Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

A former employee, Liu, sued her employer, Miniso, alleging various employment-related claims, including sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and wage and hour violations. Liu claimed that she was subjected to severe and pervasive sexual harassment and discrimination based on her sexual orientation and gender identity. She also alleged that Miniso misclassified her as an exempt employee, resulting in unpaid wages and denied rest and meal breaks. Liu further claimed that she faced retaliation for refusing to participate in illegal practices and for whistleblowing, leading to her constructive termination.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Miniso's motion to compel arbitration of Liu's claims. Miniso argued that the arbitration agreement Liu signed should compel arbitration of all her claims, except for the sexual harassment claims, which they conceded were exempt under the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA). The trial court found that Liu had adequately stated a claim for sexual harassment and ruled that the EFAA invalidated the arbitration agreement for all of Liu's claims, not just the sexual harassment claims.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that under the EFAA, if a plaintiff's case includes at least one claim related to sexual harassment, the entire case is exempt from arbitration. The court reasoned that the plain language of the EFAA invalidates the arbitration agreement with respect to the entire case, not just the specific claims of sexual harassment. Consequently, Liu could not be compelled to arbitrate any of her claims, and the trial court's denial of Miniso's motion to compel arbitration was upheld. View "Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc." on Justia Law

Former police officer Sergio Ramirez was terminated by the City of Indio Police Department following an internal affairs investigation. Ramirez was initially placed on administrative leave after being charged with rape and sexual assault, though he was later acquitted of all criminal charges. The internal investigation produced conflicting reports, with one concluding Ramirez violated multiple conduct standards and another finding the allegations "not sustained." The Chief of Police issued a Notice of Termination, citing Ramirez's poor judgment, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming of an officer.Ramirez appealed the termination through the administrative appeal procedure outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the City and the Indio Police Officers’ Association. An arbitrator conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing and recommended Ramirez's reinstatement with full back pay and benefits. However, the City Manager reviewed the arbitrator's findings and upheld the termination, citing Ramirez's poor judgment, dishonesty, and conduct that embarrassed the department.Ramirez petitioned the Superior Court of Riverside County for a writ of mandate, arguing that the City Manager should have deferred to the arbitrator's findings on the weight and credibility of the evidence. The superior court denied the petition, finding that the MOU clearly vested the final decision-making authority in the City Manager and that the City Manager's findings were supported by sufficient evidence.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, affirmed the superior court's judgment. The court held that the MOU's language and framework did not require the City Manager to defer to the arbitrator's findings on relevancy, weight, and credibility of the evidence. The court also found that the administrative appeal procedure provided Ramirez with due process, as it included notice, an opportunity to respond, and a meaningful hearing before an independent arbitrator, with the City Manager conducting a thorough review before making the final decision. View "Ramirez v. City of Indio" on Justia Law

A home improvement and solar panel salesperson visited the home of senior citizens Harold and Lucy West, who lived with their adult daughter Deon. The salesperson, Ilai Mitmiger, discussed a solar installation and bathroom renovation, leading to a loan agreement package being completed electronically with Harold’s signature. Harold and Lucy, both in their 90s and suffering from dementia, did not use email, computers, or mobile phones. Deon believed the renovations would be paid for by a government program, as suggested by Mitmiger. The loan documents were sent to Deon’s email, opened on a mobile device, and signed electronically in Harold’s name within seconds.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Solar Mosaic LLC’s petition to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provisions in the loan agreement. The court found that Mosaic had not proven the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, specifically that Harold was the person who completed the loan documents or that Deon had the authority to bind Harold to an arbitration agreement.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the evidence strongly suggested Harold lacked the technical ability to execute the electronic signatures and demonstrated a factual dispute as to whether Harold actually signed the loan documents. The court also found that Mosaic had not proven Deon had the authority to bind Harold to the agreement or that Harold ratified the agreement through a recorded telephone call. The court concluded that the recorded call did not demonstrate Harold’s awareness or understanding of the loan agreement, and thus, there was no ratification. View "West v. Solar Mosaic, LLC" on Justia Law

