Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Mitchell Glenn Revette sought medical care from Dr. Andrew Mallette at The Surgical Clinic Associates, P.A. for abdominal pain and underwent surgery for diverticulitis in June 2021. He later returned for a follow-up surgery in January 2022, after which he died due to complications related to respiratory depression. His wife, Nitkia Revette, brought a wrongful death and medical negligence lawsuit on behalf of his estate, alleging that negligent anesthesia and pain management led to his death.The defendants, Dr. Mallette and the Clinic, moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement included in an intake packet mailed to Mitchell. The agreement was signed "Mitchell Revette," but during a hearing in the Hinds County Circuit Court, Nitkia testified that she signed her husband’s name without his knowledge or presence, and she stated she had no authority to sign for him. The Clinic’s staff testified that patients were required to sign such agreements personally. The circuit court found that Mitchell did not sign the arbitration agreement and that Nitkia lacked authority to bind him, thus ruling the agreement unenforceable and denying the motion to compel arbitration.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the circuit court’s findings, applying a deferential standard to factual determinations and de novo review to the denial of arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that Nitkia lacked both actual and apparent authority to sign for Mitchell and that there was no basis for binding the estate via direct-benefits estoppel. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Mallette v. Revette" on Justia Law

Linda Elam, after suffering significant medical issues including a stroke and complications from cancer treatment, was admitted to a nursing home operated by BLC Lexington SNF, LLC for rehabilitation. Her sister, Bonnie Townsend, acting under a power of attorney, handled the admission process and signed both the admission and an optional arbitration agreement as Elam’s representative. Following further health decline, Elam died, and her estate alleged that her death resulted from negligent care at the facility.After the estate filed suit in Kentucky state court against BLC Lexington and a former administrator, BLC Lexington responded in federal court, seeking to compel arbitration based on the agreement Townsend signed. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky compelled arbitration for nearly all claims except wrongful death claims by nonsignatories. An arbitrator, after a week-long hearing, ruled in favor of BLC Lexington on all claims, finding Townsend had not met her burden of proof. The district court then confirmed the arbitration award, denying Townsend’s motions for reconsideration and to vacate the award.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Townsend argued that compelling arbitration was improper because she did not sign as attorney-in-fact, that the arbitration agreement was indefinite, and that post-arbitration relief was warranted due to alleged arbitrator misconduct and the application of an incorrect legal standard. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions, holding that the arbitration agreement was enforceable under Kentucky law, Townsend had acted as Elam’s representative, and no intervening change in law or arbitrator misconduct justified vacating the award. The court also found the arbitrator applied the correct evidentiary standard. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "BLC Lexington SNF, LLC v. Bonnie Town" on Justia Law

A woman with dementia was admitted to a memory care facility, where her family warned staff about her tendency to wander and need for supervision. Three days after admission, she was found unattended in a courtyard on a 102-degree day, suffering from severe burns and heatstroke, ultimately dying days later. Her family, acting as successors in interest and individually, sued the facility for elder neglect, negligence, fraud, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Upon admission, her niece had signed an arbitration agreement on her behalf, which the family argued should not bind their individual claims or override their right to a jury trial.The Superior Court of Sacramento County considered the facility’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings. The court found a valid arbitration agreement existed for the decedent’s survivor claims but ruled that the agreement did not bind the family members' individual claims, as they were not parties to the agreement. The court also declined to compel arbitration of the survivor claims under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c), citing the risk of conflicting rulings if the family’s claims proceeded in court while survivor claims were arbitrated. The court further held that the agreement’s reference to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not expressly incorporate the FAA’s procedural provisions to preempt California law.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. It held that the arbitration agreement did not clearly and unmistakably delegate threshold issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and that the FAA’s procedural provisions were not expressly adopted by the agreement. Therefore, California law applied, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny arbitration to avoid inconsistent rulings. The judgment was affirmed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs. View "Wright v. WellQuest Elk Grove" on Justia Law

