Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against Verizon, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, and the Iowa Debt Collection Practices Act, Iowa Code 537.7103 (2014), arising out of a billing dispute. Verizon moved to compel arbitration and plaintiffs filed a response consenting to arbitration. Before the court ruled on Verizon's motion to compel arbitration, plaintiff filed a Notice of Settlement. When the parties were unable to agree on a written settlement agreement, each filed a motion to enforce its version of the settlement. The court concluded that the district court did not err in deciding there was no binding pre-arbitration settlement; the district court did not clearly err in finding no enforceable settlement; and plaintiff Shultz had agreed to arbitration. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order denying plaintiffs' motion to amend or correct the judgment. View "Schultz v. Verizon Wireless" on Justia Law

Kurtrina Smith and Rickey Levins separately initiated actions against defendants the African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. ("the AME Church"); James L. Davis, bishop and presiding officer of the AME Church's Ninth Episcopal District (collectively, "the Ninth District"); and Lincoln National Life Insurance Company ("Lincoln National") after Lincoln National denied their respective claims for benefits filed pursuant to a group life-insurance policy Davis had purchased from Lincoln National on behalf of the Ninth District. Smith and Levins alleged the group policy provided coverage for Smith's mother and Levins's father. The defendants moved the trial court hearing each action to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration provisions that were allegedly part of the group policy and certificates. The trial court denied those motions, and defendants appealed. Finding that the trial court erred in denying the motion, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for arbitration proceedings. View "African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc. v. Levins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that, after her employment terminated, defendants failed to pay all of her final wages. She filed a putative class action under Labor Code sections 201-203, also asserting a representative Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) claim seeking civil penalties on behalf of plaintiff and other aggrieved employees. Defendants submitted an arbitration agreement signed by plaintiff, stating any disputes would be submitted to arbitration and that “[a]ny such claims must be submitted on an individual basis only and I hereby waive the right to bring or join any type of collective or class claim in arbitration, in any court, or in any other forum.” Defendants conceded that the agreement cannot waive the representative PAGA claim. The trial court compelled arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claim, dismissed the class claims, bifurcated the representative PAGA claim, and stayed the PAGA claim pending the completion of arbitration. The court of appeal concluded the order is nonappealable; the order does not appear to constitute a de facto final judgment for absent plaintiffs. The putative class members/aggrieved employees under PAGA because their PAGA claims remain pending. View "Young v. REMX" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a Court of Appeals' decision affirming a circuit court order denying petitioner's John Wieland Homes and Neighborhoods of the Carolinas, Inc.'s ("JWH") motion to compel arbitration. JWH sold lots and "spec" homes on a sixty-five acre residential subdivision. In 2007, respondents ("the Parsons") executed a purchase agreement to buy a home built and sold by JWH ("the Property"). In 2008, the Parsons discovered PVC pipes and a metal lined concrete box buried on their Property. The PVC pipes and box contained "black sludge," which tested positive as a hazardous substance. JWH entered a cleanup contract with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. JWH completed and paid for the cleanup per the cleanup contract. The Parsons claim they were unaware the Property was previously an industrial site and contained hazardous substances. In 2011, the Parsons filed the present lawsuit alleging JWH breached the purchase agreement by failing to disclose defects with the Property, selling property that was contaminated, and selling property with known underground pipes. The Parsons further alleged breach of contract, breach of implied warranties, unfair trade practices, negligent misrepresentation, negligence and gross negligence, and fraud. JWH moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the complaint. The motion asserted that all of the Parsons' claims arose out of the purchase agreement, and the Parsons clearly agreed that all such disputes would be decided by arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion and found the arbitration clause was unenforceable. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's finding that the scope of the arbitration clause was restricted to Warranty claims and declined to address the circuit court's application of the outrageous torts exception doctrine. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's conclusion and reversed. View "Parsons v. John Wieland Homes" on Justia Law

Petitioner commenced arbitration against his former employers, who are both members of FINRA. This appeal stems from the dismissal of a petition to vacate an arbitral award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10. The district court held that internal FINRA rules do not present questions of federal law, and that plaintiff's reliance on his section 10(b) claim was “squarely foreclosed” by Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Because the petition does not present a facial claim of any manifest disregard of federal law, the court must decide whether Greenberg remains good law in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Vaden v. Discover Bank. The court concluded that Vaden not only cast doubt on the court's precedent but rendered its holding fundamentally inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis of jurisdictional inquiries under the Act. Accordingly, the court overruled Greenberg and concluded that federal courts may “look through” section 10 petitions, applying the ordinary principles of federal‐question jurisdiction to the underlying dispute as defined by Vaden. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Doscher v. Sea Port" on Justia Law

