Justia Arbitration & Mediation Opinion Summaries

Defendants Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc. and Robert Shackelford, appealed the Circuit Court's order denying, in part, their motion to compel arbitration of the claims asserted against them by the plaintiffs Paul and Eleanor Jones. Specifically, defendants challenged the circuit court's refusal to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs' tort-of-outrage claim. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: the nonsignatory plaintiffs conceded that they were third-party beneficiaries of the agreement at issue here. The scope of the arbitration provision in the agreement was "indisputably" broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs' tort-of-outrage claim. Moreover, as the defendants noted, "[t]he events surrounding the change of beneficiary [on the Ameriprise accounts] form the basis for all of the [plaintiffs’] claims." Under this reasoning, the plaintiffs' tort-of-outrage claim is, like their other claims, subject to the arbitration provision in the agreement. The circuit court, therefore, improperly denied the defendants' motion seeking to compel arbitration of all of the plaintiffs' claims. View "Ameriprise Financial Services, Inc. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Each of these three consolidated cases originated with the filing of an action in the circuit court asserting claims against nursing home facilities for personal injuries suffered by a nursing home resident, violations of Ky. Rev. Stat. 216.510 et seq., and for wrongful death of the resident. At the time of each resident’s admission to the nursing home, the resident’s attorney-in-fact executed a written document providing that disputes arising out of the relationship between the resident and the nursing home would be submitted to arbitration. When each case was commenced, the defendant nursing home moved the circuit court to compel the parties to submit the claims to a formal arbitration proceeding. The circuit court denied the motion in each case, concluding that the respective power-of-attorney instruments did not authorize the resident’s attorney-in-fact to waive the resident’s right to access to the courts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) without a clear and convincing manifestation of the principal’s intention to do so, delegation to an agent of the authority to waive a trial by jury is not authorized, and the principal’s assent to the waiver is not validly obtained; and (2) the arbitration agreements in these cases were never validly formed. View "Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that CashCall and Western Sky’s business practices exploit tribal sovereign immunity and illicitly avoid federal and state regulations. The district court denied CashCall's motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court has explained that where an arbitration agreement contains a delegation provision - committing to the arbitrator the threshold determination of whether the agreement to arbitrate is enforceable - the courts only retain jurisdiction to review a challenge to that specific provision. Absent such a challenge, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., requires that the court treat a delegation provision as valid and permit the parties to proceed to arbitration. The court held that when a plaintiff seeks to challenge an arbitration agreement containing a delegation provision, he or she must challenge the delegation provision directly. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in neglecting to recognize the delegation provision in the agreement in this case. The court reversed and remanded. View "Parnell v. Cashcall, Inc." on Justia Law

The decedent resided in Appellants’ long-term skilled nursing care facility between March and August, 2010. Due to the alleged abuse and neglect inflicted upon her throughout her stay, Decedent suffered a multitude of injuries and illnesses that eventually resulted in her death. Appellee filed suit claiming Appellants knowingly sacrificed the quality of care given to their residents. Relevant to this appeal, Appellants filed preliminary objections seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement which Appellee signed, along with general admission paperwork upon Decedent’s admission to the facility. Appellants appealed the Superior Court’s decision affirming, in relevant part, the trial court’s order overruling Appellants’ preliminary objections seeking to compel arbitration and reserving for trial the underlying negligence action filed by Appellee, daughter of the decedent, and executrix of Decedent’s estate. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court and remanded this case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Wert v. Manorcare of Carlisle" on Justia Law

UEBT is a healthcare employee benefits trust governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, and pays healthcare providers directly from its own funds for the services provided to enrollees in its health plans. UEBT contracted with a “network vendor,” Blue Shield, to obtain access to Blue Shield’s provider network at the rates Blue Shield had separately negotiated, and certain administrative services. One of Blue Shield’s preexisting provider contracts was with Sutter, a group of health care providers in Northern California. UEBT sued Sutter, on behalf of a putative class of all California self-funded payors, alleging that Sutter’s contracts with network vendors, such as Blue Shield, contain anticompetitive terms that insulate Sutter from competition and drive up the cost of healthcare. UEBT sought damages, restitution, and injunctive relief under the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code 16720) and California’s unfair competition law (section 17200). Sutter moved to compel arbitration, relying on an arbitration clause in the provider contract signed by Sutter and Blue Shield. The trial court denied Sutter’s motion, concluding that UEBT was not bound to arbitrate its claims pursuant to an agreement it had not signed or even seen. The court of appeal affirmed. View "UFCW & Employers Benefit Trust v. Sutter Health" on Justia Law

