Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Personal Injury
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In a wrongful death action against an assisted-living facility, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the claims were subject to arbitration as per an agreement signed by the deceased's attorney-in-fact. The court clarified two key points. First, signing an optional arbitration agreement is not a "health care decision" under the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act. Second, the attorney-in-fact had the authority to sign the arbitration agreement on the deceased's behalf, considering the durable power of attorney gave her the power to act for him in "all claims and litigation matters". The court further ruled that the deceased's son, who brought the wrongful death action, was bound by the arbitration agreement because his claims were derivative of his father's. Consequently, the court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court.In the case, Granville Williams, Jr. died while residing at an assisted-living facility run by Smyrna Residential, LLC. His son James Williams filed a wrongful death action against the facility. The decedent's daughter, acting as his attorney-in-fact under a power of attorney, had signed an arbitration agreement with the facility at the time of his admission. The arbitration agreement was not a condition of admission to the facility. The key issues were whether the attorney-in-fact had the authority to sign the arbitration agreement and whether the son, who was not a party to the agreement, was nevertheless bound by it. View "Williams v. Smyrna Residential, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court compelling an estate's claims to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement signed during the decedent's admission to El Jen Convalescent Hospital and Retirement Center (El Jen), holding that a nonsignatory heir's wrongful death claim is not bound to an agreement like the arbitration agreement in his case that does not implicate the viability of the underlying personal injury claim.Following the death of her husband, Gary Tyler, Stacy Tyler brought this action against El Jen, asserting negligence, wrongful death, and survivorship claims individually and on behalf of Gary's estate and their minor child, and was joined by two adult statutory heirs. The district court (1) compelled the estate's claims to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration signed during Gary's admission to El Jen; and (2) concluded that the statutory heirs were not bound by the agreement because they did not sign it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly rejected Plaintiffs' challenge to the arbitration agreement's validity; and (2) did not err in holding that the heirs were not bound by the agreement because they were nonsignatories who were pursuing their own individual claims. View "El Jen Medical Hospital, Inc. v. Tyler" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, holding that remand was required for reconsideration in light of this Court's holdings in TotalEnergies E&P USA, Inc. v. MP Gulf of Mexico, LLC, 667 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. 2023).Lone Star Cleburne Autoplex filed this suit asserting that Alliance Auto Auctions of Dallas conspired with two of Lone Star's employees in order to embezzle money from Lone Star. Alliance moved to compel arbitration based on arbitration clauses contained in authorization agreements between Lone Star and a company Alliance used to verify and authorize car dealerships to buy and sell in the company's auctions. In opposing the motion Lone Star asserted that its claims fell outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. The trial court denied Alliance's motion to compel. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the court of appeals decided this case without addressing arguments rejected in TotalEnergies, remand was required. View "Alliance Auto Auction of Dallas, Inc. v. Lone Star Cleburne Autoplex, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court dismissed this interlocutory appeal from a district court order granting a motion to stay arbitration proceedings between the codefendants in the underlying negligence action, holding that the order staying arbitration was not immediately appealable.Walgreens Boot Alliance, Inc. contracted with Ferrandino & Son, Inc. to provide services at various locations through the United States. Ferrandino contracted with Patera Landscaping, LLC to perform snow removal services at three Walgreens locations in Omaha. Yvonne McPherson was injured when she slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk outside an Omaha Walgreens and filed a negligence action against Patera, Ferrandino, and Walgreens. Ferrandino filed a demand for arbitration seeking a determination that under the terms of the subcontract, Patera had a contractual duty to defend and indemnify both Ferrandino and Walgreens against McPherson's claims. Petera moved to stay the arbitration based on Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-2603. The district court granted the motion to stay arbitration, and Ferrandino appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the order staying arbitration was not immediately appealable. View "McPherson v. Walgreens Boot Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court answered two certified questions regarding the interplay between an arbitrated award against one set of tortfeasors and a litigated proceeding against another set of tortfeasors in this case concerning Kansas's one-action rule.Timothy Hunt, a farm employee, was killed when operating a grain vacuum to remove corn from a grain trailer. Plaintiff, Hunt's daughter, filed suit in Kansas federal district court against the manufacturer of the grain vacuum system. In the meantime, Hunt's children, including Plaintiff, entered into an arbitration agreement with the farm. An arbitrator entered an award in favor of the claimants. The circuit court entered final judgment confirming the arbitration award. The defendants in the federal court action subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that the suit was barred by the one-action rule. The federal court then certified questions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) an arbitration action does not qualify as a judicial determination of comparative fault where no other potential tortfeasors were involved in the arbitration; and (2) the confirmation of an arbitration award by a state court judgment does not qualify as a judicial determination of comparative fault so as to invite application of the Kansas one-action rule. View "Hodges v. Walinga USA Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff was a resident at a residential skilled nursing facility when she sustained injuries in a fall. She sued the facility, Capistrano Beach Care Center, LLC dba Capistrano Beach Care Center (CBCC), and its operator, Cambridge Healthcare Services, LLC (collectively, Defendants). Defendants petitioned to compel arbitration, claiming Plaintiff was bound by arbitration agreements purportedly signed on her behalf by her adult children. The trial court denied the petition, concluding defendants had failed to prove Plaintiff’s adult children had actual or ostensible authority to execute the arbitration agreements on Plaintiff’s behalf.