Linde Health Care Staffing, Inc., received a favorable arbitration award in Missouri against the Claiborne County Hospital. Linde reduced the award to a Missouri judgment, then enrolled the foreign judgment in two Mississippi counties. The Hospital successfully moved to set aside the foreign judgment in both Mississippi counties, since it never contracted with Linde and, thus, was not bound by the contract’s arbitration agreement. On appeal, Linde argued the Hospital’s motions to set aside the foreign judgment were filed too late and were time-barred by the Federal Arbitration Act’s procedural rules. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the FAA could not bind an entity that neither agreed to arbitrate nor contracted with the arbitration claimant. Therefore the Court affirmed the two Mississippi judgments setting aside the enrollment of the foreign judgment. View "Linde Health Care Staffing, Inc. v. Claiborne County Hospital" on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants Thomas and Lynn Hazelbaker owned a condominium in the Rancho Mirage Country Club development. Defendants made improvements to an exterior patio, which plaintiff-respondent Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Association contended were in violation of the applicable covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs). The parties mediated the dispute pursuant to the Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act, the results of which were memorialized in a written agreement. Subsequently, the Association filed this suit alleging that defendants had failed to comply with their obligations under the mediation agreement to modify the property in certain ways. While the lawsuit was pending, defendants made modifications to the patio to the satisfaction of the Association. Nevertheless, the parties could not reach agreement regarding attorney fees, which the Association asserted it was entitled to receive as the prevailing party. The Association filed a motion for attorney fees and costs, seeking an award of $31,970 in attorney fees and $572 in costs. The trial court granted the motion in part, awarding the Association $18,991 in attorney fees and $572 in costs. Defendants argued on appeal that the trial court’s award, as well as its subsequent denial of a motion to reconsider the issue, was erroneous in various respects. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's award. View "Rancho Mirage Country Club HOA v. Hazelbaker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's orders refusing to enjoin arbitration and confirming an award in favor of the WestEnd Parties. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction to review the Injunction Order; the WestEnd Parties did not substantially invoke the judicial process and thus have not waived arbitration; and the district court did not err in refusing to enjoin arbitration based on res judicata where the temporary restraining order (TRO) suit and the arbitration claims do not arise from the same transaction. The court applied the vacatur standards of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(2), and concluded that plaintiff points to no specific facts that lead to the conclusion that the Arbitrator was biased in the WestEnd Parties’ favor, and the Arbitrator did not exceed his powers in making the award. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cooper v. WestEnd Capital Mgmt, LLC" on Justia Law

League Commissioner Roger Goodell, during the 2014 football season, suspended Minnesota Vikings running back Adrian Peterson indefinitely and fined Peterson a sum equivalent to six games' pay. Peterson’s suspension stemmed from his plea of nolo contendere in November 2014 to a charge of misdemeanor reckless assault on one of his children. After Peterson appealed his discipline to an arbitrator, the arbitrator affirmed the suspension and fine. The district court then granted Peterson's petition to vacate the arbitration decision and the League appealed. The Commissioner subsequently reinstated Peterson. At issue in this appeal is whether the League may collect the fine imposed by the Commissioner and upheld by the arbitrator. The court concluded that the parties bargained to be bound by the decision of the arbitrator, and the arbitrator acted within his authority. The court rejected the Association's remaining contentions that the arbitrator was "evidently partial' and that the arbitration was “fundamentally unfair.” Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s judgment vacating the arbitration decision and the court remanded with directions to dismiss the petition. View "NFL Players Ass'n v. National Football League" on Justia Law

Tracy and Jose married in 1996. They later separated. Tracy filed a petition for dissolution in 2011. In 2012, the superior court ordered temporary spousal support. The parties decided not to further litigate the case in the superior court and stipulated to the appointment of attorney Perkovich as judge pro tempore, under California Rules of Court 2.830-2.834. After Perkovich had served for two years, Tracy learned that Perkovich had not disclosed “in writing or on the record” professional relationships she had with lawyers in the proceeding, as required by the Rules. Tracy filed in the superior court a statement seeking disqualification. Perkovich failed to respond in accordance with statutory procedure. The presiding judge ordered her disqualified, holding that she was deemed to have consented to disqualification by her failure to file a consent or verified answer. The case was reassigned; discovery proceeded. The court delayed a hearing on Tracy’s motion to set aside orders made by Perkovich. The court of appeal held that Perkovich’s failure to contest the claims means that those factual allegations must be taken as true and that she was automatically disqualified. Her rulings are all void; the settlement agreement signed before her disqualification was tainted and may not be enforced. Perkovich’s conduct did not taint the proceedings before the superior court judge who replaced her. View "Hayward v. Super Court" on Justia Law