Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Meghan Young was denied a mortgage loan due to an erroneous credit report prepared by Experian Information Solutions, Inc. The report falsely indicated that foreclosure proceedings had been initiated against her, despite her having paid off her mortgage in full. Following this, Young enrolled in a credit monitoring service called CreditWorks, which is affiliated with Experian. The terms of use for CreditWorks included an arbitration agreement covering disputes related to the service.Young sued Experian in the District of New Jersey for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Experian moved to compel arbitration based on the CreditWorks agreement. The District Court denied the motion without prejudice, allowing for limited discovery on the issue of arbitrability. The court applied the summary judgment standard from Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., as the arbitration agreement was not apparent from the face of the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court clarified that discovery is not necessary when there is no factual dispute about the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. Since Young did not dispute the existence of the agreement but only its scope, and because the agreement delegated arbitrability issues to the arbitrator, the court held that the District Court should have granted the motion to compel arbitration without discovery. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Young v. Experian Information Solutions Inc" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Tommy Coleman and Jason Perkins, who worked as oil and gas pipeline inspectors for System One Holdings, LLC, were paid a flat daily rate without overtime compensation, even when working over forty hours a week. They filed a lawsuit claiming this violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and sought unpaid overtime on behalf of themselves and a putative class of similarly compensated inspectors.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania reviewed the case. System One moved to dismiss and compel arbitration, arguing that the plaintiffs had signed arbitration agreements enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The plaintiffs countered that they fell under the transportation workers' exemption to the FAA. The District Court, following the precedent set in Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., ordered limited discovery into the arbitrability of the claims before deciding on the motion to compel arbitration. System One's motion for reconsideration of this order was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case to determine if it had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal from the District Court's order. The Third Circuit held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction because the District Court's order did not formally deny the motion to compel arbitration but rather deferred its decision pending limited discovery. The court emphasized that the FAA permits appeals from specific types of orders, and the order in question did not fall within those categories. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Coleman v. System One Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

Alison George sought to represent a class and obtain damages from Rushmore Service Center, LLC, based on a letter that identified Premier Bankcard, LLC as the “current/original creditor” instead of the actual credit card company. George alleged that this violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by failing to identify the creditor to whom the debt was owed and providing misleading information. She claimed that this would confuse the least sophisticated consumer about the legitimacy of the debt.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted Rushmore’s motion to stay proceedings and compel individual arbitration. George lost in arbitration, where the arbitrator ruled in favor of Rushmore, finding that George was not misled because she admitted she did not read the letter. The District Court then declined to vacate the arbitration award, rejecting George’s arguments that the arbitrator disregarded evidence and law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether George had standing to sue. The court concluded that George lacked standing from the outset because her complaint did not allege any specific adverse effects or confusion she personally experienced due to the letter. The court held that confusion alone is insufficient to establish a concrete injury under Article III. Consequently, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s orders and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of standing. The court declined to vacate the arbitration award itself, leaving its enforceability to be determined in a jurisdictionally correct proceeding. View "George v. Rushmore Service Center LLC" on Justia Law

Allied Painting & Decorating, Inc. withdrew from the International Painters and Allied Trades Industry Pension Fund in 2005. Twelve years later, the Fund demanded $427,195 from Allied, claiming it was owed for the withdrawal. The key issue was whether the Fund's delay in sending the demand violated the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), which requires that such demands be made "as soon as practicable" after withdrawal.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reviewed the case after Allied contested the demand, arguing that the delay caused significant prejudice. The Arbitrator initially found that the Fund did not act "as soon as practicable" but concluded that Allied failed to prove severe prejudice, thus rejecting Allied's laches defense. The District Court, however, found that Allied was prejudiced by the delay and vacated the Arbitrator's Award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's order vacating the Arbitrator's Award. The Third Circuit held that the Fund's failure to send the demand "as soon as practicable" after Allied's withdrawal violated the MPPAA. The court clarified that the "as soon as practicable" requirement is a statutory mandate independent of any laches defense, meaning that the Fund's delay alone was sufficient to invalidate the demand, regardless of whether Allied could prove prejudice. Consequently, the Fund could not recover the claimed withdrawal liability from Allied. View "Allied Painting & Decorating Inc v. International Painters and Allied Trades Industry Pension" on Justia Law

