Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

In this appeal stemming from a failed real estate investment, plaintiffs challenged the district court's judgments in favor of the non-arbitrating defendants. The real estate transactions underlying this appeal have already been described in greater depth in Rainier DSC 1, L.L.C. v. Rainier Capital Management, L.P., 546 F. App’x 491, 492–93 (5th Cir. 2013). The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that plaintiffs have not shown that the district court erred in not staying the litigation of the non-arbitrating parties during the arbitration or in granting summary judgment in favor of FSA and the physicians. View "Rainier DSC 1, LLC v. Rainier Capital Mgmt." on Justia Law

In August 2005, D.R. Horton, Inc. completed construction of the Smiths' home, and the Smiths closed on the property and received the deed. Thereafter, the Smiths experienced a myriad of problems with the home that resulted in severe water damage to the property. D.R. Horton attempted to repair the alleged construction defects on "numerous occasions" during the next five years, but was ultimately unsuccessful. In 2010, the Smiths filed a construction defect case against D.R. Horton and seven subcontractors. In response, D.R. Horton filed a motion to compel arbitration. The Smiths opposed the motion, arguing, inter alia, that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. The circuit court denied D.R. Horton's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. D.R. Horton appealed, but finding no error in the circuit court's decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. View "Smith v. D.R. Horton, Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiff signed a contract with Defendant for the construction of a house. The contract contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiff later brought suit against Defendant, claiming that there were defects in the house. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the arbitration clause was unconscionable. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred by ruling on questions of arbitrability despite the existence of a delegation provision in the arbitration agreement that vested the arbitrator with authority to determine issues of arbitrability relating to the dispute. The Supreme Court determined that the circuit court was within its rights not to enforce the delegation language because the language did not reflect the parties’ clear and unmistakable intention to delegate issues about the validity, revocability, or enforceability of the arbitration agreement to an arbitrator. The United States Supreme Court granted Defendant’s requested writ of certiorari, vacated the Supreme Court’s opinion, and remanded for further consideration in light of their decision in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order, holding that because Plaintiffs never specifically challenged the delegation language before the circuit court or Supreme Court, Plaintiffs waived any right to challenge the delegation language. Remanded for arbitration. View "Schumacher Homes of Circleville v. Spencer" on Justia Law

26th Street Hospitality, LLP appealed a district court's order granting a motion to compel arbitration; order lifting a stay in the proceedings, confirming the arbitration award, and awarding post-judgment interest; and final judgment. The Partnership argued the district court erred in ordering arbitration because the court was required to determine the validity of the contract before arbitration could be ordered and not all of the claims and parties were subject to arbitration. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "26th Street Hospitality v. Real Builders" on Justia Law

After a fire broke out at the Beacon Towers Condominium, the board of trustees for the Beacon Towers Condominium Trust, the unit owners’ organization for the condominium, assessed George Alex $62,995 for the two units that he owned. Alex commenced an arbitration action challenging the propriety of the trustees’ conduct regarding the fire damage repairs and the imposition of the assessment. The arbitration panel found in favor of Alex. Although the panel recognized that the arbitration agreement in the trust’s bylaw did not provide for an award of fees, the panel nonetheless awarded fees, reasoning that the American Arbitration Association allowed an award of fees where “substantially all of the defenses were wholly insubstantial, frivolous and not advanced in good faith.” The trust filed suit, claiming that the arbitrators’ award of attorney’s fees exceeded the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement. A superior court judge vacated the award of attorney’s fees, concluding that such an award was not authorized by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, 6F when ordered by an arbitrator because section 6F does not authorize an arbitrator to award attorney’s fees. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that an arbitrator lacks the authority to award attorney’s fees under the circumstances of this case. View "Beacon Towers Condo. Trust v. Alex" on Justia Law

