Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Branches Neighborhood Corporation, a community association incorporated pursuant to the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, filed an arbitration claim against the association’s developer, defendant CalAtlantic Group, Inc., formerly known as Standard Pacific Corp. (Standard), for construction defects. The arbitrator granted summary judgment in Standard’s favor, concluding the association did not receive the consent of its members to file the claim until after the claim was filed, in violation of its declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The trial court subsequently denied the association’s motion to vacate the award, concluding the court had no power to review the arbitrator’s decision. Branches argued on appeal the trial court incorrectly denied its motion to vacate because the arbitrator exceeded its powers by abridging an unwaivable statutory right or public policy. Finding no such right or policy, the Court of Appeal determined the plain language of the CC&Rs controlled. The Court therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Branches Neighborhood Corp. v. CalAtlantic Group, Inc.," on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal from a circuit court order granting Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that no statutory authority existed to entertain the appeal as a matter of right.Plaintiffs sued Defendant seeking a declaratory judgment and rescission of a contract for the sale of land and an incorporated lease. The circuit court issued a temporary restraining order against Defendant and a show cause order setting a hearing for preliminary injunction. Thereafter, Defendant filed a demand for arbitration. The circuit court entered an order compelling arbitration on all claims alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the order compelling Plaintiffs to engage in arbitration was not an order appealable as a matter of right under either S.D. Codified Laws 15-26A-3(2) or S.D. Codified Laws 21-25A-35. View "Stoebner v. Konrad" on Justia Law

The Lorain County Board of Revision (BOR) had continuing-complaint jurisdiction to determine the value of a property for tax years 2012, 2013, and 2014 and therefore, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) erred in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over tax year 2014.Appellant sought a reduction from the value determined by the Lorain County auditor for the three years at issue by asserting a continuing complaint. Appellant predicated its claim on its originally filed complaint, which had challenged the property valuation for tax year 2009. That complaint was finally determined in 2014. Appellant’s continuing complaint sought to apply the same value determined in that case to 2012, 2013, and 2014. The BOR retained the auditor’s valuation. The BTA adopted Appellant’s appraiser’s valuation of $750,000 for 2012 and 2013 but concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the value for tax year 2014. Specifically, the BTA found that the BOR lacked jurisdiction over tax year 2014 because a proper complaint was not filed for that tax year. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the BOR had jurisdiction to determine the property’s value for tax years 2012, 2013, and 2014; and (2) an aggregate value of $750,000 shall be assigned to the property for all three tax years. View "Novita Industries, LLC v. Lorain County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

In this construction defect action brought by Homeowners, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not govern the arbitration agreement contained in the common-interest community’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) because, contrary to the conclusion of the district court, the underlying transaction involved interstate commerce. Further, to the extent that Nevada case law concerning procedural unconscionability disfavors arbitration of disputes over transactions involving interstate commerce, that case law is preempted by the FAA. The Court remanded this case for entry of an order directing the parties to arbitration. View "U.S. Home Corp. v. Michael Ballesteros Trust" on Justia Law

A party waives any right to object to the validity of an arbitration provision calling for the arbitration of certain claims once that party agrees to arbitrate those claims. Here, the parties settled the claims made the basis of case no. CV-2015-900849 by agreeing to arbitrate any further disputes regarding alleged violations of the Hillwood Office Center Owners' Association, Inc.’s ("the HOCOA"), governing documents. Following the dismissal of case no. CV-2015- 900849, Carol Blevins continued to assert violations of the governing documents and made a demand for arbitration. The HOCOA and its board members agreed to the submission of Carol's claims to arbitration. Although the HOCOA and its board members did object to certain issues being submitted to the arbitrator for determination, arguing that those issues instead should be determined by the trial court, they did not object to the submission of the claims to arbitration. The HOCOA and its board members agreed upon two different arbitrators and also sought the enforcement of the settlement agreement containing the arbitration provision by initiating case no. CV-2015- 901891. Accordingly, The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that because the HOCOA and its board members agreed to the submission of the claims raised in this matter to the now pending arbitration proceeding, they waived their right to object to the validity of the arbitration provision. The appeal in case no. CV-2015-900849 was dismissed. To the extent that the HOCOA and its board members appealed the trial court's order dissolving the stay of arbitration in case no. CV-2015-901891, that order was affirmed. Finally, the order appealed from case no. CV-2016- 901627 was affirmed in part and reversed in part and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Hillwood Office Center Owners' Association, Inc., et al. v. Blevins" on Justia Law