StoneMor, Inc. operates cemeteries and funeral homes, with maintenance workers at two cemeteries unionized under the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 469. The Union and StoneMor negotiated a collective bargaining agreement (the "Agreement"), which was ratified on October 5, 2020. The Agreement included a grievance procedure requiring the Union to file grievances within ten days of a dispute. After ratification, StoneMor sent drafts of the Agreement with a clarified wage provision, which the Union contested. The Union did not file a grievance until January 5, 2021, after the Agreement was executed on December 29, 2020.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reviewed the case and vacated the arbitrator's award. The District Court held that the Agreement was enforceable upon ratification on October 5, 2020, and that the grievance provision was triggered by October 30, 2020, when paychecks were issued without the salary increase. The court found that the arbitrator's decision, which allowed the Union to wait until January to file a grievance, was contrary to the Agreement's plain meaning.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's judgment. The Third Circuit held that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by disregarding the Agreement's clear terms, which made the Agreement binding upon ratification. The court emphasized that the grievance procedure was mandatory from the ratification date, and the arbitrator's decision to allow a delay in filing the grievance was not supported by the Agreement. The court concluded that the arbitration award reflected a manifest disregard of the Agreement and was correctly vacated. View "Stonemor Inc v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 469" on Justia Law

The case involves the Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) and its affiliates, who sued several medical practices in separate actions in the District of New Jersey. GEICO alleged that the practices defrauded them of more than $10 million by abusing the personal injury protection (PIP) benefits offered by its auto policies. The practices allegedly filed exaggerated claims for medical services, billed medically unnecessary care, and engaged in illegal kickback schemes. GEICO's suits against the practices each included a claim under the New Jersey’s Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA).The practices sought arbitration of GEICO’s IFPA claim, arguing that a valid arbitration agreement covered the claim and that a different New Jersey insurance law allowed them to compel arbitration. However, each District Court disagreed, ruling instead that IFPA claims cannot be arbitrated. The practices appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that claims under the IFPA are arbitrable. The court found that GEICO's argument that the IFPA implicitly prohibits arbitration was not persuasive. The court also concluded that GEICO’s IFPA claims must be compelled to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), as the claims fell under the scope of the arbitration agreement in GEICO's Precertification and Decision Point Review Plan. The court remanded the case with instructions to compel arbitration of GEICO’s IFPA claims against the practices. View "GEICO v. Caring Pain Management PC" on Justia Law

