Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Joe F. Watkins, Patricia M. Smith, and RE/MAX Lake Martin Properties, LLC sued Bear Brothers, Inc., ETC Lake Development, LLC ("ETC Lake"), and E.T. "Bud" Chambers, among others, asserting claims related to the construction and development of a condominium project on Lake Martin. ETC Lake and Chambers crossclaimed against Bear Brothers seeking to recover losses suffered on the project as well as indemnification for the costs of litigating the plaintiffs' action and any damages for which they might be found liable to the plaintiffs. In January 2010, Bear Brothers moved the circuit court to compel arbitration of the cross-claim against it. The circuit court did not rule on that motion. Bear Brothers renewed its motion in July 2011, and the circuit court granted the motion to compel arbitration of the cross-claim in December. Bear Brothers then moved the circuit court "to stay [the] proceedings [in the plaintiffs' action] pending the outcome of a related arbitration." After a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion to stay. Bear Brothers appealed the circuit court's order denying the motion to stay to the Supreme Court; ETC Lake and Chambers moved to dismiss the appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the motion at issue in this case was a motion to stay related proceedings pending the arbitration of a crossclaim between codefendants and was filed separately from the initial motion to compel arbitration of the cross-claim and subsequent to the circuit court's order granting the motion. Thus, Bear Brothers did not demonstrate a right to appeal the denial of the motion to stay at this time, and accordingly the Court dismissed the appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment. View "Bear Brothers, Inc. v. ETC Lake Development, LLC" on Justia Law

First Franklin Financial Corporation and Jason Gardner attended foreclosure mediation. The parties disputed the outcome of the mediation. Gardner argued that the parties reached a binding agreement requiring First Franklin to offer a trial loan modification plan to Gardner and subsequently filed a motion for sanctions. The district court granted the motion and ordered First Franklin to pay monetary sanctions and to enter into a loan modification with Gardner on the terms agreed upon by the parties at foreclosure mediation. First Franklin filed an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and held that the motion court did not err (1) in finding that Gardner and First Franklin entered into a binding agreement requiring First Franklin to offer the loan modification to Gardner; and (2) in finding that First Franklin did not mediate in good faith and in granting Gardner's motion for sanctions. View "First Franklin Fin. Corp. v. Gardner" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Nevada homeowner, elected mediation pursuant to the Nevada Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) to produce a loan modification. When the mediation did not result in a loan modification, Appellant filed a petition for judicial review asking for sanctions against Respondent, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (BAC), alleging that BAC failed to comply with the FMP's document production and good faith requirements. The district court rejected Appellant's petition, finding (1) there was no irregularity as to the submitted documents; (2) BAC met its burden of showing a lack of bad faith; and (3) absent a timely appeal, a letter of certification would issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although BAC's document production lacked a key assignment, Appellant filled the gap with a document he produced; and (2) the district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions and allowing the FMP certificate to issue. View "Einhorn v. BAC Homes Loans Servicing" on Justia Law

This consolidated appeal stemmed from a lawsuit in which Mark Wolgin sued various entities alleging wrongdoing surrounding his 2006 purchase of a condominium on the Gulf Coast. In case #2010-CA-00653-SCT, Wolgin appealed the Chancery Court's decision to dismiss two credit reporting agencies (Trans Union LLC and Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian")), finding that claims against them were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). In case #2010-CA-01177-SCT, the broker for the sale, The Power Broker, Inc. ("Power Broker"), appealed the Chancery Court's decision to order discovery on the scope of the mandatory arbitration clause in the "Contract for the Sale and Purchase of Real Estate" instead of fully granting its "Motion to Compel Arbitration." Regarding Wolgin's appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the credit reporting agencies, as Wolgin's claims are preempted by the FCRA. As to Power Broker's appeal, the Court reversed the trial court judgment ordering discovery and remanded the case with instructions to stay the proceedings and refer the matter to arbitration. View "Wolgin v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

This case related to an arbitration award denying an express easement on Petitioners' property. Petitioners filed a petition in the circuit court to confirm the arbitration award, and Respondent filed a motion to vacate the same. Respondent argued that the award was irrational because, without an easement over Petitioners' land, his land would be landlocked. The circuit court confirmed the arbitration award, relying upon the Uniform Arbitration Act. The court of special appeals (CSA) reversed, overturned the arbitrator's denial of the easement, and directed that an easement by necessity be located over Petitioners' land. While recognizing the Act's limitation on the authority of the courts to overturn arbitration awards, the CSA pointed out that arbitration awards that were completely irrational or which were manifestly in disregard of the law had been overturned in previous opinions. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the CSA and remanded with directions to vacate the circuit court, holding (1) the arbitration award, in part, was contradictory; and (2) Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 3-225(a) authorizes a court to vacate an award and order a rehearing before arbitrators when the award is ambiguous or contradictory. Remanded for further proceedings pursuant to section 3-225(a). View "Downey v. Sharp" on Justia Law