The decedent, suffering from Parkinson’s disease, dysphagia, and dementia, was admitted to Elmcrest Care Center in February 2013. On August 4, 2017, he was found nonresponsive on the floor by Elmcrest staff, who administered CPR and called 911. He was transported to a hospital and passed away four days later. The Estate of Jose de Jesus Ortiz, represented by Ericka Ortiz, filed a civil action against Elmcrest and its staff, alleging elder abuse, neglect, negligence, willful misconduct, and fraud. The trial court compelled arbitration based on an agreement signed upon the decedent’s admission to Elmcrest.The arbitrator issued a First Interim Award on March 30, 2022, finding that the Estate did not meet its burden of proof on any of its claims. The award was labeled "interim" and allowed for further submissions by the parties to address any omitted issues. The Estate filed a request to amend the First Interim Award, arguing that damages for pre-death loss of dignity were not considered. The arbitrator issued a Second Interim Award on May 26, 2022, awarding $100,000 in damages for pre-death pain and suffering, and invited the Estate to file for attorney fees and costs.The trial court initially denied the Estate’s petition to vacate the First Interim Award, ruling it was not final. However, it later vacated the Final Award and confirmed the First Interim Award, reasoning that the First Interim Award had resolved all necessary issues. The Estate appealed.The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the First Interim Award was not final as it expressly reserved jurisdiction for further proceedings. The court concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed her authority in issuing the Final Award, which included the omitted decision on pre-death loss of dignity. The trial court was directed to enter a new order confirming the Final Award. View "Ortiz v. Elmcrest Care Center, LLC" on Justia Law

Julian Rodriguez, an hourly machine operator for Lawrence Equipment, Inc., filed a class action lawsuit in December 2015 alleging various wage-and-hour violations under the California Labor Code. Rodriguez claimed that Lawrence failed to pay for all hours worked, provide adequate meal and rest breaks, issue accurate wage statements, and pay final wages timely. In July 2014, Rodriguez had signed an arbitration agreement with Lawrence, which led to the arbitration of his non-PAGA claims. The arbitrator ruled in favor of Lawrence, finding that Rodriguez failed to prove any of the alleged Labor Code violations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County confirmed the arbitration award and entered judgment in favor of Lawrence. Rodriguez appealed the judgment, but it was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Subsequently, Lawrence moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Rodriguez's remaining PAGA claim was barred by issue preclusion because the arbitrator had already determined that no Labor Code violations occurred. The trial court initially denied the motion but later granted it after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, which influenced the court's interpretation of PAGA standing.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the arbitrator's findings precluded Rodriguez from establishing standing as an aggrieved employee under PAGA. The court concluded that issue preclusion applied because the arbitrator's decision was final, the issues were identical, actually litigated, and necessarily decided, and the parties were the same. Consequently, Rodriguez lacked standing to pursue the PAGA claim, and the judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "Rodriguez v. Lawrence Equipment, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lisa Lombardo, Daniel Bates, and James Bates sued Gramercy Court as heirs of Elizabeth Stein, alleging wrongful death, negligence, elder abuse, and gross negligence due to the care Stein received at Gramercy Court's nursing facility. Stein developed bedsores and died shortly after being transferred back to the hospital. Gramercy Court petitioned to compel arbitration based on an agreement Lombardo signed on Stein's behalf, but the trial court denied the petition.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found that Stein's durable power of attorney did not grant Lombardo the authority to sign arbitration agreements on Stein's behalf. The court also determined that Stein did not give Lombardo ostensible authority through her actions. Additionally, the court ruled that the arbitration agreement was not enforceable against Lombardo's or the other plaintiffs' individual claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that Lombardo did not have actual or ostensible authority to bind Stein to the arbitration agreement. The durable power of attorney did not explicitly grant Lombardo the authority to enter into arbitration agreements, and there was no evidence that Stein's conduct led Gramercy Court to believe Lombardo had such authority. The court also concluded that the arbitration agreement did not apply to the plaintiffs' individual claims, as Lombardo was not a party to the agreement in her individual capacity. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order denying Gramercy Court's petition to compel arbitration. View "Lombardo v. Gramercy Court" on Justia Law