Kleen Energy Systems, LLC, an electric generating facility, entered into a contract with Connecticut Light and Power Company, an electric distribution company. A dispute subsequently arose concerning the proper interpretation of the contract’s pricing provision. At the request of Waterside Power, LLC, which had entered into a similar contract with Connecticut Light and Power, the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection, acting through the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (the Authority), conducted proceedings to resolve the dispute. Kleen Energy was a participant in, but not a party to, those proceedings. Waterside subsequently filed a petition for a declaratory ruling challenging the decision. The Authority issued a declaratory ruling denying Waterside relief. Kleen Energy filed an administrative appeal from the Authority’s ruling, claiming that it had a contractual right to submit the dispute to arbitration and that the Authority lacked jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling to resolve the dispute. The trial court ultimately concluded (1) the Authority had jurisdiction to issue a declaratory ruling to resolve the dispute, (2) Kleen Energy had waived its contractual right to arbitration, and (3) the Authority had properly resolved the dispute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in determining that the Authority had jurisdiction to resolve the pricing dispute. View "Kleen Energy Sys., LLC v. Comm’r of Energy & Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action suit against his employer, alleging various Labor Code violations and unfair business practice. Plaintiff had entered into an agreement with his employer, providing that all disputes arising out of his employment would be resolved by arbitration, and the agreement prohibited class arbitration. The trial court denied the employer's motion to compel arbitration under the test laid out in Gentry v. Superior Court. After the trial court's ruling, the Supreme Court held, in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC, that Gentry’s rule against employment class waivers was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. The court concluded, however, that this matter is not subject to the FAA and that Gentry’s holding has not been overturned under California law in situations where the FAA does not apply. Accordingly, the court found that the agreement’s class waiver provision is unenforceable. Neither party asserts that class arbitration is appropriate. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Garrido v. Air Liquide Industrial U.S. LP" on Justia Law

After an arbitrator determined that a non-compete agreement Andrew Gantman signed as a partner in SingerLewak was enforceable, the trial court denied SingerLewak's petition to confirm the award. The trial court found that the non-compete agreement was unenforceable under California law. However, the court concluded that the general rule prohibiting review of an arbitration award was applicable in this case. The court concluded that judicial review of the award was not appropriate in light of the statutory right and public policy exception to the general rule. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court. View "SingerLewak LLP v. Gantman" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife signed an agreement to arbitrate the issues in their divorce under the Family Law Arbitration Act (FLAA). The family law arbitrator entered conclusions of law providing for legal and physical custody of the parties’ child to be granted to Wife, Husband to pay certain child support obligation, the division of the marital property, Husband to pay certain spousal maintenance costs, and Husband to pay $95,000 of Wife’s attorney’s fees. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the arbitrator’s decision. Husband appealed the arbitrator’s attorney fee award. Wife cross-appealed other issues. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in the appellate consideration of an FLAA award, the proper standard of review is the same standard of appellate review that applies to the review of trial court decisions in marriage dissolution cases; and (2) in this case, the family law arbitrator’s award satisfies that standard, and Husband failed to establish that the award of attorney’s fees is not supported by the arbitrator’s findings. View "Masters v. Masters" on Justia Law

Miranda is a former employee of Anderson Enterprises; Hansen is the company’s general manager. During his employment, Miranda signed an “Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy” by which agreed to arbitrate all employment claims and waived the right to arbitrate claims as a class or collective action. In 2013, Miranda filed a purported class action lawsuit, asserting wage and hour claims, including a Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA; Lab. Code, 2698) claim. The trial court found the arbitration agreement valid and enforceable, dismissed the class and representative claims without prejudice based on the arbitration agreement’s waiver, directed Miranda to arbitrate his individual claims, and stayed the superior court proceedings pending completion of arbitration of the individual claims. The court of appeal reversed as to the representative PAGA claim, based on a subsequently-issued California Supreme Court opinion, Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC (2014), under which the waiver is unenforceable. The court noted that Miranda had represented that he would not pursue his individual claims through arbitration and concluded that the PAGA ruling was, therefore, appealable. View "Miranda v. Anderson Enters., Inc." on Justia Law