Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Northport in a wrongful death action brought by plaintiff, Mark, as the representative of the estate of his deceased father. Another son, Matt, signed the admission agreement, which included an arbitration agreement, at the residential rehabilitation center owned by Northport. Northport sought to compel arbitration and the district court granted the motion. Mark appealed, asserting that the district court misused the third-party beneficiary theory when no underlying agreement was present between the Poseys and Northport.Arkansas courts have repeatedly declined to find that individuals like Matt—relatives without power-of-attorney or other legal authority who admit a family member to a nursing home—possess valid authority to bind their relatives to arbitration under a third-party beneficiary theory. In this case, because Matt was undisputedly not his father's legal guardian or attorney-in-fact, he lacked the capacity to sign the contract as his father's representative. Accordingly, the court reversed the order compelling arbitration and remanded for further proceedings. View "Northport Health Services of Arkansas, LLC v. Posey" on Justia Law

Rhonda Stephan as the personal representative of the Estate of Bobby Gene Hicks, appealed an order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by Millennium Nursing and Rehab Center, Inc. Stephan contends that Hicks, her father, died in 2015 while he was a resident at Millennium Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, a skilled-nursing facility owned and operated by Millennium ("the Rehab Center"). During Hicks's hospitalization at Crestwood Medical Center ("Crestwood"), Stephan signed all the paperwork arranging for her father to be discharged from the hospital and transferred to the Rehab Center; however, she did not hold a power of attorney or other actual legal authority to act on Hicks's behalf or to contract in his name. Hicks did not sign any of the paperwork, but he is named as a party to the contracts included within that paperwork. On October 26, 2015, Hicks was transferred from Crestwood to the Rehab Center. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded Stephan could not be bound to the arbitration provision in her capacity as personal representative to Hicks' estate when she signed the agreement at issue here in her capacity, in what amounted to, Hicks' relative or next friend. View "Stephan v. Millennium Nursing and Rehab Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Following mediation, a trust beneficiary and a trustee signed a document purporting to settle a bitter family litigation and referring future disputes to the mediator for resolution. The beneficiary subsequently denied that she settled and asked the mediator to resolve the issue, but the mediator concluded that the parties had reached a binding settlement. The beneficiary tried to resurrect this issue in the superior court, but the court concluded that the mediator’s decision was within the scope of the authority conferred by the parties. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err by confirming the mediator’s decision. Furthermore, the court did not err by denying the beneficiary’s petition to review the trustee’s compensation, or by awarding Alaska Civil Rule 82 attorney’s fees to the trustee. View "Lee v. Sheldon" on Justia Law

Candy Parkhurst ("Parkhurst"), personal representative of the estate of her husband, Andrew P. Parkhurst ("Andrew"), deceased, file suit to compel Carter C. Norvell and Parkhurst & Norvell, an accounting firm Norvell had operated as a partnership with Andrew ("the partnership"), to arbitrate a dispute regarding the dissolution of the partnership. Pursuant to an arbitration provision in a dissolution agreement Norvell and Andrew had executed before Andrew's death, the trial court ultimately ordered arbitration and stayed further proceedings until arbitration was complete. Subsequently, however, Parkhurst moved the trial court to lift the stay and to enter a partial summary judgment resolving certain aspects of the dispute in her favor. After the trial court lifted the stay and scheduled a hearing on Parkhurst's motion, Norvell and the partnership appealed, arguing that the trial court was effectively failing to enforce the terms of a valid arbitration agreement in violation of the Federal Arbitration Act. The Alabama Supreme Court determined there was no evidence in the record indicating that Norvell made such an agreement and he, in fact, denied doing so. In the absence of any evidence that would establish such an agreement, as well as any other evidence that would conclusively establish that Norvell clearly and unequivocally expressed an intent to waive his right to have the arbitrator resolve this dispute. As such, Parkhurst failed to meet her burden of showing that the arbitration provision in the dissolution agreement should not have been enforced. Accordingly, the trial court erred by lifting the arbitral stay in order to consider Parkhurst's motion for a partial summary judgment, and its judgment doing so was reversed and remanded. View "Norvell v. Parkhurst" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is intended to give trustees broad authority to fulfill their duties as trustee and gives trustees the power to enter into predispute arbitration agreements, so long as doing so is not prohibited under the operative trust instrument.At issue in this interlocutory appeal was whether the signature of the trustee of a trust on an investment/brokerage account agreement that included a provision requiring the arbitration of disputes bound the beneficiary of the trust to the predispute arbitration provision. The Supreme Court held (1) under both the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and the operative trust instrument, the trustee had authority to enter into the arbitration agreement contained within the account agreement; and (2) applying the principle that a third party who seeks the benefit of a contract must also bear its burdens, the trust beneficiary in this case may be bound to arbitrate claims against the investment broker that sought to enforce the account agreement. The court vacated the trial court order compelling arbitration of all claims and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination as to which, if any, of the claims asserted by the trust beneficiary seek to enforce the account agreement. View "Harvey ex rel. Gladden v. Cumberland Trust & Investment Co." on Justia Law

