Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around the death of Skyler A. Womack (Skyler) at Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc., a skilled nursing facility. Skyler's parents, Jonie A. Holland (Holland) and Wayne D. Womack (Wayne), filed a lawsuit against Silverscreen, alleging dependent adult abuse and negligence on behalf of Skyler, as well as their own claim for wrongful death. Silverscreen moved to compel arbitration of the entire complaint based on an arbitration agreement between Skyler and Silverscreen.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Silverscreen’s motion to compel arbitration for the survivor claims but denied the motion for the wrongful death cause of action. The court reasoned that the parents did not have an enforceable arbitration agreement with Silverscreen. The court's decision was heavily influenced by the case Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc.Silverscreen appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District. The appellant argued that, according to Ruiz v. Podolsky, the parents are bound by the arbitration agreement signed by Skyler, and therefore, the parents’ wrongful death claim should be subject to arbitration. The appellate court agreed with Silverscreen, stating that Ruiz governs this matter. Consequently, under Ruiz and Code of Civil Procedure section 1295, the parents’ wrongful death claim must go to arbitration along with Skyler’s survivor claims. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case with directions. View "Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Yuriria Diaz, a former employee of Macy's West Stores, Inc., filed a lawsuit under the California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) for alleged violations of California's labor code. Macy's appealed the district court's order compelling arbitration of all Diaz's claims. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order compelling arbitration of Diaz's individual PAGA claims, but vacated the order to the extent it compels arbitration of her non-individual claims.Previously, the district court had compelled arbitration of all Diaz's claims, interpreting the arbitration agreement between Diaz and Macy's to include non-individual PAGA claims. The court denied Diaz's request for a stay and closed the case, stating there were no remaining claims before the court.The Ninth Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the district court's order as a final decision with respect to arbitration. The court found that at the time of contracting, the parties consented only to arbitration of individual claims relating to Diaz's own employment. The agreement's language was strongly indicative of an intent to exclude any amalgamation of employees’ claims—including non-individual PAGA claims—from arbitration.The court rejected Macy's request that the district court on remand be instructed to dismiss the non-individual claims because under a recent California Supreme Court decision, those claims cannot be dismissed. The court remanded with instruction to treat the non-arbitrable non-individual claims consistent with the California Supreme Court’s decision, anticipating that the parties will, per their agreement, request a stay with respect to those claims. View "Diaz v. Macy’s West Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves the Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) and its affiliates, who sued several medical practices in separate actions in the District of New Jersey. GEICO alleged that the practices defrauded them of more than $10 million by abusing the personal injury protection (PIP) benefits offered by its auto policies. The practices allegedly filed exaggerated claims for medical services, billed medically unnecessary care, and engaged in illegal kickback schemes. GEICO's suits against the practices each included a claim under the New Jersey’s Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA).The practices sought arbitration of GEICO’s IFPA claim, arguing that a valid arbitration agreement covered the claim and that a different New Jersey insurance law allowed them to compel arbitration. However, each District Court disagreed, ruling instead that IFPA claims cannot be arbitrated. The practices appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that claims under the IFPA are arbitrable. The court found that GEICO's argument that the IFPA implicitly prohibits arbitration was not persuasive. The court also concluded that GEICO’s IFPA claims must be compelled to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), as the claims fell under the scope of the arbitration agreement in GEICO's Precertification and Decision Point Review Plan. The court remanded the case with instructions to compel arbitration of GEICO’s IFPA claims against the practices. View "GEICO v. Caring Pain Management PC" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Andrew Reynosa and his former employer, Advanced Transportation Services, Inc. (ATS). Reynosa had signed an arbitration agreement with ATS during his employment. After leaving the company, he filed a complaint for damages against ATS, which was then moved to arbitration as per the agreement. However, Reynosa later filed a motion to withdraw from arbitration, arguing that ATS had twice failed to pay the required arbitration fees within the stipulated 30-day period, thereby waiving its right to compel him to proceed with arbitration.The Tulare County Superior Court denied Reynosa's motion to withdraw from arbitration. The court found that the parties had mutually agreed to extend the deadline for payment of the arbitration fees, and ATS had paid the fees within the extended deadline. Therefore, the court concluded that ATS had not materially breached the arbitration agreement.Reynosa