The case involves the Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) and its affiliates, who sued several medical practices in separate actions in the District of New Jersey. GEICO alleged that the practices defrauded them of more than $10 million by abusing the personal injury protection (PIP) benefits offered by its auto policies. The practices filed exaggerated claims for medical services, billed medically unnecessary care, and engaged in illegal kickback schemes. GEICO's suits against the practices each included a claim under the New Jersey’s Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA).The practices sought arbitration of GEICO’s IFPA claim, arguing that a valid arbitration agreement covered the claim and that a different New Jersey insurance law allowed them to compel arbitration. However, each District Court disagreed, ruling instead that IFPA claims cannot be arbitrated. The practices appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts' decisions and compelled arbitration. The court found that the IFPA does not implicitly prohibit arbitration. The court also found that the IFPA claims before them should be compelled to arbitration under a different New Jersey law. Furthermore, the court concluded that GEICO’s IFPA claims must be compelled to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The court held that the arbitration agreement in the Plan covers the IFPA claims and therefore, must compel arbitration. The court also addressed practice-specific issues in the Mount Prospect and Precision Spine appeals. The court concluded that the District Court should not have granted GEICO leave to amend its complaint in the Mount Prospect case. In the Precision Spine case, the court held that the District Court abused its discretion by denying Precision Spine’s motion sua sponte because it was addressed to the unamended complaint. View "GEICO v. Mount Prospect Chiropractic Center PA" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Maria Del Rosario Hernandez, filed a lawsuit against MicroBilt Corporation alleging the company violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act after the lender denied her loan application based on inaccurate information provided by a MicroBilt product. MicroBilt moved to compel arbitration based on the terms and conditions that Hernandez agreed to while applying for the loan, which included an arbitration provision. However, Hernandez had already submitted her claims to the American Arbitration Association (AAA) for arbitration.The AAA notified MicroBilt that its agreement with Hernandez was a consumer agreement, which meant the AAA's Consumer Arbitration Rules applied. Applying these rules, the AAA notified MicroBilt that its arbitration provision included a material or substantial deviation from the Consumer Rules and/or Protocol. Specifically, the provision’s limitation on damages conflicted with the Consumer Due Process Protocol, which requires that an arbitrator should be empowered to grant whatever relief would be available in court under law or in equity. After MicroBilt did not waive the damages limitation, the AAA declined to administer the arbitration under Rule 1(d).MicroBilt asked Hernandez to submit her claims to a different arbitrator, but she refused, requesting a hearing before the District Court. She argued that she must now pursue her claims in court because the AAA dismissed the case under Rule 1(d). The District Court reinstated Hernandez’s complaint and granted MicroBilt leave to move to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4. However, the District Court denied MicroBilt’s motion to compel, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that Hernandez had fully complied with MicroBilt’s arbitration provision, which allowed her to pursue her claims in court. The court held that it lacked the authority to compel arbitration. The court rejected MicroBilt's arguments that the AAA administrator improperly resolved an arbitrability issue that should have been resolved by an arbitrator, that the provision’s Exclusive Resolution clause conflicted with Hernandez’s return to court, and that the AAA’s application of the Consumer Due Process Protocol was unreasonable. The court concluded that it lacked the authority to review the AAA’s decision or to sever the damages limitation from the arbitration provision. View "Hernandez v. MicroBilt Corp" on Justia Law

An Asset Purchase Agreement provided that the sellers could receive variable payments (Earn-Out Consideration) if the post-merger company (IAS) achieved specific benchmarks. Section 2.6(c) specifies that IAS had to provide the sellers with the computation for each period, to become final unless they submitted a “notice of disagreement.” Any disagreement would be settled according to Section 2.3(e),” which refers to resolution by an accounting firm. Section 11.17, however, directs the parties generally to use non-binding mediation, followed by litigation if mediation fails.IAS determined that the company did not meet its targets. The sellers claim that IAS intentionally prevented the company from hitting its targets. Negotiations failed. The sellers sued for breach of contract and tortious interference; later, they filed a notice of disagreement and sought a declaration that the lawsuit was outside the scope of sections 2.3(e) and 2.6(d). IAS sought to compel arbitration under 2.3(e). The district court held that the Agreement contained a valid agreement to arbitrate. An accounting firm subsequently determined that the sellers had no right to Earn-Out Consideration. The district court entered judgment for IAS.The Third Circuit vacated. The Purchase Agreement contains an agreement to submit narrow disputes to an accounting firm for expert determination, not arbitration. Although the statement of IAS’s financial benchmarks becomes final after the expert completes its accounting analysis, the authority to resolve legal questions—like whether IAS violated the duty of good faith— remains with the courts. View "Sapp v. Industrial Action Services LLC" on Justia Law

Berkelhammer and Ruiz participated in the ADP TotalSource Retirement Savings Plan, an investment portfolio managed by NFP. They filed suit under section 502(a)(2) of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132, for their own losses and derivatively on behalf of the Plan. The Plan’s contract with NFP contained an agreement to arbitrate disputes between the two entities. Berkelhammer and Ruiz argued that since they did not personally agree to arbitrate, the arbitration provision did not reach their claims. The district court disagreed, holding that Berkelhammer and Ruiz stand in the Plan’s contractual shoes and must accept the terms of the Plan’s contract.The Third Circuit affirmed. Civil actions under section 502(a)(2) “for breach of fiduciary duty [are] brought in a representative capacity on behalf of the plan as a whole” to “protect contractually defined benefits.” Because the plaintiffs’ claims belong to the Plan, the Plan’s consent to arbitrate controls. The presence or absence of the individual claimants’ consent to arbitration is irrelevant. View "Berkelhammer v. ADP TotalSource Group Inc." on Justia Law