Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

In 2009, GameStop, Inc., which operated retail stores that sold video games and video gaming software, hired Petitioner as an assistant manager. When she began her employment, Petitioner received a store associate handbook. In a document included with the handbook was an arbitration agreement. Petitioner signed and dated an acknowledgment of the handbook and rules including arbitration. In 2011, Petitioner sued GameStop and some of its managers (collectively, GameStop) for wrongful discharge, sexual harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, among other causes of action. The circuit court dismissed the complaint pending Petitioner's submission of her claims to final and binding arbitration. Petitioner appealed, arguing that she did not enter into a valid arbitration with GameStop or, in the alternative, the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner and GameStop entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate Petitioner's claims; and (2) the arbitration agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. View "New v. GameStop, Inc." on Justia Law

Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. (RJFS), and its employee, Bernard Michaud appealed a trial court order vacating an arbitration award in their favor and entering a judgment in favor of Kathryn Honea. Honea had multiple investment accounts with Raymond James and sued RJFS alleging violations of the Alabama Securities Act and sought damages for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, wantonness, and fraud. RJFS moved to compel arbitration, and the trial court granted the motion. An arbitration panel unanimously entered an award in favor of RJFS on Honea's claims. Honea filed a motion at circuit court to vacate the award. The trial court ultimately vacated the award, and RJFS appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment vacating the arbitration award, holding that a provision in the arbitration agreement Honea signed when she opened the accounts required the trial court to conduct a de novo review of the arbitration award, and remanded the case for it to conduct such a review. Both parties acknowledged on appeal that the award had not been entered as a judgment of the trial court. Because the award to RJFS was not entered as a judgment of the trial court as required by statute, the Supreme Court could reach no other conclusion but that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the award on remand. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment purporting to vacate that award and to enter a judgment in favor of Honea was void. This appeal was dismissed.View "Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. v. Honea " on Justia Law

A snowplow driver for the City of Alexandria collided with Donald Fernow's vehicle. Fernow brought a personal injury action against the City. At the same time, Fernow's insurance company (Insurer) sought arbitration against the City, seeking repayment in basic economic loss benefits paid to Fernow. In the personal injury action, the district court denied the City's motion for summary judgment on the basis that Fernow's claim was barred by statutory discretionary immunity, common law official immunity, and statutory snow and ice immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. Meanwhile, the arbitrator awarded Insurer basic economic loss benefits, concluding that the defense of governmental statutory immunity did not apply to the matter because of the denial of the City's motion for summary judgment. The district court confirmed the award. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the arbitrator exceeded her authority when she determined that the defense of governmental statutory immunity did not apply to the matter. The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that claims of immunity, including necessary questions of fact, should be determined by the district court prior to arbitration on the merits under the Minnesota No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act. Remanded.View "Fernow v. Gould" on Justia Law

Karl McGhee, a financial advisor at LPL Financial, acted as financial planner for Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a complaint against McGhee and LPL, asserting claims for, inter alia, violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A. Defendants moved for an order compelling the parties to proceed to arbitration due to an arbitration agreement signed by Plaintiff. The motion judge denied the motion, concluding that none of Plaintiff's claims could be compelled to arbitration because claimants under chapter 93A, section 9 are not required to submit to arbitration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) claims alleging an unfair or deceptive trade practice in violation of chapter 93A, section 9 must be referred to arbitration where the contract involves interstate commerce and the agreement is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); and (2) because Plaintiff and Defendants in this case entered into a valid contract whereby they agreed to settle all controversies related to Plaintiff's financial account by arbitration, and because the arbitration agreement was governed by the FAA, Defendants as a matter of law were entitled under the FAA to a stay of judicial proceedings and an order compelling arbitration. Remanded.View "McInnes v. LPL Fin., LLC" on Justia Law