then petitioned the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, seeking a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order and grant his motion to withdraw from arbitration. The appellate court granted Reynosa's request for a stay of the arbitration proceedings and issued an order to show cause why writ relief should not be granted.The appellate court concluded that the superior court had erroneously denied Reynosa's motion to withdraw from arbitration. The court found that ATS had materially breached the arbitration agreement by failing to pay the arbitration fees within the stipulated 30-day period. The court held that Reynosa was entitled to withdraw from arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction. The court issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order and grant Reynosa's motion to withdraw from arbitration. The court also ordered the superior court to address Reynosa's requests for sanctions under the relevant code of civil procedure. View "Reynosa v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves Ramon Dejesus Cedeno, an employee of Strategic Financial Solutions, LLC, and a participant in its Strategic Employee Stock Ownership Plan. Cedeno sued the company, its trustee Argent Trust Company, and other defendants under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), alleging that a transaction caused the Plan to incur substantial losses and that Argent breached fiduciary duties owed to Plan participants. The defendants moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), pointing to a provision in the Plan’s governing document that required Plan participants to resolve any claims related to the Plan in arbitration.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the motion, reasoning that the agreement was unenforceable because it would prevent Cedeno from effectuating rights guaranteed by Congress through ERISA, namely, the plan-wide relief available under Section 502(a)(2) to enforce the rights established in ERISA Section 409(a).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the arbitration provision is unenforceable because it would prevent Cedeno from pursuing the Plan-wide remedies Sections 409(a) and 502(a)(2) unequivocally provide. The court concluded that the entire arbitration provision is null and void due to a non-severability clause in the Plan. View "Cedeno v. Sasson" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over a real estate commission. Andrew Waldo, a broker in charge of a realty company, represented buyers in the purchase of thirteen golf courses from National Golf Management, LLC (NGM). Michael Cousins, another broker, who had previously represented NGM in an earlier transaction, claimed a commission for the golf course deal despite not having a written representation agreement. Cousins, Waldo, and Waldo's agent agreed to arbitrate their dispute. The arbitration panel ruled in favor of Cousins, awarding him half of the commission earned on the golf course sale.The circuit court initially dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that oral agreements for a commission were unenforceable under South Carolina law. However, the arbitration panel later ruled in favor of Cousins. Waldo petitioned the circuit court to vacate the award, which was referred to the Master-in-Equity. The Master-in-Equity vacated the award, stating that the arbitration panel ignored statutory law regarding real-estate agency. The court of appeals reversed this decision, ruling that there was a "barely colorable" ground for the arbitration award based on a line of cases upholding oral and implied contracts for real estate commissions.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the court of appeals' decision and vacated the award. The court held that the arbitration panel had manifestly disregarded several statutes governing real-estate agency law in awarding Cousins half of the commission. The court noted that the Act, which governs real-estate licensing, requires written agreements for real estate agency and forbids oral or implied ones. The court also rejected Cousins' argument that he was entitled to a commission based on a series of cases that recognized a realtor's right to a commission through an oral or implied contract, as these cases were decided before the Act became law. View "Waldo v. Cousins" on Justia Law

A group of individuals, including a minor, filed a class action lawsuit against Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. for alleged misrepresentations related to the mobile application Game of Thrones: Conquest (GOTC). The plaintiffs claimed that Warner Bros. engaged in false and misleading advertising within the game. In response, Warner Bros. moved to compel arbitration of all claims based on the GOTC Terms of Service, which users agree to by tapping a “Play” button located on the app’s sign-in screen. The district court denied Warner Bros.' motion, finding that the notice of the Terms of Service was insufficiently conspicuous to bind users to them.The case was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The lower court had found that Warner Bros. failed to provide reasonably conspicuous notice of its Terms of Service, thus denying the motion to compel arbitration. The district court focused on whether the context of the transaction put the plaintiffs on notice that they were agreeing to the Terms of Service, concluding that the app did not involve a continuing relationship that would require some terms and conditions.The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court erred in finding that Warner Bros. failed to provide reasonably conspicuous notice. The court found that the context of the transaction and the placement of the notice were both sufficient to provide reasonably conspicuous notice. