Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

As a condition of her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff signed an agreement to resolve any employment-related disputes through arbitration. After Plaintiff resigned, she filed a complaint against Defendants, alleging that she suffered harassment, discrimination, and retaliation during the course of her employment. Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff opposed the motion, asserting that it was unconscionable. The trial court agreed with Plaintiff and denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court of appeal reversed. The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because of a clause in the agreement providing that, in the event a claim proceeds to arbitration, the parties are authorized to seek preliminary injunctive relief in the superior court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable because the clause did no more that restate existing law. View "Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal stems from Roger and Mary Jo Carlson's attempt to arbitrate class action claims against Pulte under a sales agreement that contained an arbitration clause, and Pulte's efforts to limit arbitration to the claims between the three parties. Because the primary goal in enforcing an arbitration agreement is to discern and honor party intent, and because of the fundamental differences between bilateral and class arbitration - which change the nature of arbitration altogether - the court held that whether parties agree to class arbitration is a gateway question for the court. In this case, the parties did not unmistakably provide that the arbitrator would decide whether their agreement authorizes class arbitration. In fact, the sales agreement says nothing at all about the subject. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that the question was a procedural one for the arbitrator. Accordingly, the court reversed the order denying Pulte's motion for partial summary judgment, vacated the judgment dismissing the petition, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Del Webb Communities, Inc. v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Sgouros purchased a “credit score” package from TransUnion. Armed with the number TransUnion gave him, he went to a car dealership and tried to use it to negotiate a favorable loan. The score he had bought, however, was useless: it was 100 points higher than the score pulled by the dealership. Sgouros filed suit, asserting that TransUnion violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681g(f)(7)(A); the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1; and the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. 407.010, by misleading consumers by failing to inform them that the formula used to calculate their purchased credit scores was materially different from the formula used by lenders. TransUnion moved to compel arbitration, asserting that the website through which Sgouros purchased his product included an agreement to arbitrate. The district court concluded that no such contract had been formed and denied TransUnion’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed after evaluating the website and concluding that TransUnion had not put consumers on notice of the terms of agreement, as required by Illinois law, but actually distracted them from noticing those terms. View "Sgouros v. TransUnion Corp." on Justia Law

Ling's employment as a Monterey restaurant manager was terminated. Her position was classified as exempt under Industrial Wage Order 5-2001(1)(B)(1), from overtime compensation and mandated meal periods. Ling sued, seeking unpaid overtime wages, waiting time penalties, and premium pay for failure to provide meal and rest periods; she alleged unfair competition and sought attorney‘s fees and costs. An arbitrator rejected Ling’s claim that she was wrongly classified and her contention that chronic staffing shortages required her to spend time performing nonexempt hourly work. Based on nine weeks when she attended training, Ling was compensated $1,038 for missed meal periods and $7,668 in waiting time penalties. The arbitrator deemed employer the prevailing party on all but that minor issue, awarded employer $29,046 in costs and $212,685 in attorney‘s fees based on the dominant contention of erroneous classification.The court corrected and remanded. The court of appeal agreed that the arbitrator exceeded his power by awarding statutory attorney‘s fees to an employer for work performed in defeating inextricably intertwined claims, contrary to public policy embedded in the Labor Code‘s one-way fee shifting provision. The court upheld the trial court‘s remedy and subsequent order confirming an award to plaintiff of costs but not attorney‘s fees based on intervening California Supreme Court authority. View "Ling v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc." on Justia Law

Brian Beck, Audrey Mahoney, David and Felice Oppenheim, Patty Brown, and others brought an action in the Oakland Circuit Court against Park West Galleries, Inc., and others, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and fraud. Defendant Park West Galleries, Inc. (Park West) sold art on various cruise ships traversing international waters. Plaintiffs purchased art from Park West on multiple occasions over the course of several years while on different cruise ships in different locations. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether an arbitration clause included in invoices for plaintiffs’ artwork purchases applied to disputes arising from plaintiffs’ previous artwork purchases when the invoices for the previous purchases did not refer to arbitration. The Court agreed with plaintiffs that the arbitration clause contained in the later invoices could not be applied to disputes arising from prior sales with invoices that did not contain the clause. Each transaction involved a separate and distinct contract, and the facts did not reasonably support a conclusion that the parties intended for the arbitration clause to retroactively apply to the previous contracts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed that part of the Court of Appeals judgment that extended the arbitration clause to the parties’ prior transactions that did not refer to arbitration. The case was remanded back to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues raised in plaintiffs’ appeal that the Court did not address to the extent those issues relate to claims that are not subject to arbitration. In all other respects, leave to appeal was denied because the Court was not persuaded that it needed to review the remaining questions presented. View "Beck v. Park West Galleries, Inc." on Justia Law