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that CBCC did not meet its initial burden to make a prima facie showing that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate by submitting arbitration agreements signed by Plaintiff’s adult children. CBCC presented no evidence that the children had actual or ostensible authority to execute the arbitration agreement on Plaintiff’s behalf beyond their own representations in the agreements. The court wrote that a defendant cannot meet its burden to prove the signatory acted as the agent of a plaintiff by relying on representations of the purported agent alone. View "Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care Center" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff sought to represent a class of individuals, known as Amazon Flex drivers, claiming damages and injunctive relief for alleged privacy violations by Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”). Plaintiff contended that Amazon monitored and wiretapped the drivers’ conversations when they communicated during off hours in closed Facebook groups. The district court denied Amazon’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the dispute did not fall within the scope of the applicable arbitration clause in a 2016 Terms of Service Agreement (“2016 TOS”). Amazon appealed, arguing that the district court should have applied the broader arbitration clause in a 2019 Terms of Service Agreement (“2019 TOS”) and that even if the arbitration clause in the 2016 TOS applied, this dispute fell within its scope.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Amazon’s motion to compel arbitration. Under California law and principles of contract law, the burden is on Amazon, as the party seeking arbitration, to show that it provided notice of a new TOS and that there was mutual assent to the contractual agreement to arbitrate. The panel held that there was no evidence that the email allegedly sent to drivers adequately notified drivers of the update. The district court, therefore, correctly held that the arbitration provision in the 2016 TOS still governed the parties’ relationship. The panel concluded that because Amazon’s alleged misconduct existed independently of the contract and therefore fell outside the scope of the arbitration provision in the 2016 TOS, the district court correctly denied Amazon’s motion to compel arbitration. View "DRICKEY JACKSON V. AMZN" on Justia Law

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Betty Smith brought a negligence and wrongful death lawsuit against Belhaven Senior Care, LLC (Belhaven), a nursing home facility in which her mother Mary Hayes had resided shortly before Hayes’s death. Belhaven sought to compel arbitration, citing the arbitration provision in the nursing home admissions agreement Smith signed when admitting her mother. The trial judge denied arbitration, finding that Smith lacked the legal authority to bind her mother to the agreement. Belhaven appealed. The nursing home’s primary argument on appeal was that under the Health-Care Decisions Act (“the Act”), Smith acted as a statutory healthcare surrogate. So in signing the nursing home admission agreement, Smith had authority to waive arbitration on her mother’s behalf. In addition, Belhaven puts forth arguments of direct-benefit estoppel and third-party beneficiary status. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed, finding that while Hayes did suffer from some form of dementia, when admitted to the nursing home, she was neither evaluated by a physician nor was she determined to lack capacity. Indeed, her “Admission Physician Orders” were signed by a nurse practitioner. It was not until eleven days later that a physician evaluated Hayes. "And even then, the physician did not deem she lacked capacity. In fact, Belhaven puts forth no evidence that—at any time during her stay of more than a year at Belhaven—any physician ever determined Hayes lacked capacity." The Court determined Belhaven failed to prove the strict requirements of the surrogacy statute to rebut this presumption. Furthermore, the Court found Belhaven’s direct-benefit estoppel and third-party beneficiary arguments were lacking: because Belhaven contends that Hayes was incapacitated, she could not knowingly seek or obtain benefits from the agreement. "Nor does Smith’s largely negligence-based lawsuit seek to enforce the contract’s terms or require determination by reference to the contract. So Smith is not estopped from pursuing these claims." View "Belhaven Senior Care, LLC, et al. v. Smith, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed claims against the Ford Motor Company (FMC) for alleged defects in vehicles the company manufactured. FMC filed a motion to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims based on the arbitration provision in the sale contracts. Plaintiffs opposed FMC’s motion, including on the grounds that FMC had waived its right to compel arbitration through its litigation conduct. The trial court denied FMC’s motion on its merits.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that it agreed with the trial court that FMC could not compel arbitration based on Plaintiffs’ agreements with the dealers that sold them the vehicles. Equitable estoppel does not apply because, contrary to FMC’s arguments, Plaintiffs’ claims against it in no way rely on the agreements. FMC was not a third-party beneficiary of those agreements, as there is no basis to conclude Plaintiffs and their dealers entered into them with the intention of benefitting FMC. And FMC is not entitled to enforce the agreements as an undisclosed principal because there is no nexus between Plaintiffs’ claims, any alleged agency between FMC and the dealers, and the agreements. View "Ford Motor Warranty Cases" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Jimmy Hang sued defendants RG Legacy I, LLC, 1899 Raymond LLC, and Arlene Rosales for elder abuse and negligent hiring and supervision. The RG Legacy parties filed a petition to compel arbitration of those claims pursuant to arbitration agreements Jimmy entered on the decedent, Daniel Hang’s behalf when Daniel was admitted to a RG Legacy parties’ skilled nursing facility. Jimmy opposed the petition arguing, inter alia, Daniel had been indigent and his estate had no funds to pay arbitration fees and costs. Citing Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine, 219 Cal.App.4th 87 (2013), the trial court found Daniel was indigent at the time of his death and granted the petition to compel arbitration on the condition that, within 15 days, the RG Legacy parties agreed to pay all arbitration fees and costs, or waive the right to arbitrate the matter. The RG Legacy parties did not agree to pay all arbitration fees and costs and instead filed this appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed: substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings of Daniel’s indigence, and the trial court properly applied the holdings of Roldan and its progeny in ordering the RG Legacy parties to either agree to pay all arbitration fees and costs or waive arbitration. The RG Legacy parties’ refusal to so agree, within the time specified, effected the court’s denial of their petition to compel arbitration. View "Hang v. RG Legacy I" on Justia Law