Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

A dispute arose between SunStone Realty Partners X LLC (SunStone) and Bodell Construction Company (Bodell) over the postjudgment interest rate applied to a domesticated Hawaii judgment in Utah. Following arbitration in Hawaii over construction defects in a condominium development, SunStone obtained a judgment against Bodell exceeding $9.5 million, which it domesticated in Utah. Bodell requested the Utah court to apply Utah's lower postjudgment interest rate instead of Hawaii's higher one. SunStone opposed this, arguing that the Utah Foreign Judgment Act (UFJA) required the application of Hawaii's rate, or alternatively, that their contract or principles of comity mandated the Hawaii rate.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed the district court's decision to apply Utah's postjudgment interest rate. The court found that the UFJA, which does not specifically address postjudgment interest, instructs Utah courts to treat a foreign domesticated judgment like a Utah judgment for enforcement purposes. Since postjudgment interest serves, at least in part, as an enforcement mechanism, the UFJA requires the imposition of Utah’s postjudgment interest rate. Further, the construction contract did not require the application of the Hawaii postjudgment interest rate. The court did not consider principles of comity because the UFJA mandates a result. View "Sunstone Realty v. Bodell Construction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying David Taylor's motion to invalidate an arbitration award in this divorce case on the grounds that it was contrary to public policy to arbitrate divorce actions or, alternatively, arguing that the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the law, holding that there was no error.After litigating their divorce for a year, David asked Jill to arbitrate. After the arbitrator issued his decision, David filed a motion to invalidate the award under Utah Uniform Arbitration Act 78B-11-107, arguing that the arbitration agreement was not valid or binding in the divorce context for policy reasons. The district court denied David's request and confirmed the arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) having participated in arbitration without objection, David was barred from relying on section 78B-11-107 to contest the arbitration award; and (2) there was no reason to invalidate the arbitration award for manifest disregard of the law. View "Taylor v. Taylor" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Ahhmigo, LLC's motion to vacate the arbitrator's ruling in favor of The Synergy Company of Utah, LLC in this breach of contract proceeding, holding that the district court did not err.Ahhmigo filed a complaint and demand for arbitration against Synergy, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and other climes. Synergy agreed to arbitrate Ahhmigo's claims, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of Synergy. Ahhmigo moved the district court to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the law. The district court denied the motion and confirmed the arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that this Court will not reach the question presented on appeal because Ahhmigo did not raise it in the district court. View "Ahhmigo, LLC v. Synergy Co. of Utah, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court compelling arbitration in this suit alleging breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, holding that there was no error.Three doctors, including Lisa Pasquarello and John Artz, formed a limited liability company for their veterinary clinic and adopted an operating agreement that contained an arbitration clause. When Pasquarello tried to sell her portion of the practice to Artz through an oral agreement and the sale failed, Pasquarello brought this lawsuit against Artz. The district court compelled arbitration, concluding that the claims fell under the arbitration clause in the operating agreement. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) each of Pasquarello's claims related to the enforcement or interpretation of the operating agreement; and (2) therefore, court of appeals correctly held that the district court properly compelled arbitration. View "Hitorq, LLC v. TCC Veterinary Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In this, the second appeal arising out of a lawsuit against Westgate Resorts alleging violations of the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, Westgate challenged an arbitration panel’s award of attorney fees to Shawn Adel and Consumer Protection Group, LLC (collectively, CPG). In the first appeal, the Supreme Court confirmed the panel’s award of damages against Westgate. Here, Westgate argued, inter alia, that the arbitration panel had no authority to award attorney fees for the court proceedings that confirmed the panel’s decision on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the panel’s award of fees for court proceedings confirming the panel’s own decisions is void because the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act does not authorize attorney fees for such proceedings; (2) the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act allows the panel’s award of attorney fees expended during arbitration; and (3) CPG is entitled to attorney fees for this appeal. View "Westgate Resorts, Ltd. v. Adel" on Justia Law

