Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The decedent, suffering from Parkinson’s disease, dysphagia, and dementia, was admitted to Elmcrest Care Center in February 2013. On August 4, 2017, he was found nonresponsive on the floor by Elmcrest staff, who administered CPR and called 911. He was transported to a hospital and passed away four days later. The Estate of Jose de Jesus Ortiz, represented by Ericka Ortiz, filed a civil action against Elmcrest and its staff, alleging elder abuse, neglect, negligence, willful misconduct, and fraud. The trial court compelled arbitration based on an agreement signed upon the decedent’s admission to Elmcrest.The arbitrator issued a First Interim Award on March 30, 2022, finding that the Estate did not meet its burden of proof on any of its claims. The award was labeled "interim" and allowed for further submissions by the parties to address any omitted issues. The Estate filed a request to amend the First Interim Award, arguing that damages for pre-death loss of dignity were not considered. The arbitrator issued a Second Interim Award on May 26, 2022, awarding $100,000 in damages for pre-death pain and suffering, and invited the Estate to file for attorney fees and costs.The trial court initially denied the Estate’s petition to vacate the First Interim Award, ruling it was not final. However, it later vacated the Final Award and confirmed the First Interim Award, reasoning that the First Interim Award had resolved all necessary issues. The Estate appealed.The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the First Interim Award was not final as it expressly reserved jurisdiction for further proceedings. The court concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority in issuing the Final Award, which included the omitted decision on pre-death loss of dignity. The trial court was directed to enter a new order confirming the Final Award. View "Ortiz v. Elmcrest Care Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lisa Lombardo, Daniel Bates, and James Bates sued Gramercy Court as heirs of Elizabeth Stein, alleging wrongful death, negligence, elder abuse, and gross negligence due to the care Stein received at Gramercy Court's nursing facility. Stein developed bedsores and died shortly after being transferred back to the hospital. Gramercy Court petitioned to compel arbitration based on an agreement Lombardo signed on Stein's behalf, but the trial court denied the petition.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found that Stein's durable power of attorney did not grant Lombardo the authority to sign arbitration agreements on Stein's behalf. The court also determined that Stein did not give Lombardo ostensible authority through her actions. Additionally, the court ruled that the arbitration agreement was not enforceable against Lombardo's or the other plaintiffs' individual claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that Lombardo did not have actual or ostensible authority to bind Stein to the arbitration agreement. The durable power of attorney did not explicitly grant Lombardo the authority to enter into arbitration agreements, and there was no evidence that Stein's conduct led Gramercy Court to believe Lombardo had such authority. The court also concluded that the arbitration agreement did not apply to the plaintiffs' individual claims, as Lombardo was not a party to the agreement in her individual capacity. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order denying Gramercy Court's petition to compel arbitration. View "Lombardo v. Gramercy Court" on Justia Law

In January 2019, Raymond Robinson and his son sued Emerald Homes, L.L.C., and 21st Mortgage Corporation in the Baldwin Circuit Court. Robinson had contracted with Emerald to purchase a mobile home, financed by a loan from 21st Mortgage. After tearing down his existing house in preparation for the new mobile home, the loan was not completed, allegedly due to Emerald and/or 21st Mortgage's refusal to finalize the transaction. The complaint included claims of breach of contract, misrepresentation, suppression, and negligence, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.The trial court compelled arbitration for claims against Emerald and granted summary judgment in favor of 21st Mortgage on Raymond's claims. The case proceeded to a jury trial on Robinson's claims against 21st Mortgage. The jury found in favor of Robinson on promissory fraud and the tort of outrage, awarding him $2,980,000 in total damages. 21st Mortgage's post-trial motions, including for judgment as a matter of law (JML), were denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It held that Robinson did not present substantial evidence of promissory fraud, as he failed to prove that 21st Mortgage had no intention to perform the loan promise at the time it was made or intended to deceive him. The court also found that Robinson did not meet all the conditions required for the loan, and the failure to close the loan was not due to any fraudulent intent by 21st Mortgage.Regarding the tort of outrage, the court held that the conduct of 21st Mortgage did not meet the extreme and outrageous standard required for such a claim. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "21st Mortgage Corporation v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In July 2020, the plaintiff used Uber's app to request a ride. Upon being dropped off in the middle of a roadway, she was struck by another vehicle and sustained injuries. She filed a personal injury lawsuit against Uber in November 2020, serving the complaint via the New York Secretary of State. Uber did not respond within the required 30 days, allegedly due to mail processing delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.In January 2021, Uber updated its terms of use, including an arbitration agreement, and notified users via email. The plaintiff received and opened this email. When she next logged into the Uber app, she was presented with a pop-up screen requiring her to agree to the updated terms to continue using the service. She checked a box and clicked "Confirm," thereby agreeing to the terms, which included a clause delegating the authority to resolve disputes about the agreement's applicability and enforceability to an arbitrator.The plaintiff moved for a default judgment in March 2021, and Uber responded by asserting that she had agreed to arbitrate her claims. Uber then sent a Notice of Intent to Arbitrate. The plaintiff moved to stay Uber's arbitration demand, arguing that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and violated ethical rules. Uber cross-moved to compel arbitration.The Supreme Court granted Uber's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the plaintiff was on inquiry notice of the arbitration agreement and had assented to it. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that the plaintiff's challenges to the agreement's validity must be decided by an arbitrator due to the delegation provision.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision, holding that the clickwrap process used by Uber resulted in a valid agreement to arbitrate. The court also held that the delegation provision was valid and that the plaintiff's challenges to the arbitration agreement's enforceability should be resolved by an arbitrator. The court found no abuse of discretion in the lower court's decision not to sanction Uber for the alleged ethical violation. View "Wu v. Uber Tech., Inc." on Justia Law

In February 2013, the decedent was admitted to Elmcrest Care Center, suffering from Parkinson’s disease, dysphagia, and dementia. On August 4, 2017, he was found nonresponsive and later died in the hospital. The Estate of Jose de Jesus Ortiz, represented by Ericka Ortiz, filed a civil action against Elmcrest and its staff for elder abuse, neglect, negligence, willful misconduct, and fraud, alleging that their failure to provide necessary care led to his death. The trial court compelled arbitration based on an agreement signed upon the decedent’s admission.The arbitrator issued a First Interim Award on March 30, 2022, finding that the Estate did not meet its burden of proof on any claims. The award allowed for further submissions to address any omitted issues. The Estate requested an amendment, arguing the arbitrator had omitted damages for pre-death loss of dignity. The arbitrator issued a Second Interim Award on May 26, 2022, awarding $100,000 in damages for pre-death pain and suffering. Respondents moved to vacate this award, arguing the First Interim Award was final. The arbitrator denied the motion, stating the First Interim Award was not final and had omitted a necessary issue.The trial court initially denied the Estate’s petition to vacate the First Interim Award, ruling it was not final. However, it later vacated the Final Award and confirmed the First Interim Award, finding the First Interim Award had resolved all necessary issues. The Estate appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s order, holding that the First Interim Award was not final as it expressly reserved jurisdiction for further proceedings. The court directed the trial court to confirm the Final Award issued on September 30, 2022, which included the damages for pre-death pain and suffering. View "Ortiz v. Elmcrest Care Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Trudy Maxwell, a 93-year-old resident of Atria Park of San Mateo, died after ingesting an industrial strength cleaner mistakenly served to her by an Atria employee. Trudy’s eight surviving children, including James Maxwell III (James III), filed a lawsuit against Atria Management Company and related entities, alleging negligence, wrongful death, and elder abuse. The trial court denied Atria’s motion to compel arbitration, concluding that James III, who signed the arbitration agreement, was not authorized to do so under his durable power of attorney (DPOA) because he was not authorized to make health care decisions for Trudy. Instead, Trudy’s daughter, Marybeth, held the power of attorney for health care.The Atria defendants appealed, arguing that James III had the authority to sign the arbitration agreement and that all of Trudy’s heirs were bound to arbitrate their wrongful death claims. They also contended that California’s Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c), which allows an exception to arbitration when third-party claims may be affected, was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reversed the trial court’s order denying arbitration and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court instructed the trial court to reconsider the validity of the arbitration agreement in light of the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Harrod v. Country Oaks Partners, LLC, which held that agreeing to an optional arbitration agreement is not a health care decision. The appellate court also directed the trial court to determine whether the DPOA was valid and whether James III had the authority to agree to arbitration despite Marybeth holding the health care POA. Additionally, the court noted that the wrongful death claims of Trudy’s children were not subject to arbitration as they were not parties to the arbitration agreement. View "Maxwell v. Atria Management Co., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2020, several residents at a skilled nursing facility died from coronavirus infections. Family members of the deceased sued the facility and its alleged alter egos, asserting claims including elder abuse, negligence, and wrongful death. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on agreements signed by family members rather than the decedents. The trial court denied the motion, finding no evidence that the family members had authority to sign on behalf of the decedents, and that the agreements did not bind the family members in their individual capacities. For one agreement where a family member had power of attorney, the court exercised its discretion to deny arbitration to avoid conflicting results.The Shasta County Superior Court denied the motion to compel arbitration. It found that the defendants did not provide evidence that the family members had authority to sign the arbitration agreements on behalf of the decedents. Additionally, the court ruled that the agreements did not bind the family members in their individual capacities. For the agreement involving a power of attorney, the court denied arbitration to prevent conflicting rulings between court and arbitration proceedings.