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable due to its ban on public injunctive relief. The court concluded that the unenforceability of the waiver of one’s right to seek public injunctive relief did not make either this provision or the arbitration agreement unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "KEEBAUGH V. WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed a case involving a dispute between the University of Iowa and Modern Piping, Inc., a mechanical contractor. The dispute arose during the construction of the University of Iowa Stead Family Children’s Hospital. Modern Piping sought to arbitrate some delay disputes, but the University obtained a temporary injunction preventing arbitration. Modern Piping successfully had the injunction dissolved and sought to recover not only the fees and costs it incurred in doing so, but also restitution for the University's wrongful injunction.The district court initially granted the University an ex parte temporary injunction against Modern Piping, preventing arbitration of specific disputes. Modern Piping intervened and successfully had the injunction dissolved. The University appealed this decision but was unsuccessful. Meanwhile, the parties arbitrated the original disputes, resulting in the University paying Modern Piping over $16 million pursuant to the arbitration award.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the restitution awarded to Modern Piping was not a proper remedy for a claim for wrongful injunction and could not stand. The court affirmed the $21,784.50 award to Modern Piping for fees and costs but reversed the $12,784,177.00 award for restitution. The court found that Modern Piping's claim for restitution was not directly correlated to the injunction, and therefore, it was not entitled to recover restitution in the form of a broad-reaching unjust enrichment claim. The case was remanded for entry of an order consistent with this directive. View "The University of Iowa v. Modern Piping, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Christine Matlock Dougherty, who sued U.S. Behavioral Health Plan, California (USB) for claims related to her son's healthcare. Dougherty's son, Ryan, was enrolled in a UnitedHealthcare HMO health plan, which Dougherty had access to through her employer. Ryan admitted himself into a residential treatment facility for severe drug addiction, but USB denied coverage for his stay after three days, arguing that he could be treated at home. Ryan fatally overdosed shortly after his discharge from the facility. Dougherty then sued USB, claiming that its wrongful denial of coverage for Ryan's treatment caused his death. USB petitioned to compel arbitration of her claims, but the trial court denied the petition, stating that USB's arbitration agreement was not enforceable because it did not comply with the disclosure requirements imposed by Health & Safety Code section 1363.1.The trial court denied USB's petition to compel arbitration on the grounds that the arbitration agreement did not comply with the disclosure requirements of Health & Safety Code section 1363.1. The court found that there were two separate contracts, one between Dougherty and UnitedHealthcare, and another between Dougherty and USB. The court ruled that the arbitration agreement in the supplement, which governed Dougherty's claims against USB, did not comply with section 1363.1's disclosure requirements.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Two reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court concluded that USB forfeited its argument that the issue of whether the arbitration agreement was valid under the disclosure requirements of section 1363.1 was delegated to the arbitrator. However, the court agreed with USB that the trial court erroneously denied USB’s petition because USB complied with section 1363.1. The court found that the only "health care service plan" at issue that "includes terms that require binding arbitration" is Dougherty’s plan with UnitedHealthcare, which includes both the EOC and the supplement as components of the plan. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no section 1363.1 violation and reversed the trial court's order denying the petition to compel arbitration. View "Dougherty v. U.S. Behavioral Health Plan" on Justia Law

The case involves Angel Mondragon, an employee of Sunrun Inc., who was required to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of his employment. The agreement covered most disputes related to Mondragon’s employment but excluded claims brought under the Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA). After his employment ended, Mondragon filed a complaint asserting several causes of action under PAGA. Sunrun filed a motion to compel arbitration of Mondragon’s claims, which the trial court denied. Sunrun appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in ruling on whether Mondragon’s claims were arbitrable.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County had previously denied Sunrun's motion to compel arbitration. The court ruled that it, not the arbitrator, should decide questions of arbitrability. The court also ruled that the arbitration agreement unambiguously excluded PAGA claims and did not differentiate between individual PAGA claims and PAGA claims brought on behalf of other employees.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Seven affirmed the decision of the lower court. The court concluded that Mondragon, an unsophisticated party, did not delegate arbitrability decisions to the arbitrator. The court also concluded that the language of the arbitration agreement did not require Mondragon to arbitrate his individual PAGA claims. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court. View "Mondragon v. Sunrun Inc." on Justia Law