The litigation surrounding this appeal has lasted more than a decade. Watergate Resorts first sued Shaun Adel and Consumer Protection Group, LLC (together, CPG) for breach of contract. CPG counterclaimed for fraud under the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (UPUAA). An arbitration panel decided the UPUAA claims in CPG’s favor, but, claiming bias, Westgate moved the district court to vacate the panel’s decision. The court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and confirmed the arbitration panel’s award of damages against Westgate. On remand, the arbitration panel awarded attorney fees to CPG. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the panel’s award of fees for the the court proceedings confirming the panel’s decisions on the merits is void; but (2) the panel’s award of attorney fees expended during arbitration is allowed, and CPG is entitled to attorney fees for this appeal. View "Westgate v. Adel" on Justia Law

While employed with Employer, Employee agreed to arbitrate any disputes arising from his employment. Employee's employment was later terminated. Employee filed a charge of discrimination with the Utah Anti-Discrimination and Labor Division of the Utah Labor Commission (UALD), alleging that Employer discriminated against him, retaliated against him, and harassed him. The UALD dismissed Employee's discrimination claims. Employee appealed to the Utah Labor Commission. The district court subsequently granted Employer's motion to compel arbitration and ordered Employee to submit to arbitration. The Supreme Court vacated the order compelling arbitration, holding that the district court erred in compelling arbitration because the plain language of the arbitration clause in Employee's employment contract allowed him to pursue administrative remedies prior to submitting to arbitration. View "Zions Mgmt. Servs. v. Record" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were two agreements: a ground lease agreement between ASC Utah, Inc. (ASCU) and Wolf Mountain Resorts, and a specifically planned area (SPA) development agreement, which had thirty-six signatories, including ASCU, Wolf Mountain, the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership (Osguthorpe). ASCU and Wolf Mountain began litigating claims involving both the ground lease and the SPA agreement. Shortly thereafter, Osguthorpe sued ASCU and Wolf Mountain, alleging that each party had breached a land-lease agreement distinct from the ground lease or the SPA agreement. The district court consolidated Osguthorpe's separate actions into ASCU's litigation. Osguthorpe later moved to compel arbitration on all the claims related to the SPA agreement, including the claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain, to which Osguthrope was not a party. The district court denied Osguthrope's motion. Osguthrope withdrew its SPA claims from the case, leaving for appeal only Osguthrope's motion to compel arbitration of the SPA claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the disputes for which Osguthrope sought to compel arbitration were not subject to the SPA agreement's arbitration provision; and (2) furthermore, as a non-party to the disputes, Osguthrope had no contractual right to compel their arbitration. View "Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C." on Justia Law

This case arose out of collective bargaining negotiations between the Utah Transit Authority (UTA) and Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union (Union). Those negotiations came to a standstill in 2009 when the parties entered into arbitration and litigation to resolve their disputes. The district court granted UTA's partial motion for summary judgment in the ensuing litigation, and the Union appealed. Before the matter could be addressed on appeal, however, the arbitrator entered a binding ruling largely in favor of the Union. With this ruling in hand, the parties once again entered into negotiations and successfully hammered out a new collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court dismissed the Union's appeal because the dispute had been resolved and the case was moot. View "Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of Amalgamated Transit Union" on Justia Law

This appeal was rooted in a dispute over an arbitration award. Each party had selected an arbitrator, and a third neutral arbitrator was selected by the two party-appointed arbitrators. Appellee argued that the award should be vacated because one of the party-appointed arbitrators did not disclose that he was first cousins with one of the shareholders in the opposing counsel's law firm. The district court granted Appellee's motion to vacate arbitration award. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under section 129 of the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act (UUAA), there is no appeal of right from a district court order denying confirmation of an arbitration award, vacating the award, and directing a rehearing; (2) party-appointed arbitrators are held to the disclosure standards of the UUAA and not the standards that apply to neutral arbitrators; and (3) the UUAA does not support vacatur in this case, as (i) under subsection 113(4) of the UUAA, the failure to disclose a relationship can support vacatur only if it also meets one of the provisions outlined in subsection 124(1)(b) of the UUAA; and (ii) none of those provisions was shown in this case. View "WestGate Resorts, Ltd. v. Adel" on Justia Law