes the arbitration clause is meant to cover and must set forth, in plain language, those legal rights the parties will give up by agreeing to arbitration. In this case, the Defendants did not make the necessary disclosures, thus, the arbitration clause was unenforceable. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower courts was affirmed. View "Hodges v. Reasonover" on Justia Law

Arnold & Itkin, a Texas-based law firm, appealed from a judgment of the district court sanctioning it for its conduct in opposing the arbitration of a dispute between its clients. Arnold & Itkin challenged the determination that the conduct was sanctioned and the amount and form of the sanctions imposed. The court largely affirmed the judgment of the district court, except that the court remanded in part to permit the district court to consider whether it should impose certain limits on its requirements that Arnold & Itkin's attorneys attached the sanction order to all future applications for admission pro hac vice in the Southern District of New York. View "Prospect Capital Corp. v. Enmon" on Justia Law

The Town of Little Compton filed a complaint against the town firefighters union, contending that the union, or its representative, had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when the union allowed its nonlawyer business agent to represent it at a labor arbitration hearing. The Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee concluded that the union representative's action constituted a technical violation of the statute governing the unauthorized practice of law. Mindful that this type of lay representation of unions in labor arbitrations is a common practice, the Committee petitioned the Supreme Court on how to proceed. The Supreme Court held that, although the conduct involved in this case may have been the practice of law pursuant to the statute, because of the long-standing involvement of nonlawyer union employees at public grievance arbitrations, the Court would not limit this involvement at this time. View "In re Town of Little Compton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former in-house counsel for Toyota Motor Corp. (TMS), presented TMS with a claim asserting, inter alia, constructive wrongful discharge related to TMS's alleged unethical discovery practices. TMS and plaintiff settled the claims and entered into a Severance Agreement. TMS subsequently sued in state superior court seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and permanent injunctive relieve to prevent plaintiff from violating the attorney-client privilege and plaintiff filed a cross complaint for a TRO and a permanent injunction prohibiting TMS from interfering with his business practices and those of his consulting business. The court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., governed the Severance Agreement; the FAA authorized limited review of the Final Award; and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law governing the Severance Agreement where the arbitrator's writing was sufficient under the terms of the Severance Agreement and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard California law in addressing plaintiff's affirmative defenses. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's contempt motion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Biller v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from appellee's legal representation of appellant in a criminal tax fraud case. Appellee subsequently filed a lawsuit against appellant for recovery of unpaid attorneys' fees and appellant counterclaimed for malpractice and later petitioned for arbitration before the District of Columbia Attorney/Client Arbitration Board (ACAB), an arm of the District of Columbia Bar. Appellant also moved the district court for a stay pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 3, the denial of which he appealed. At issue was whether appellant was "in default" of his right to arbitrate. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the stay where appellant failed to make a timely assertion of his right to arbitrate and his litigation activity, after he filed his initial answer and counterclaim, imposed substantial costs upon appellee and the district court. View "Zuckerman Spaeder LLP v. Auffenberg, Jr." on Justia Law