Mark Stanford, an incapacitated resident of a Mississippi nursing facility, suffered severe burns after starting a fire in his room. The Mississippi State Department of Health determined that the nursing center failed to adequately supervise Stanford and maintain a safe environment, citing the facility for violating federal regulations regarding the safety and supervision of residents. Stanford, through his conservator, brought a lawsuit alleging negligence and medical malpractice against the nursing facility and related entities.Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement signed in 2017 by Stanford’s brother, Russell Phillips, who acted as Stanford’s health surrogate during his admission. Stanford opposed arbitration, arguing that the agreement was invalid because Phillips lacked authority under Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act to bind Stanford, since Stanford’s adult son—a higher-priority family member under the statute—was reasonably available and willing to serve as surrogate. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi held that Phillips was not a proper surrogate under the statute and denied the motion to compel arbitration.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied de novo review to both the denial of arbitration and interpretation of state law. The Fifth Circuit determined that the key issue was whether, under Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, a health care provider must ensure that no higher-priority family member is “reasonably available” before accepting decisions from a lower-priority family member acting as surrogate. Noting the statutory ambiguity and lack of controlling Mississippi precedents, the Fifth Circuit did not resolve the merits but instead certified this question of state law to the Mississippi Supreme Court for authoritative interpretation. View "Stanford v. Brandon Nursing" on Justia Law

An 84-year-old man with a history of dementia was admitted to a hospital after several falls and subsequently transferred to a nursing home for rehabilitation. His wife, acting as his “Authorized Representative,” signed an optional arbitration agreement as part of his admission paperwork. During his stay, the man developed a pressure wound that became septic, leading to his removal from the facility and subsequent death. The wife, as personal representative of his estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the nursing home and its administrator, alleging medical negligence and asserting that the man was incompetent and unable to make decisions for himself at the time of admission.The Mobile Circuit Court reviewed the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, which was based on the signed agreement. The wife opposed the motion, arguing she lacked authority to bind her husband to arbitration because he was permanently incapacitated due to dementia. She provided medical records and her own affidavit to support her claim of his incapacity. The defendants countered with evidence suggesting the man had periods of lucidity and was not permanently incapacitated. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration and later denied a postjudgment motion by the defendants that included additional medical records.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. It held that the wife did not meet her burden to prove the man was permanently incapacitated or temporarily incapacitated at the time the arbitration agreement was executed. The Court found that the evidence showed the man had lucid intervals and was at times alert and able to communicate, and that no contemporaneous evidence established incapacity at the time of signing. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case, holding that the arbitration agreement was enforceable. View "Mobile Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Sliman" on Justia Law

A nursing home resident’s legal representative, acting under a durable power of attorney, sued a nursing home for alleged medical negligence during the resident’s stay. Upon admission, the representative signed several documents, including an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising from the resident’s care. The representative later claimed not to recall signing the documents but did not dispute her signature. The nursing home moved to compel arbitration based on the signed agreement, which expressly stated it was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The District Court of McCurtain County, Oklahoma, held a hearing on the motion to compel arbitration. The court found that a valid arbitration agreement existed, signed by both an authorized agent of the nursing home and the legal representative. The court determined that the FAA applied due to the involvement of interstate commerce and that the Oklahoma Nursing Home Care Act’s (NHCA) prohibition of arbitration agreements was preempted by federal law. The court granted the nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration and stayed the judicial proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the FAA preempts the NHCA’s categorical prohibition of arbitration agreements in the nursing home context when interstate commerce is involved and the agreement expressly invokes the FAA. The court found the arbitration agreement was validly executed and not unconscionable, distinguishing this case from prior Oklahoma precedent and aligning with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed the district court’s order compelling arbitration. View "Thompsonl v. Heartway Corp." on Justia Law

Several minors were injured at trampoline parks operated by Sky Zone in Philadelphia. In each instance, only one parent signed a “Participation Agreement, Release and Assumption of the Risk” on behalf of the minor child. The Agreement included a release of liability and an arbitration provision requiring all claims to be resolved by arbitration, waiving the right to a jury trial. After the injuries, lawsuits were filed by both the injured minors’ non-signing parents and the minors themselves, seeking damages for the injuries sustained.The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County reviewed the cases and denied Sky Zone’s petitions to compel arbitration. The trial courts found that the Agreements were enforceable only against the signing parent, not the non-signing parent or the minor child. The courts reasoned that there was no evidence of agency between spouses that would allow one parent to bind the other, and that parents do not have the legal authority to waive a minor’s right to pursue personal injury claims or to bind a minor to an arbitration agreement. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed these rulings, emphasizing that agency cannot be inferred from marriage alone and that parents, as natural guardians, lack authority over a minor’s property interests, including legal claims, without court approval.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the consolidated appeals. It held that the arbitration agreement signed by one parent is not enforceable against the non-signing parent or the minor child. The Court found that a marital relationship alone does not create an agency relationship, and there was no evidence of express, implied, apparent, or estoppel-based agency. Additionally, the Court held that parents, as natural guardians, lack inherent authority to bind their minor children to arbitration agreements that forfeit the right to a judicial forum and the procedural protections afforded to minors in court. The orders of the Superior Court were affirmed. View "Santiago v. Philly Trampoline Park" on Justia Law