Christina Leeper entered into an independent contractor agreement with Shipt, Inc. to provide services as a Shipt shopper. The agreement included an arbitration clause requiring all disputes to be resolved through binding arbitration. Leeper filed a complaint against Shipt and its parent company, Target Corporation, under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), alleging that Shipt misclassified her and other workers as independent contractors, violating multiple provisions of the Labor Code. Leeper sought civil penalties and injunctive relief on behalf of herself and other aggrieved employees.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Shipt and Target's motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that Leeper's PAGA action did not include any individual claims subject to arbitration under the parties' agreement. The court concluded that the action was solely a representative PAGA suit without any individual causes of action to compel to arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that every PAGA action necessarily includes an individual PAGA claim based on the unambiguous statutory language and legislative history. Consequently, the court directed the lower court to issue a new order compelling arbitration of Leeper's individual PAGA claim and staying the litigation of the representative PAGA claim portion of the lawsuit. The appellate court awarded costs on appeal to Shipt and Target. View "Leeper v. Shipt, Inc." on Justia Law

Pauline Mary Huff filed a class action and a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) action against her former employer, Interior Specialists, Inc., alleging various wage-and-hour violations. Huff opposed the motion to compel arbitration, arguing that the arbitration agreement was invalid because it was signed by someone else named "William" in DocuSign. The trial court found sufficient evidence that Huff consented to the agreement and granted the motion to compel arbitration.The trial court consolidated the class and PAGA actions. Interior Specialists then moved to compel Huff’s PAGA claims to arbitration. The trial court reiterated its earlier finding that Huff validly signed the agreement and, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, ordered Huff’s individual PAGA claims to arbitration and dismissed her nonindividual PAGA claims without prejudice for lack of standing.Huff appealed the October 21, 2022 order, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing her nonindividual PAGA claims and in finding that she signed the arbitration agreement. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, concluded that Huff timely appealed the October 21 order. On the merits, the court reversed the dismissal of Huff’s nonindividual PAGA claims based on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc., which rejected Viking River’s interpretation of California law on standing. The court did not address Huff’s arguments concerning the electronic signature, as the reversal based on Adolph rendered it unnecessary.The court remanded the case with directions to stay Huff’s nonindividual PAGA claims pending the completion of arbitration. Huff was awarded her costs on appeal. View "Huff v. Interior Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

In January 2019, Raymond Robinson and his son sued Emerald Homes, L.L.C., and 21st Mortgage Corporation in the Baldwin Circuit Court. Robinson had contracted with Emerald to purchase a mobile home, financed by a loan from 21st Mortgage. After tearing down his existing house in preparation for the new mobile home, the loan was not completed, allegedly due to Emerald and/or 21st Mortgage's refusal to finalize the transaction. The complaint included claims of breach of contract, misrepresentation, suppression, and negligence, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.The trial court compelled arbitration for claims against Emerald and granted summary judgment in favor of 21st Mortgage on Raymond's claims. The case proceeded to a jury trial on Robinson's claims against 21st Mortgage. The jury found in favor of Robinson on promissory fraud and the tort of outrage, awarding him $2,980,000 in total damages. 21st Mortgage's post-trial motions, including for judgment as a matter of law (JML), were denied.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It held that Robinson did not present substantial evidence of promissory fraud, as he failed to prove that 21st Mortgage had no intention to perform the loan promise at the time it was made or intended to deceive him. The court also found that Robinson did not meet all the conditions required for the loan, and the failure to close the loan was not due to any fraudulent intent by 21st Mortgage.Regarding the tort of outrage, the court held that the conduct of 21st Mortgage did not meet the extreme and outrageous standard required for such a claim. The court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "21st Mortgage Corporation v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In January 2023, the Keenums and Karibu Home Builders, LLC entered into a real-estate sales contract where the Keenums agreed to sell seven lots and construct a paved road before the closing date. The contract included dispute-resolution provisions for mediation and arbitration. The Keenums did not complete the road or appear for the closing. Karibu sued for specific performance and damages, claiming the Keenums breached the contract. The Keenums argued the contract was void due to Karibu's failure to meet obligations and the requirement for mediation and arbitration.The Colbert Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Keenums, dismissing the case with prejudice. The court concluded it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to the contract's mediation and arbitration provision, implying Karibu should have filed directly with the American Arbitration Association.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo and found that the trial court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction. The court held that the trial court had the authority to determine whether the mediation and arbitration provision applied and should have compelled arbitration rather than dismissing the case. The summary judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Karibu Home Builders, LLC v. Keenum" on Justia Law