An owners association for a construction defect action against a condominium developer, seeking recovery for damage to its property and damage to the separate interests of the condominium owners who composed its membership. In response, the developer filed a motion to compel arbitration based on a clause in the recorded declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions providing that the association and the individual owners agreed to resolve any construction dispute with the developer through binding arbitration. The trial court determined that the clause embodied an agreement to arbitrate between the developer and the association but invalidated the agreement upon finding it marked by slight substantive unconscionability and a high degree of procedural unconscionability. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration clause bound the association and was not unconscionable. View "Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass'n v. Pinnacle Market Dev." on Justia Law

Brentwood Homes, Inc. and the other appellants in this case (collectively "Brentwood Homes") appealed a circuit court's order denying a motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration in a lawsuit filed by Petitioner Fred Bradley that arose out of his purchase of a home in South Carolina. Although Brentwood Homes conceded the Home Purchase Agreement did not meet the technical requirements of the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act (the "UAA"), it claimed the court erred in denying the motion because the transaction involved interstate commerce and thus was subject to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the essential character of the Agreement was strictly for the purchase of a completed residential dwelling and not the construction, the Court found the FAA did not apply. Furthermore, the existence of the national warranty and Bradley's use of out-of-state financing did not negate the intrastate nature of the transaction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying Brentwood Homes' motion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration as Brentwood Homes failed to offer sufficient evidence that the transaction involved interstate commerce to subject the Agreement to the FAA. View "Bradley v. Brentwood Homes" on Justia Law

Nicole Tausend, the beneficiary of a trust together with her father, Ronald, commenced a N.Y.C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding against Ronald and the partnership (NJR) formed by Ronald for the purpose of acquiring and selling property. Nicole commenced the proceeding in order to obtain access to the partnership documents and an accounting of its finances. In response, NJR issued a demand for arbitration. Supreme Court ordered the parties to arbitration, and the appellate division affirmed. Nicole appeared in the arbitration and asserted several counterclaims, which lead to NJR's commencement of this court proceeding seeking to stay arbitration of the counterclaims on the basis of the expiration of the statute of limitations. Supreme Court granted the petition and stayed arbitration of the counterclaims. The appellate division modified by dismissing NJR's petition to stay arbitration of the counterclaims, reasoning that the partnership was precluded from obtaining a stay because it had initiated and participated in the arbitration. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because NJR initiated and participated in the arbitration of issues stemming from the dispute, its timeliness challenge to the counterclaims must be decided by an arbitrator. View "N.J.R. Assocs. v. Tausend" on Justia Law

David Bennett and Bennett & Bennett Construction, Inc. ("Bennett") appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration of the claims alleging fraud in the inducement and the tort of outrage brought against them by Barbara and Leotes Skinner. The Skinners entered into a construction-services contract with Bennett, pursuant to which Bennett was to renovate and remodel their residence located in Oxford. After disagreements developed between the parties, the Skinners sued Bennett, alleging claims of breach of contract; breach of warranty; fraud in the inducement; assault and battery; the tort of outrage; and negligence, wantonness and recklessness. Bennett moved to compel arbitration of all claims, arguing that, because each of the claims alleged by the Skinners arose from the construction-services contract or were related to the construction-services contract, the claims were subject to arbitration. Furthermore, Bennett argued that the tort-of-outrage claim arose out of a disagreement concerning the construction-services contract and that the Skinners should not be allowed to avoid arbitration because they cast their claim as a tort. The Skinners responded, arguing that their agreement to the arbitration clause in the contract was obtained fraudulently. The trial court denied Bennett's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Skinners' tort-of-outrage claim arose out of a disagreement concerning the construction-services contract and thus was a proper claim for arbitration. The Court reversed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bennett v. Skinner " on Justia Law

Appellants Michael and Analisa Jones purchased a home with a loan from a mortgage company, which assigned the note and deed of trust to SunTrust Mortgage. After the Joneses defaulted on their mortgage, the Joneses elected to participate in the Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) provided for in Nev. Rev. Stat. 107.086. SunTrust and the Joneses resolved the pending foreclosure by agreeing to a short sale of the Joneses' home. The Joneses, however, never returned the short-sale documents and instead filed a petition for judicial review in the district court, requesting that the court impose sanctions against SunTrust because SunTrust violated section 107.086 and foreclosure mediation rules (FMRs) by failing to provide required documents and mediating in bad faith. The district court (1) denied the petition, finding that the Joneses entered into an enforceable short-sale agreement and therefore waived any claims under section 107.086 and the FMRs; and (2) allowed SunTrust to seek a certificate from the FMP to proceed with the foreclosure based on the terms of the short-sale agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the short-sale agreement was an enforceable settlement agreement, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to impose sanctions against SunTrust. View "Jones v. SunTrust Mortgage, Inc." on Justia Law