Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

In this case involving an agreement to arbitrate, the Supreme Court reiterated the elements of equitable estoppel required for an outside party not contemplated by the agreement to enforce an arbitration clause against a signatory and reversed the trial court's determination that a third party could compel arbitration, holding that none of the traditional elements of equitable estoppel were satisfied.Jane Doe's legal guardian (Guardian) arranged for Jane to live at Carmel Senior Living (CSL) and initialed an arbitration agreement. Guardian later filed a complaint against CSL; its management company, Spectrum; and one of its employees, claiming that the employee had sexually abused Jane and that CSL and Spectrum (together, CSL) were vicariously liable. Guardian later amended the complaint to add Certiphi Screening, the company CSL had hired to run background checks on new employees. The defendants demanded arbitration. The trial court granted the motions to compel arbitration, concluding that the agreement covered CSL and that equitable estoppel mandated arbitration of Guardian's claims against Certiphi. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Certiphi did not meet the requirements of equitable estoppel. View "Doe v. Carmel Operator, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the determination of the trial court that Jane Doe could compel her legal guardian (Guardian) to arbitrate her claims against it and affirmed the trial court's order compelling Guardian to arbitrate as to the remaining defendants, holding that this Court declines to adopt any alternative theories to the doctrine of equitable estoppel.After Jane had been living at Carmel Senior Living (CSL) for a few months, Guardian filed a complaint against CSL, CSL's management company and one of its employees, and Certiphi Screening, the company CSL had hired to run background checks on new employees, alleging that Jane had been sexually abused. The trial court granted CSL's and Certiphi's motions to compel arbitration under the arbitration agreement in the residency contract, determining that the agreement covered CSL under and agency theory and that equitable estoppel mandated arbitration of Guardian's claims against Certiphi. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Certiphi was not one of the third-party beneficiaries provided for in the arbitration agreement and could not meet the requirements of equitable estoppel; and (2) this Court declines to endorse any alternative equitable estoppel theories. View "Doe v. Carmel Operator, LLC" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife signed an agreement to arbitrate the issues in their divorce under the Family Law Arbitration Act (FLAA). The family law arbitrator entered conclusions of law providing for legal and physical custody of the parties’ child to be granted to Wife, Husband to pay certain child support obligation, the division of the marital property, Husband to pay certain spousal maintenance costs, and Husband to pay $95,000 of Wife’s attorney’s fees. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the arbitrator’s decision. Husband appealed the arbitrator’s attorney fee award. Wife cross-appealed other issues. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in the appellate consideration of an FLAA award, the proper standard of review is the same standard of appellate review that applies to the review of trial court decisions in marriage dissolution cases; and (2) in this case, the family law arbitrator’s award satisfies that standard, and Husband failed to establish that the award of attorney’s fees is not supported by the arbitrator’s findings. View "Masters v. Masters" on Justia Law