In November 2008, following the collapse of the housing market, the New Jersey Supreme Court implemented a statewide Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program to address the economic crisis that left many facing the loss of their homes. After defaulting on her home loan with plaintiff GMAC Mortgage, LLC, defendant TamiLynn Willoughby entered into the Foreclosure Mediation Program. The mediation process led to an agreement between GMAC and Willoughby that gave Willoughby a path to save her home through a permanent modification of the loan. The agreement, executed in 2010, set forth the required down payment and monthly payments, the unpaid principal balance, the amount in arrears, and the length and interest rate of the loan. Willoughby complied with that agreement, paying the down payment and each monthly installment for one year. Then, GMAC began sending Willoughby proposals differing from the 2010 agreement, which GMAC claimed was provisional. Willoughby moved to enforce the 2010 settlement agreement, but instead the chancery court ordered additional mediation sessions. Willoughby never accepted in writing any of GMAC s proposals to modify the original agreement. Protracted litigation ensued. Willoughby's efforts to enforce the 2010 settlement agreement proved fruitless, and GMAC s foreclosure action ended with a Sheriff's sale of Willoughby's home. Willoughby was denied relief by the chancery court, which held that the 2010 mediation agreement was provisional and not enforceable as a final settlement agreement. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, concluding Willoughby and GMAC entered into an enforceable settlement agreement through the Foreclosure Mediation Program. The case was remanded to the chancery court to consider an appropriate remedy. View "GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. TamiLynn Willoughby" on Justia Law

This case arose from competing claims to a portion of the Yuba Goldfields, a 10,000-acre valley on both sides of the Yuba River near Marysville. At issue was whether an arbitration award resolving a dispute between plaintiff Cal Sierra Development, Inc. (Cal Sierra), and Western Aggregates, Inc., served as res judicata to bar Cal Sierra’s lawsuit against Western Aggregates’ licensee George Reed, Inc., and the licensee’s parent Basic Resources, Inc. The Court of Appeal concluded yes. View "Cal Sierra Development v. George Reed, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed its decision in Narayan I, in which the court held that Plaintiffs, a group of individual condominium owners, could not be compelled to arbitrate claims arising from the financial breakdown of a condominium project. Specifically, the court held in Narayan I that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because the terms of the documents at issue were ambiguous with respect to Plaintiffs’ intent to arbitrate and that portions of the arbitration clause were unconscionable. The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded Narayan I for further consideration in light of its recent decision in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. __ (2015), which held that state law must place arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts. After recognizing this principle, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that that the arbitration clause at issue in the present case was unconscionable under common law contract principles. View "Narayan v. Ritz-Carlton Development Co." on Justia Law

This case centered on whether the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act (“CCIOA”) permitted a developer–declarant to retain a right of consent to certain proposed amendments to a common interest community’s declaration. Petitioner Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condominium Association, Inc. (the “Association”), sought damages for alleged construction defects in the Vallagio at Inverness residential development project (the “Project”), a community organized under CCIOA. The Project’s developer and declarant, respondent Metro Inverness, LLC (the “Declarant”), drafted and recorded the Project’s original declaration, which set forth specific dispute resolution procedures for construction defect claims. As pertinent here, certain provisions of the original declaration: (1) required that all construction defect claims be resolved through binding arbitration; and (2) provided that the provisions governing such claims “shall not ever be amended” without the Declarant’s written consent. Shortly before the Association filed the present action, and without obtaining the Declarant’s consent, the requisite number of the Project’s unit owners voted to amend the declaration to delete the foregoing dispute resolution provisions. The Declarant moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the attempted declaration amendment was ineffective absent its written consent and, thus, the Association was bound by the arbitration provision contained in the original declaration. The district court denied the Declarant’s motion, reasoning in pertinent part that the consent-to-amend provision violated and was therefore void under CCIOA. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the consent-to-amend provision contained in the Project’s original declaration was consistent with CCIOA and was therefore valid and enforceable. Furthermore, the Court concluded that because the unit owners did not obtain the Declarant’s consent to remove the arbitration provision, the attempted removal was ineffective, and the declaration’s arbitration agreement remained in force. View "Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo. Assn. v. Metro. Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent, who owned a ranch, sued Petitioner, which produced natural gas on the ranch, for underpayment of royalties and underproduction of its lease. The parties resolved their dispute with two agreements that contained an arbitration provision. Respondent later sued Petitioner for environmental contamination and improper disposal of hazardous materials on the ranch. Before arbitration commenced, Respondent asked the Railroad Commission (RRC) to investigate contamination of the ranch by Petitioner. Meanwhile, an arbitration panel awarded Respondent $15 million for actual damages and $500,000 for exemplary damages. At issue on appeal was whether the RRC had exclusive or primary jurisdiction over Respondent’s claims, precluding the arbitration, and whether the arbitration award should be vacated for the evident partiality of a neutral arbitrator or because the arbitrators exceeded their powers. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding (1) because Respondent’s claims were inherently judicial, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not apply, and vacatur was not warranted for failure to abate the arbitration hearing; and (2) the arbitrators did not exceed their authority. View "Forest Oil Corp. v. El Rucio Land & Cattle Co." on Justia Law