The Iowa Individual Health Benefit Reinsurance Association (“IIHBRA”), a nonprofit corporation, sued its members (“the universities”) for unpaid assessments it was statutorily obligated to collect. The universities filed a motion to dismiss the petition, arguing that the IIHBRA lacks the capacity to sue based on the 2001 amendment to Iowa Code chapter 513C. Chapter 513C initially included a provision stating that IIHBRA had the power to “sue or be sued,” but the 2001 amendment deleted that provision. Alternatively, the universities argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the IIHBRA is required to arbitrate under Iowa Code 679A.19. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2001 amendment to chapter 513C left intact the IIHBRA’s capacity to sue under Iowa Code chapter 504A; (2) the IIHBRA is not subject to mandatory arbitration under Iowa Code 679A.19; and (3) therefore, the IIHBRA has the capacity to sue its members in district court for unpaid assessments. View "Iowa Individual Health Benefit Reinsurance Ass’n v. Stat Univ. of Iowa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of J&K, filed suit claiming unpaid overtime wages. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's order compelling collective arbitration of plaintiff's complaint. After disposing of preliminary arguments, the court concluded that the district court correctly applied Pedcor Management Co. Inc. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Personnel of Texas, Inc. In Pedcor, the court concluded that a clause submitting any dispute in connection with the agreement included determinations of class or collective arbitration. In this case, the court concluded that section (g) of the arbitration agreement is unambiguous evidence of the parties' intention to submit arbitrability disputes to arbitration and that arbitration was properly compelled. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. Arbitration of plaintiff's claims, including whether class procedures are permissible, should proceed as ordered with JAMS as the arbitral forum. View "Robinson v. J & K Admin. Mgmt. Servs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a putative class of California consumers who purchased flower arrangements through Provide's website, ProFlowers.com, filed suit alleging consumer fraud claims. On appeal, Provide challenges the trial court's order denying its petition to compel arbitration. The Terms of Use on ProFlowers.com fall into a category of Internet contracts commonly referred to as “browsewrap” agreements. Plaintiff opposed the petition to compel arbitration on the ground that he was never prompted to assent to the Terms of Use, nor did he actually read them, prior to placing his order on ProFlowers.com. The court found that the hyperlinks and the overall design of the ProFlowers.com website would not have put a reasonably prudent Internet user on notice of Provide’s Terms of Use, and Plaintiff therefore did not unambiguously assent to the subject arbitration provision simply by placing an order on ProFlowers.com. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Long v. Provide Commerce, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case were three different versions of an account agreement between Appellees, who are customers of Bank of the Ozarks, and Ozarks, which holds the accounts. The agreements included an arbitration provision. Appellees filed a class-action complaint against Ozarks, and Ozarks filed a motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration provision in the account agreement was unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a determination as to whether there was a valid agreement to arbitrate. On remand, the circuit court determined that there was not a valid agreement to arbitrate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that the agreement lacked mutuality of obligation and in thus denying Ozarks’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Walker" on Justia Law

Beverly, a former Abbott employee whose employment was terminated on October 20, 2010, filed suit against Abbott. She alleged that during her employment, Abbott had discriminated and retaliated against her on the basis of her German nationality in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as well as on the basis of her disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court denied Abbott’s motion for summary judgment and the parties engaged in a private mediation. During mediation, the parties signed a handwritten agreement stating that Beverly demanded $210,000 and mediation costs in exchange for dismissing the lawsuit. Abbott later accepted Beverly’s demand and circulated a more formal settlement proposal. After Beverly refused to execute the draft proposal, Abbott moved to enforce the original handwritten agreement. The court found that the parties entered into a binding settlement agreement and granted Abbott’s motion to enforce. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the handwritten agreement was valid and enforceable, since its material terms were clearly conveyed and consented to by both parties, and the existence and content of the draft proposal do not affect enforceability. View "Beverly v. Abbott Labs., Inc." on Justia Law