In 2012, a fire destroyed three buildings and related equipment that were owned by Jackson Hop, LLC, and were used to dry hops, to process and bale hops, and to store hop bales. The buildings were insured by Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho for the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment, not to exceed the policy limit. Farm Bureau’s appraisers determined that the actual cash value of the buildings was $295,000 and the value of the equipment was $85,909. Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop $380,909. Jackson Hop disagreed with that figure, and it hired its own appraiser, who concluded that the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment totaled $1,410,000. Farm Bureau retained another appraiser to review the report of Jackson Hop’s appraiser, and that appraiser concluded that the value of $1,410,000 was unrealistically high. Jackson Hop filed this action to recover the balance of what it contended was owing under the insurance policy, plus prejudgment interest. The parties agreed to submit the matter to arbitration as provided in the policy. During that process, Jackson Hop presented additional opinions regarding the actual cash values, ranging from $800,000 to $1,167,000 for the buildings and $379,108 to $399,000 for the equipment. Farm Bureau’s experts revised their opinions upward, although only from $295,000 to $333,239 for the buildings and from $85,909 to $133,000 for the equipment. Before completion of the arbitration, Farm Bureau paid an additional sum of $85,330. Arbitrators determined that the actual cash value of the buildings and the equipment was $740,000 and $315,000, respectively, for a total of $1,055,000. Within seven days of the arbitrators’ decision, Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop $588,761, which was the amount of the arbitrators’ award less the prior payments. Jackson Hop filed a motion asking the district court to confirm the arbitrators’ award and to award Jackson Hop prejudgment interest, court costs, and attorney fees. Farm Bureau filed an objection to the request for court costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest. The court awarded Jackson Hop attorney fees, but denied the request for court costs because the parties’ arbitration agreement stated that both parties would pay their own costs, and the court denied the request for prejudgment interest because the amount of damages was unliquidated and unascertainable by a mathematical process until the arbitrators’ award. Jackson Hop then appealed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jackson Hop v. Farm Bureau Insurance" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, individual condominium owners, entered into purchase agreements with the developer of a Maui condominium project. Homeowners received the condominium declaration, which contained an arbitration clause, and other documents governing the project along with their purchase agreements. When the condominium development began experiencing financial problems, Homeowners filed suit against Respondents, the development and management companies for the project. Respondents filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the circuit court summarily denied. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) reversed, holding that a valid arbitration agreement existed, this dispute fell within the scope of that agreement, the arbitration terms were procedurally conscionable, and the arbitration clause was not an unenforceable contract of adhesion. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment and affirmed the circuit court’s order denying Respondents’ motion to compel arbitration, holding (1) because Plaintiffs did not unambiguously assent to arbitration, the agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable; (2) the ICA erred by placing dispositive weight on procedural unconscionability without addressing the alleged substantive unconscionability of the arbitration terms; and (3) the ICA erred by concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate procedural unconscionability. View "Narayan v. Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co." on Justia Law

Daimante, LLC was the operator of a golf course that contained two subdivisions. Gary and Linda Dye, property owners within one subdivision, filed a declaratory-judgment complaint seeking a declaration that certain obligations and restrictions were unenforceable. Diamante moved to compel arbitration with the Dyes. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration, finding that Diamante had waived arbitration by unnecessary delay that prejudiced the Dyes. Class members were subsequently added to the lawsuit upon class certification and filed a second amended motion for declaratory judgment. The circuit court denied Diamante’s motion to compel arbitration based on the court’s previous ruling. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals’ decision was not conclusive on the issue of whether Diamante had waived arbitration as to the class members who were subsequently added to the lawsuit, and therefore, this argument does not compel dismissal of this appeal; and (2) because the circuit court did not issue on order as to whether there was a valid agreement to arbitrate between Diamante and the unnamed class members, the case must be reversed for the circuit court to make that determination. View "Diamante LLC v. Dye" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Oklahoma law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. In April 2008, plaintiffs Shannon and Eric Walker requested several samples of hardwood flooring from BuildDirect.com Technologies, Inc., a Canadian corporation, through BuildDirect's website. The next month they arranged, over the telephone, to purchase 113 boxes of flooring from BuildDirect. BuildDirect emailed a two-page written Contract entitled "Quotation" to Ms. Walker, who signed and dated the Contract and returned it to BuildDirect via fax. The Contract described the type, amount, and price of the flooring purchased by the Walkers. And, it included 14 bullet points setting forth additional terms. The sixth bullet point stated: "All orders are subject to BuildDirect's 'Terms of Sale.'" The Walkers alleged that after they installed the flooring, they discovered that their home was infested with nonindigenous wood-boring insects. According to the Walkers, the insects severely damaged the home, and caused the home to be subject to quarantine and possible destruction by the United States Department of Agriculture. The question the federal appeals court posed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court was whether a written consumer contract for the sale of goods incorporated by reference a separate document entitled "Terms of Sale" available on the seller's website, when the contract stated that it was "subject to" the seller's "Terms of Sale" but did not specifically reference the website. In response, the Oklahoma Court held that Oklahoma law did not recognize a "vague attempt at incorporation by reference" as demonstrated in this case. Under the Oklahoma law of contracts, parties may incorporate by reference separate writings, or portions thereof, together into one agreement where: (1) the underlying contract makes clear reference to the extrinsic document; (2) the identity and location of the extrinsic document may be ascertained beyond doubt; and (3) the parties to the agreement had knowledge of and assented to its incorporation. View "Walker v. BuildDirect.com Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, Plaintiffs purchased real estate from Charter West National Bank. Plaintiffs later filed suit, alleging that Charter West represented that the property would be free and clear of all liens but manipulated the language of the deed to reflect that the conveyance was subject to liens of record. Charter West moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the real estate purchase agreement, which contained an arbitration clause. Plaintiffs filed an objection asserting that the arbitration clause was void because it failed to comply with Nebraska’s Uniform Arbitration Act, and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was inapplicable because the transaction did not involve interstate commerce. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration without prejudice based on a lack of evidence that the transaction affected interstate commerce as to trigger the provisions of the FAA. Charter West appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds that there was no final, appealable order entered by the district court capable of appellate review. View "Wilczewski v. Charter West Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law