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the defendants failed to establish that the family members were authorized agents of the decedents. The court also found that the family members did not sign the agreements in their individual capacities, and thus were not bound by them. Furthermore, the court upheld the trial court's discretion to deny arbitration for the claim involving a power of attorney to avoid conflicting rulings. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed. View "Hearden v. Windsor Redding Care Center" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between William Good and Uber Technologies, Inc., and Rasier, LLC (collectively, Uber), and one of its drivers, Jonas Yohou. Good, a chef, used Uber's mobile application to secure a ride. On April 25, 2021, when Good opened Uber's app, he was presented with a screen notifying him of Uber's updated terms of use. The screen required Good to check a box indicating that he had reviewed and agreed to the terms before he could continue using the app. Five days later, Good used Uber's app to order a ride home from work. During the ride, Yohou's car collided with another vehicle, causing Good to suffer severe injuries.Good filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and Yohou in the Superior Court Department. The defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the terms of use that Good had agreed to. The motion judge denied the motion, finding that a contract had not been formed because Good neither had reasonable notice of Uber's terms of use nor had manifested assent to the terms.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the lower court's decision. The court found that Uber's "clickwrap" contract formation process provided Good with reasonable notice of Uber's terms of use, including the agreement to arbitrate disputes. The court also found that Good's selection of the checkbox and his activation of the "Confirm" button reasonably manifested his assent to the terms. The court remanded the case for entry of an order to submit the claims to arbitration. View "Good v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Five diabetic patients, Henry J. Hebert, Traci Moore, Aliya Campbell Pierre, Tiffanie Tsakiris, and Brenda Bottiglier, were prescribed the Dexcom G6 Continuous Glucose Monitoring System (Dexcom G6) to manage their diabetes. The device allegedly malfunctioned, failing to alert them of dangerous glucose levels, resulting in serious injuries and, in Hebert's case, death. The patients and Hebert's daughters filed separate product liability actions against Dexcom, Inc., the manufacturer. Dexcom moved to compel arbitration, arguing that each patient had agreed to arbitrate disputes when they installed the G6 App on their devices and clicked "I agree to Terms of Use."The trial court granted Dexcom's motions to compel arbitration in all five cases. The plaintiffs petitioned the appellate court for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its orders compelling them to arbitrate. The appellate court consolidated the cases and issued an order directing Dexcom to show cause why the relief sought should not be granted.The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred. Although a clickwrap agreement, where an internet user accepts a website’s terms of use by clicking an “I agree” or “I accept” button, is generally enforceable, Dexcom’s G6 App clickwrap agreement was not. The court found that Dexcom undid whatever notice it might have provided of the contractual terms by explicitly telling the user that clicking the box constituted authorization for Dexcom to collect and store the user’s sensitive, personal health information. For this reason, Dexcom could not meet its burden of demonstrating that the same click constituted unambiguous acceptance of the Terms of Use, including the arbitration provision. Consequently, arbitration agreements were not formed with any of the plaintiffs. The court granted the petitions and directed the trial court to vacate its orders granting Dexcom’s motions to compel arbitration and to enter new orders denying the motions. View "Herzog v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In a wrongful death action against an assisted-living facility, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the claims were subject to arbitration as per an agreement signed by the deceased's attorney-in-fact. The court clarified two key points. First, signing an optional arbitration agreement is not a "health care decision" under the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act. Second, the attorney-in-fact had the authority to sign the arbitration agreement on the deceased's behalf, considering the durable power of attorney gave her the power to act for him in "all claims and litigation matters". The court further ruled that the deceased's son, who brought the wrongful death action, was bound by the arbitration agreement because his claims were derivative of his father's. Consequently, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court.In the case, Granville Williams, Jr. died while residing at an assisted-living facility run by Smyrna Residential, LLC. His son James Williams filed a wrongful death action against the facility. The decedent's daughter, acting as his attorney-in-fact under a power of attorney, had signed an arbitration agreement with the facility at the time of his admission. The arbitration agreement was not a condition of admission to the facility. The key issues were whether the attorney-in-fact had the authority to sign the arbitration agreement and whether the son, who was not a party to the agreement, was nevertheless bound by it. View "Williams v. Smyrna Residential, LLC" on Justia Law