Several minors were injured at trampoline parks operated by Sky Zone in Philadelphia. In each instance, only one parent signed a “Participation Agreement, Release and Assumption of the Risk” on behalf of their child, which included an arbitration provision waiving the right to sue in court. After the injuries, both the signing and non-signing parents, along with the injured minors, brought lawsuits seeking damages for the injuries sustained at the facilities.The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County reviewed petitions by Sky Zone to compel arbitration and stay the litigation, relying on the signed agreements. The trial courts denied these petitions, finding that the agreements were enforceable only against the signing parent. The courts determined that a spouse does not have authority to act as the agent of the other simply by virtue of marriage, and Sky Zone had not provided evidence of agency. Additionally, the courts held that parents do not have the legal authority to waive a minor’s right to pursue personal injury claims or to bind a minor to an arbitration agreement that would require waiving the right to a judicial forum.The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial courts’ decisions, holding that neither the non-signing parents nor the minors were bound by the arbitration provisions. The Superior Court reasoned that agency cannot be inferred from family ties alone and that parents, as natural guardians, lack inherent authority to manage a minor’s property, including legal claims, without court approval.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s orders. The Court held that a parent who signs an arbitration agreement cannot bind a non-signing spouse or a minor child to its terms. Specifically, parents lack the authority to bind a minor to an agreement to arbitrate, as this would deprive the minor of judicial protections and oversight designed to safeguard their interests. View "Shultz v. Sky Zone, LLC" on Justia Law

An adolescent female, who was continuously enrolled as a dependent under her mother’s Kaiser health care plans from 2005 to 2023, received gender-affirming medical care between the ages of 13 and 17. After experiencing negative outcomes and later detransitioning, she filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, The Permanente Medical Group, and several individual providers. The claims alleged that the care provided was not medically justified, that risks were not adequately disclosed, and that the providers failed to meet the standard of care in both treatment and informed consent.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County reviewed Kaiser’s petition to compel arbitration, which was based on arbitration provisions in the health plan documents. Kaiser argued that the plaintiff, as a dependent, was bound by arbitration agreements incorporated in the evidence of coverage and benefits booklets for both the union-based and self-funded plans. The trial court found that Kaiser failed to establish the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, noting that the relevant documents referenced in the enrollment forms were not provided, and there was no evidence of the plaintiff or her mother expressly agreeing to the specific arbitration provisions Kaiser sought to enforce. The court denied the petition to compel arbitration and later denied Kaiser’s motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that Kaiser did not meet its burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a valid and binding arbitration agreement covering the controversy. The court emphasized that mere enrollment and general references to arbitration were insufficient; the precise arbitration provision must be clearly incorporated and agreed to. The order denying the petition to compel arbitration was affirmed. View "Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this multi-district products liability suit allege that they purchased defective Chrysler Pacifica minivans from FCA, which were recalled due to a risk of battery explosions. After the recall, plaintiffs filed seven putative class action suits, which were consolidated in the Eastern District of Michigan. During discovery, FCA discovered that some plaintiffs had agreed to arbitration clauses when purchasing their minivans and moved to compel arbitration for those plaintiffs. The district court denied FCA’s motion, finding that FCA had waived its right to arbitrate by moving to dismiss the entire complaint.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied FCA’s motion to compel arbitration, concluding that FCA had waived its right to arbitrate by engaging in litigation conduct inconsistent with that right, specifically by moving to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims. The district court made this finding sua sponte, without the plaintiffs raising the issue of waiver.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that a party cannot waive its right to arbitration without knowledge of that right. The court found that FCA did not know about the arbitration clauses until it obtained the relevant purchase agreements through discovery. Additionally, the appellate court determined that the district court erred by raising the issue of waiver on its own, violating the principle of party presentation. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court’s decision was clearly erroneous and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Berzanskis v. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law