Bernard Norton, by and through Kim Norton, brought a wrongful death action against a number of defendants who were affiliated with a nursing home in which his wife, Lola Norton, died. Bernard claimed that negligent treatment caused Lola’s death. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration of all claims in accordance with an agreement entered into by Lola at the time she was admitted to the nursing home. The trial court granted the motion to stay and compel arbitration, and Bernard appealed, contending that, as a wrongful death beneficiary, he could not be bound to Lola’s arbitration agreement. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and found that Lola’s beneficiaries were not required to arbitrate their wrongful death claims against the defendants. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and entered into by a decedent and/or her power of attorney, which bound the decedent and her estate to arbitration, was also enforceable against the decedent’s beneficiaries in a wrongful death action. The Court found that such an arbitration agreement did bind the decedent’s beneficiaries with respect to their wrongful death claims, and, accordingly, reversed the Court of Appeals. View "United Health Services of Georgia, Inc. v. Norton" on Justia Law

FMR Corp. n/k/a FMR LLC, Fidelity Management Trust Company, and Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC (collectively, "Fidelity") appealed a circuit court order denying their motion asking the court to compel Elizabeth Howard n/k/a Elizabeth Hart ("Hart") to arbitrate Fidelity's dispute with her regarding her responsibility to indemnify Fidelity for losses it might suffer if Hart's stepchildren prevailed on claims they asserted against Fidelity that were the subject of a separate pending arbitration proceeding. In 2006, Hart's husband, Frederick Howard, opened an individual retirement account with Fidelity ("the Fidelity IRA"), funding it with money previously been held in a retirement account administered by Howard's former employer. Although Howard had previously designated his three children from a prior marriage as beneficiaries of the employer's retirement account, he did not designate any beneficiary for the Fidelity IRA at the time it was opened or at anytime thereafter. Howard died in 2011. His will left all his personal property to the children, explaining that Hart "has a sizeable separate estate of her own." However, because Howard never designated a beneficiary for the Fidelity IRA, Fidelity distributed the money held in that account to Hart in accordance with the terms of the Fidelity IRA, which provided that any assets in the account would become the property of a surviving spouse when the account holder died if no beneficiary had been named. The Howard children unsuccessfully challenged that distribution in Probate Court. Then the Howard children sued Fidelity and Hart, asserting claims of undue influence, fraud, and conversion against Hart and a claim of negligence against Fidelity, contending their father was incompetent at the time the Fidelity IRA was opened and that Hart was the impetus behind the opening of the Fidelity IRA, Fidelity was negligent for failing to implement adequate procedures governing its online-account-opening process that would prevent either fraudulent activity or invalid actions by incompetent individuals. Fidelity moved the Circuit Court to compel arbitration, noting in its motion that Howard, Hart, and the Howard children had all executed documents related to accounts with Fidelity that contained arbitration provisions. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the circuit court denied Fidelity's motion notwithstanding the submission of competent evidence establishing Fidelity had a right to arbitrate these claims. View "FMR Corp. n/k/a FMR LLC, et al. v. Howard n/k/a Hart" on Justia Law

Monschke, acting as personal representative for the estate of her mother, the decedent, filed suit for wrongful death and elder abuse against Timber Ridge Assisted Living, which petitioned to compel arbitration on the ground plaintiff, on behalf of decedent, had signed an agreement with an arbitration clause before enrolling decedent in the facility. The trial court denied the petition, finding the wrongful death claim had been brought on behalf of decedent’s surviving children, and the children were not parties to the arbitration agreement. The trial court also declined to submit the elder abuse claim to arbitration because of the possibility of conflicting rulings. The court of appeal affirmed. While a personal representative’s interests may not directly align with the interests of any particular heir, the personal representative’s duty is to stand in the position of the heirs, not the decedent. View "Monschke v. Timber Ridge Assisted Living, LLC" on Justia Law

Singer-songwriters John Whitehead and Gene McFadden were “an integral part of the 1970s Philadelphia music scene. In 2002, Pullman approached them about purchasing their song catalogue. The parties signed a contract but never finalized the sale. Pullman claims he discovered tax liens while conducting due diligence and that the matter was never resolved. Whitehead and McFadden passed away in 2004 and 2006, respectively. Pullman became embroiled in disputes with their estates over ownership of the song catalogue. The parties eventually agreed to arbitration. Pullman, unhappy with the ruling, unsuccessfully moved to vacate the arbitration award on the ground that the panel had committed legal errors that made it impossible for him to present a winning case by applying the Dead Man’s Statute, which disqualifies parties interested in litigation from testifying about personal transactions or communications with deceased or mentally ill persons.” The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that the arbitrators did not misapply the law, but that legal error alone is not a sufficient basis to vacate the results of an arbitration in any case. View "Whitehead v. Pullman Group LLC" on Justia Law

In 2011, Mr. Nichols was admitted to the Richmond, Kentucky, Kenwood Nursing & Rehabilitation Center. He signed an agreement that states that it applies to “any and all disputes arising out of or in any way relating to this Agreement” including “wrongful death.” It is governed by “The Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act. . . . If for any reason there is a finding that Kentucky law cannot support the enforcement of this Agreement, then the Parties agree to resolve their disputes by arbitration . . . pursuant to the [FAA].” It binds Nichols and all persons with claims through or on behalf of him. After Nichols dies, his estate sued, asserting wrongful death and other state law claims. The district court declined to compel arbitration of the wrongful-death claim, but stayed the case until arbitration of the other claims was complete. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, relying on state law precedent, not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, that a wrongful-death claim is “independent” of any claims held by a decedent and constitutes a “distinct interest in a property right that belongs only to the statutorily-designated beneficiaries.” Decedents have no “cognizable legal rights” in that claim. View "Richmond Health Facilities v. Nichols" on Justia Law